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INTRODUCTION
To maintain its credibility, the law must accurately reflect the
reality it purports to govern. Measured by this standard, the Court's
recent "right to die" decision, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health,I was an abysmal failure. The Justices' several opinions re-
flect an almost surreal refusal to recognize the actual condition of
the patient whose constitutional rights the case decided. The pa-
tient, though capable of certain vegetative bodily functions, had per-
manently lost all ability to experience the world. She felt no
sensation, had no thoughts, no emotions, and no desire or ability to
interact with others.2 Nor would she ever regain these capacities.3
In this, she was and is not unique. As many as 25,000 such perma-
nently unconscious patients were then and are now in hospitals
throughout this country.4
1 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
3 See infra part I.C.
4 Am. Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263
JAMA 426, 427 (1990) [hereinafter AMA Council]. Several years ago Cranford estimated
the number at between 5000 and 10,000, declaring, "[T]his number can be anticipated
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In framing and deciding the constitutional issues, the Justices
evaded the most pressing question raised by the reality of the pa-
tient's condition: Whether it makes any sense at all to attribute in-
terests, much less rights, to a permanently insentient patient.5 The
Justices spoke of the patient's right to refuse medical treatment, 6 the
need to respect her desires, 7 and the harm she would suffer as a
result of an erroneous decision to continue treatment.8 TheJustices
balanced these concerns against the supposed interests of the state
to significantly increase in the future, especially when coupled with [permanently uncon-
scious patients'] increased longevity." Ronald E. Cranford, The Peistent Vegetative State:
The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at
27, 31.
5 ALLEN E. BucHANAN & DAN W. BROCK; DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISIONMAKXING 128 (1989) ("the permanently unconscious, as such, have
no interests, certainly no experiential interests"); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 400 (1988) ("It thus makes no more sense to attribute an
interest in continued life to a persistently vegetative person than it does to attribute such
an interest to a plant."); John .A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Non-
treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139, 1157 (1991) ("Irreversibly
comatose patients, by definition, have no interests in their present condition, because
they lack the mental substrate essential to the possession of interests); Yale Kamisar,
Right to Die, Or License To Kill?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 13, 1989, at 26, 27; Rebecca Dresser,
Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28
ARIz. L. REv. 373, 385 (1986) ("[IThe court imputed to the patient interests she was
incapable of possessing in her comatose condition. Privacy, bodily integrity, pain, and
suffering could no longer matter to this patient.") (referring to In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976)). For a discussion of whether a permanently unconscious patient may be
deemed to have any interest in how she is treated and regarded, see infra part II.B.l.a.
6 The Justices uncritically used the rights and interests of competent patients as a
basis for attributing rights and interests to permanently unconscious patients. With the
exception ofJustice Scalia, all of theJustices were willing to at least assume that a com-
petent patient has a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (majority opinion); id. at 2856-57 (O'ConnorJ., concurring); id. at
2865-67 (principal dissenting opinion); id. at 2885 (Stevens,J., dissenting). TheJustices
reasoned that this right must extend to an incompetent patient, viewing the truly diffi-
cult issue as how an incompetent patient may exercise the right. Id. at 2852 (majority
opinion); id at 2857-59 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing various procedures states
can use to protect an incompetent's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment); id. at
2867-77 (principal dissenting opinion). The majority held that the Constitution permits
a state to condition the exercise of the permanently unconscious patient's right on proof
by clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent's wishes. The dissent disagreed.
These Justices' common assumption that permanently unconscious patients have an in-
terest in their treatment or nontreatment seems embarrassed by a permanently uncon-
scious patient's insentience. For a discussion of whether interests may rationally be
attributed to a permanently unconscious patient, see infra part II.B.1.a.
7 110 S. Ct. at 2853 (majority opinion); id at 2876 (principal dissenting opinion).
8 Id. at 2873 (principal dissenting opinion); id. at 2885-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to patient's interest in "how she will be thought of after her death by those
whose opinions mattered to her"). See also Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon,
Coming to Terms with Death: The Cruzan Case, 42 HASTING L.J. 817, 845 (1991) ("If Nancy
Cruzan's family had made an erroneous decision, one person would suffer-Nancy.");
Susan M. Wolf, Nancy Beth Cruzan: In No Voice At All, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 38 (the Missouri Supreme Court "has condemned her to years of constant,
invasive treatment").
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in not judging the quality of her life,9 preventing suicide,' 0 and hav-
ing the ultimate decision reflect what the patient would decide if she
could." Yet these ways of looking at the case presuppose the very
sentience that is lacking; they ignore that neither the decision to
withdraw nor to continue medical treatment can affect a patient who
has completely and permanently lost consciousness. Ironically, the
Justices gave short shrift to the interests of those whom these deci-
sions do intensely affect-the family. 12 The Justices were not alone
in attributing rights and interests to a permanently insentient pa-
tient and in ignoring the family's own interests. Virtually all state
court opinions addressing such cases do so as well.' 3
9 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
10 Id at 2852 (majority opinion); id. at 2859, 2861-63 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11 Id, at 2856 (majority opinion) ("[t]here is no automatic assurance that the view of
dose family members .will necessarily be the same as the patient's"); id at 2871 (princi-
pal dissenting opinion). Because a permanently unconscious patient is obviously in no
position to make treatment decisions and because most patients do not have a living will,
the patient's right to make such decisions only can be exercised by having someone else
construct a decision for the patient. This is known as "surrogate decision making" or
"substituted judgment." See infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
12 Although the Justices briefly discussed the role of the family in making a decision
on behalf of the patient, they treated the family's own interests as improper considera-
tions. The majority briefly discussed and rejected the argument that the state was ordi-
narily required to accept the judgment of the family about what the patient would choose.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56. The principal dissenting opinion concluded that the state
must ordinarily accept the family's judgment regarding the patient's wishes. Id. at 2877.
See Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 1 (contrast-
ing majority's and dissent's depiction of the family's role). Justice O'Connor noted in
passing one advantage of a patient's formal appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker:
"[A]s patients are likely to select a family member as a surrogate... giving effect to a
proxy's decisions may also protect the 'freedom of personal choice in matters of...
family life."' Id at 2858 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639
(1974)). None of theJustices suggested that the family's own interests may be taken into
account. Indeed, the Justices treated the family's own interests as illegitimate-as some-
thing that must be forbidden from having any influence on decisions regarding the pa-
tient's treatment. Id. at 2853 (majority opinion) (noting potential "abuse" of having
family members make decision on grounds other than patient's supposed wishes); id. at
2876-77 (dissenting opinion) (state may ensure that family's decision reliably reflects
what patient would have chosen).
For a description of the effect that a permanently unconscious patient has on the
lives of family members, see infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
13 See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558
N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway,
549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
448 U.S. 958 (1988); Rasmussen By Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987); In reJobes,
529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987); Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass.
1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); John F. Ken-
nedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re L. H. R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga.
1984); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Guardian-
ship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482
CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 77:490
This Article explores a more realistic perspective on the legal
issues raised by the plight of permanently unconscious patients.
Part I considers whether such patients, who form a sub-class of
those in a "persistent vegetative state," 14 can even be considered
alive. It concludes they cannot. Consciousness is an essential fea-
ture of any plausible account of personhood and life; its permanent
loss necessarily signifies death.' 5 Unfortunately, this conclusion
conflicts with the "whole-brain" standard of death currently found
in the law. While that standard requires the loss of all brain activity,
the permanently unconscious generally retain "lower" brain activity
sufficient to support some mechanical bodily functions.16 Given ex-
isting state law definitions of death, one can avoid the legal conclu-
sion that a permanently unconscious patient is alive only if the
patient or her family possesses a constitutional right to define the
terms upon which her death is decided.
Accordingly, Part II explores whether the patient or the family
possesses such a constitutional right, which requires one to make
sense of the constitutional privacy morass. Finding little meaningful
guidance in the Justices' opinions, Part II reformulates the First
A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983);
In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Severns, 425
A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); see also Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D. R.I. 1988).
14 Confusion surrounds the terms "coma," "persistent vegetative state," "irreversi-
bly comatose state," "permanently unconscious state," "brain death," and "neocortical
brain death." A coma is a state of sleep-like unarousability due to dysfunction on part of
both the brain stem (the so-called "lower" brain) and the cerebral hemispheres (the
"upper" brain). "The life-span of a truly comatose patient is limited to weeks or
months, rarely years. ." Cranford, supra note 4, at 28. Some comatose patients move
into a "persistent vegetative state" in which the brain stem retains significant function
but those parts of the cerebral hemispheres supporting consciousness remain dysfunc-
tional. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROGRAMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SuSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 174-75 & n.9 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT]. Although patients in such a state are unconscious and feel no pain, the state is
not always permanent. See infra part I.C. The term permanently unconscious state is
thus useful for identifying a persistent vegetative state that can reliably be diagnosed as
permanent. Such patients are sometimes said to be neocortically dead because those
aspects of the cerebral hemispheres supportive of consciousness have permanently lost
function. Neurologists, however, sometimes use the term neocortical death more pre-
cisely, to designate the small percentage of cases of permanent unconsciousness in
which the brain shows no electrical activity. Cranford, supra note 4, at 30. "Whole-brain
death" refers to the permanent loss of function on the part of both the lower and upper
brain. See infra part I.C.
15 This Article uses the terms "person" and "life" interchangeably to mean a being
eligible for the moral rights accorded to indisputably alive human beings, particularly a
right to life. As defined, these terms leave open the questions of whether all human
biological life is eligible for a right to life and whether forms of non-human animal life
are eligible. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
16 For a discussion of the whole-brain criterion and of the distinction between the
upper and lower brain, see infra part I.C. 1-2.
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Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion to encompass
aspects of the right of privacy. On this view, the free exercise guar-
antee, in some circumstances, recognizes a constitutional right of a
permanently unconscious patient or her family to define the terms
upon which her death is decided.
The import of this Article extends beyond the soundness of the
various judicial opinions in Cruzan. Its discussion has relevance for
the thousands of patients currently in a permanently unconscious
state. 17 The entrenched way of thinking found in the justices' opin-
ions, state court opinions, and much-applauded surrogate decision-
making proposals, focuses on the patient's supposed wishes. This
approach pointlessly attributes interests to patients who possess
none and worse, treats the interests truly at stake, those of the fam-
ily, as illicit considerations. Rather than imputing fictitious interests
to the patient, the analysis should focus on whether the patient's
unconsciousness is truly permanent and, at least when the patient
does not have a living will, on the interests of close family members.
The Justices' opinions in Cruzan, state court decisions, and sub-
stituted judgment proposals, also wrongly apply the same analytical
framework to all right-to-die cases. They view all such cases as in-
volving the patient's right of autonomy, trying in every case to ascer-
tain her choice. By focusing on the special considerations raised by
permanent unconsciousness, this Article unmasks the error of this
monolithic way of thinking. It reveals three separate categories of
cases: those involving permanently unconscious patients; fully con-
scious and competent patients; and conscious, but incompetent pa-
tients. A different justification for the right-to-die attends each of
these categories, and the strength of each justification differs. The
strongest justification exists respecting the permanently uncon-
17 The Supreme Court's decision in Cruan has not halted efforts to withdraw life-
support from persistently vegetative patients. Numerous cases continue to work them-
selves through the state courts. See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991); In re
Christine Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315 (March 5, 1991); In re Estate
of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990);Judge Orders Feedings Resumed, WASH. POSr,
May 19, 1991, at A16 (reporting on Indiana case);Judge Reects Request by Doctors to Remove
a Patient's Respirator, N.Y. TiMES,July 2, 1991, at A12 (reporting on Helga Wanglie case
in Minnesota). Cf Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Court Bars Efforts to End Life Support for
Stricken Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10 (reporting on Georgia court decision
refusing to give effect to hospital's recommendation, made over father's objection, that
life-support be withdrawn from near-comatose 13-year-old). These cases seek judicial
resolution of the matter because someone opposes the withdrawal of treatment. Other
cases, however, never attract the attention of the judicial system or the media because
family members and the responsible medical professionals quietly agree to the with-
drawal of support. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Il. 1989) ("There
is reliable information that for many years, members of a patient's family, together with
doctors and clergy, have made decisions to withdraw life-sustaining equipment from
incompetent, hopelessly ill patients without seeking judicial approval.").
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scious, whom this Article contends ought to be regarded as dead.
The weakest involves conscious, incompetent patients. Such cases,
unlike those involving the permanently unconscious,' 8 necessarily
turn on quality of life judgments and, unlike cases involving compe-
tent patients, the patient cannot make this judgment herself. The
tripartite scheme of right-to-die cases proposed here, and the defini-
tion of death underlying it, bear on statutory reform efforts as well
as on state and federal constitutional law.
This Article also has significance outside the context of perma-
nent unconsciousness. The definition of death and the constitu-
tional analysis developed here furnish a framework for thinking
about other, related bioethical problems-most notably that of
abortion. 19 Perhaps the Article's most significant contribution lies
in Part II's reformulation of the free exercise guarantee to encom-
pass aspects of constitutional privacy. This view gives privacy a tex-
tual basis in the Constitution and exposes a deep symmetry
underlying Cruzan and Roe v. Wade,20 which essentially involve the
same questions at opposite ends of the life-cycle. This reformula-
tion also diminishes the anomalous treatment of religious believers
and nonbelievers that results from the prevailing understanding of
free exercise. The view of free exercise proposed here demands se-
rious consideration as a solution to the interrelated puzzles of con-
stitutional privacy and the free exercise of religion.
I
DEFINING DEATH
Despite other sharp disagreements, 21 the Justices in Cruzan
agreed on one fundamental point: The case involved the rights and
interests of a patient who was still alive. Yet this assumption seems
suspect. Like thousands of others in what the medical profession
18 For a defense of the claim that cases involving permanent unconsciousness do
not implicate quality of life considerations, see infra part I.B.3.a.
19 See infra notes 67-73, 235, 263-65 and accompanying text. The analysis also has
relevance for anencephalic babies and for persons suffering the end-stage of some pro-
gressive dementias, such as Alzheimer's or those caused by brain tumors. See supra notes
72, 137.
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 The majority and the dissent ultimately disagreed about the legitimacy of Mis-
souri's insistence upon clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire to have
treatment withdrawn. In reaching their disparate conclusions, the majority and dissent
disagreed over the status of the patient's liberty interest in refusing treatment, see infra
note 206 and accompanying text; the strength of the justification required for the gov-
ernment to override it, id.; the validity of the state's asserted interest in preserving life,
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852, 2870; the usefulness of the clear and convincing evidence
standard in promoting an accurate determination of the patient's wishes, id. at 2854,
2871-76; and the relative costs of erroneous decisions to continue or withdraw treat-
ment, id. at 2854, 2873-74.
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terms a persistent vegetative state, the patient's brain stem re-
mained largely intact, permitting some reflexive functions such as
circulation, breathing, and digestion. But that portion of her brain
that made consciousness possible had effectively died.22 This pa-
tient, and many others in a persistent vegetative state, have lost all
ability to experience the world-to feel sensation of any kind, re-
member, have thoughts, communicate, or feel emotion. 23 Does it
22 In fact, those portions of her brain associated with cognition had such extreme
degeneration that the brain matter had been largely replaced with fluid. Cruzan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2845 n.1 (reporting trial court's finding that the patient "suffered anoxia of the
brain resulting in massive enlargement of the ventricles filling with cerebro-spinal fluid
in the area where the brain has degenerated").
23 Patients in a fully developed persistent vegetative state do manifest a vari-
ety of normal brain stem functions. The patient's eyes are open at times,
and periods of wakefulness and sleep are present. The eyes wander, but
without sustained visual pursuit (that is, following people or objects in
the room in a consistent, meaningful, purposeful fashion). The pupils
respond normally to light....
The patient is also completely unconscious, i.e., unaware of him or
herself or the surrounding environment. Voluntary reactions or behav-
ioral responses reflecting consciousness, volition, or emotion at the cere-
bral cortical level are absent. PVS patients, then, are awake but unaware.
Cranford, supra note 4, at 28 (citation omitted): See also AMA Council supra note 4, at
427. Of particular importance, such patients do not experience pain:
Persistent vegetative state patients do not have the capacity to experience
pain or suffering. Pain and suffering are attributes of consciousness re-
quiring cerebral cortical functioning, and patients who are permanently
and completely unconscious cannot experience these symptoms.
There are several independent bases for the neurological conclusion
that persistent vegetative state patients do not experience pain or suffer-
ing.
First, direct clinical experience with these patients demonstrates that
there is no behavioral indication of any awareness of pain or suffering.
Second, in all persistent vegetative state patients studied to date,
postmortem examination reveals overwhelming bilateral damage to the
cerebral hemispheres to a degree incompatible with consciousness or the
capacity to experience pain or suffering.
Third, recent data utilizing positron emission tomography indicates
that the metabolic rate for glucose in the cerebral cortex is greatly re-
duced in persistent vegetative state patients, to a degree incompatible
with consciousness.
Am. Academy of Neurology, Position ofthe American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of
the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125 (1989).
See also DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 181-82
("Pain and suffering are absent, as are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure."). But compare
Jeremy Brown, The Persistent Vegetative State: Time for Caution?, 66 POSTGRADUATE MED.J.
697 (1990) (suggesting that the rare reports of recovery from a persistent vegetative
state undermine the conclusion that all patients in such a state have suffered brain dam-
age permanently precluding consciousness) with Sheldon Berrol, Considerations for Man-
agement of the Persistent Vegetative State, 67 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILrrATION 283
(1986) (some doctors "suggest that the fact that patients sometimes recover signifies
that the diagnostic categories are not sufficiently well developed. It might well be, how-
ever, that the diagnoses were made in error ....").
Interestingly, the trial court in Cruzan found that the patient's "highest cognitive
brain function is exhibited by her grimacing perhaps in recognition of ordinarily painful
stimuli, indicating the experience of pain and apparent response to sound .. ." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct.
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make any sense to regard as alive those who retain certain mechani-
cal bodily functions but who have permanently lost the capacity for
consciousness?
A. Approaching the Definitional Problem
To answer this question one must consider how to define death.
At least three approaches suggest themselves. One approach would
search for the conception of "death" implicit in our ordinary uses of
the term. Ordinary language, however, cannot furnish the requisite
guidance. Because it contemplates dear cases, it permits many dis-
parate conceptions. 24 More important, even if ordinary language
resolved whether the permanently unconscious are "dead," no
moral conclusion would follow regarding the justifiability of ceasing
treatment. To show that ordinary language yields moral conclu-
sions requires moral argument.
at 2845 n.1 (emphasis added). The trial court mistook "facial movements and other
signs indicating an apparent manifestation of conscious human suffering" for the experi-
ence of pain. Cranford, supra note 4, at 31. In fact,
these actions result from subcortical.. . and brain stem actions of a prim-
itive stereotyped, reflexive nature. PVS patients may "react" to painful
and other noxious stimuli, but they do not "feel" (experience) pain in the
sense of conscious discomfort of the kind that physicians would be obli-
gated to treat and of the type that would seriously disturb the family.
Id
24 Ordinary language contemplates cases in which persons have permanently lost
respiration, circulation, brain activity, and consciousness. These dear cases are compat-
ible 'with conceptions that have different implications respecting permanently uncon-
scious patients. Ordinary usage might embody a conception defining "death" as the
irreversible absence of circulation and respiration, because the paradigmatic instances of
"death" all involve these features. Under such a conception, the permanently uncon-
scious patient remains alive, for her functioning brain stem permits circulation and res-
piration. Alternatively, ordinary usage might reflect a conception defining death as the
irreversible absence of cognition and memory, because the paradigmatic instances in
these cases all involve an absence of these features. Thus, according to this definition, a
permanently unconscious patient is "dead." Ordinary language does not embody a
choice between these competing conceptions of death. Cf. Stuart J. Younger et al.,
'Brain Death' and Organ Retrieval, 261 JAMA 2205 (1989) (survey of physicians and nurses
likely to be involved in organ transplantation showed that "[m]ost respondents (58%o)
did not use a coherent concept of death consistently; others (19%) had a concept of
death that was logically consistent with changing the whole-brain standard to classify
anencephalics and patients in a persistent vegetative state as dead.").
The abortion controversy confirms the inability of ordinary language to resolve the
moral dilemma of whether to withdraw treatment. The issue of whether the early fetus
is actual, as opposed to potential, life forces one to choose between a concept of life and
death organized around purely biological functions and a concept of life requiring con-
sciousness. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. The substantial disagreement
over the fetus's status is not a dispute about ordinary language. Further, even if ordi-
nary language pointed to one conception, supporters of the competing conception
would deny that any moral conclusions follow from ordinary linguistic conventions.
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A second approach would define the concept of death in ac-
cordance with the concept's purposes.2 5 In this context, the pur-
pose of the term "death" might be to decide whether to withdraw
nutrition and life-sustaining medical treatment; the definition of
"death" would specify the conditions under which termination of
medical intervention is appropriate. This approach, however, may
yield a definition that is far too broad. One might wish to accord the
right to refuse medical treatment to fully competent persons who
have an imminently terminal illness or who find continued life intol-
erable for other reasons.2 6 Yet we can hardly call a fully competent
person "dead." It seems desirable to preserve the distinction, im-
plicit in ordinary language and thought, between persons who have
a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and persons who
are "dead."
A third approach, and the one chosen here, would recharacter-
ize the term "death's" purpose. The previous approach conceives
of this purpose broadly, as deciding whether life-sustaining treat-
ment may be withdrawn. So conceived, this inquiry would decide
not only who is eligible for the right to life accorded to live human
beings, but also when that right may be waived or overridden. The
purpose of the term "death" may be viewed more narrowly, as de-
ciding when a being is eligible for such a right to life. Understood in
this light, the inquiry would seek to identify the features that justify
according a right to life to normal, adult human beings. The perma-
nent loss of these features would extinguish eligibility for such a
right and constitute death.2 7
This inquiry is fundamentally moral in nature. It requires one
to imagine beings having and lacking certain features and to con-
sider the appropriateness of attributing a right to life to such be-
25 Lawyers are quite familiar with defining terms in this fashion. When defining an
ambiguous term in a statute, for instance, a lawyer may consider the statute's purpose
and define the term accordingly.
26 Cf. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (recognizing mentally compe-
tent quadriplegic's right to decide to have life-sustaining respirator withdrawn); Bartling
v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing a nonterminally ill,
competent patient to refuse all life-sustaining procedures).
27 Robert Veatch posits the following formal definition of death: "Death means a
complete change in the status of a living entity characterized by the irreversible loss of
those characteristics that are essentially significant to it." ROBERT VEATCH, DEATH, DY-
ING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 17 (1989). The approach proposed here inter-
prets "those characteristics that are essentially significant" to a human being to mean
the characteristics that make a being eligible for the moral right of life accorded to fully
normal, adult human beings. See Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers,
Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. Rv. 659, 659 (1991) ("When the crucial
aspects of 'personhood' are irretrievably lost, we feel that an individual has died.").
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ings.28 To call a being a live person is implicitly to deem it eligible
for the moral rights, including a right to life, accorded to fully nor-
mal, live human beings.29 To call a being a nonperson or a dead
person is implicitly to consider it ineligible for such rights. Any sat-
isfactory account of "life" and "death" must be faithful to the moral
function of these terms. As with other moral inquiries, the aim is to
achieve some sort of "reflective equilibrium" between intuitions
about particular cases and the theoretical considerations offered to
explain and justify those intuitions.30
The approach followed here does not seek to define life and
death in purely biological terms, divorcing the question of life and
death from all moral questions. A purely biological definition would
be inconsistent with the aim of existing medical and legal definitions
of death. Existing definitions are not concerned with biological life
per se;3 1 they pronounce a person dead despite the persistence of
considerable biological life.3 2 Existing definitions are intended to
28 Although this process is partly conceptual and metaphysical, it is inevitably struc-
tured by the moral considerations forming the background of the concept of life and
personhood. Even though our intuitive concept of personhood may not be explicitly
moral, its underlying moral background must be exposed to make sense of it. See H.
Tristan Engelhardt, Medicine and the Concept of the Person, in ETHICAL IssuES IN DEATH AND
DYING 271 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Seymour Perlin eds., 1978); Jay A. Friedman, Taking
the Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 917, 952 (1990). This has led Michael Tooley to refer to personhood "as a
purely moral concept." Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in APPLIED ETHICS 57,
60 (Peter Singer ed., 1986). In contrast, Green and Winkler view the concept as purely
metaphysical and without moral content. Michael B. Green & Daniel Winkler, Brain
Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHIL. & PuB. Arr. 117-19 & n.28 (1980). The concept of life
and personhood might plausibly be regarded as metaphysical and conceptual in part.
Any account of personhood must be tested not only by explicit moral analysis, but also
by its correspondence with intuitions about whether particular kinds of beings ought to
be regarded as persons-intuitions that might sensibly be regarded as more conceptual
and metaphysical than moral. Yet it seems plainly wrong to regard the concept of per-
sonhood as purely metaphysical or conceptual. We would have no use for a concept of
personhood wholly without moral content. Absent the moral function of determining
eligibility for a right to life, it is not clear that the terms "life" and "death" would fulfill
any useful function. But cf. PETER CARRuTrnERS, INTRODUCING PERSONS 227-29 (1986)
(using concept of personhood to identify what is distinctively valuable and desirable
about human life rather than to determine who is eligible for the right to life accorded to
normal, adult humans).
29 Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception,"
43 STAN. L. REv. 599 n.1 (1991) ("I mean by 'person' essentially a creature with a right
to life .. "); see also HOWARD BRODY, ETHICAL DECISIONS IN MEDICINE 83 (1981) (argu-
ing that only persons with "a minimal level of cognitive awareness" can be said to have
rights).
30 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJusTICE 20-21, 34-53 (1971); cf. W.V. QUINE &J.S.
ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 3-8 (2d ed. 1978) (outlining a coherence theory of rational
belief).
31 KAREN G. GERVAIS, REDEFINING DEATH 3, 5 (1986).
32 Id. at 3, 83; Robert S. Morison, Death: Process or Event?, 173 SCIENCE 694, 695
(1971) ("[W]e now know that various parts of the body can go on living for months after
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fulfill the moral function of distinguishing between beings that do
and do not deserve a right to life.3 3 The only moral conclusion that
a purely biological definition can support is that live persons are
eligible for the same right to life accorded to other biological orga-
nisms such as plants and cells. Although human beings differ from
other forms of biological life by virtue of membership in the human
species, a purely biological definition does not explain the moral rel-
evance of this difference. It cannot establish that humans, as a
moral matter, deserve a right to life not accorded to every other
biological organism. Possessed of no real moral relevance,34 a
purely biological definition thus appears rather useless.
This Article's thesis that a capacity for consciousness consti-
tutes a necessary condition of any plausible conception of life sup-
ports a strong moral conclusion. It implies that a being irretrievably
bereft of consciousness has no claim whatsoever to the right to life
associated with. personhood.
Any definition of death ought to be viewed from two aspects.
One aspect, the concept of death, identifies the qualities constitut-
ing personhood so that permanent loss of such qualities results in
death. The other aspect, the medical indicators of death, refers to
the clinical manifestations and measurements upon which doctors
should rely in determining whether particular patients satisfy the
specified concept of death.35 A concept of death might specify, for
instance, that a person who has permanently lost all brain activity
must be regarded as dead. Thus, a flat electroencephalogram
("EEG") is one medical indicator which would satisfy this concept.
its central organization has disintegrated. Some cell lines, in fact, can be continued
indefinitely.").
33 This explains why it is regarded as unquestionably appropriate to cease treat-
ment of a patient who is dead, but problematic to cease treatment of a patient who is still
alive. This also explains the expansion of the criteria of death from the traditional heart-
lung criteria of death to inclusion of a whole-brain standard. For a discussion of this
expansion, see infra part I.0.1. Rather than resting on a purely biological notion of an
organism, the expansion derives from the widely accepted judgment that brain-dead
patients do not deserve a right to life.
Some commentators argue that existing definitions attempt to identify when a
human being ceases to be an integrated, functioning biological organism. For addi-
tional argument that existing definitions cannot reasonably be interpreted in this fash-
ion, see infra note 47. For other criticism of this approach to the definitional problem,
see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
34 A definition of life based on nonmoral considerations, such as ordinary language
or biology, yields no moral conclusions. Moral argument, not merely a definition, is
needed to show that ordinary language or biology supports moral conclusions.
35 For similar distinctions between or among aspects of a definition of death, see
GERVAIS, supra note 31, ch. 2; VEATCH, supra note 27, at 16; DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ON
DEFINING DEATH 20-22 (1979).
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B. The Concept of Death
One might suggest many features constituting life and per-
sonhood. Start, for example, with an obvious straw man: the sug-
gestion that personhood is distinguished by the possession of
opposable thumbs. This proposal completely misses the point.
Clearly, an otherwise intact person lacking opposable thumbs is a
live person deserving a right to life. What, then, are the characteris-
tics that define personhood which, if permanently lost, would lead
to the conclusion that life no longer exists?
1. Concepts Not Requiring Consciousness: Bodily Integrity
Until the last twenty-five years, only the permanent cessation of
heart and lung function was regarded as signifying death.3 6 Cardiac
and respiratory function, however, cannot be seen as important in
itself. No one, for instance, would describe as dead an otherwise
intact person whose natural heart has stopped and whose lungs no
longer function, but whose blood is nonetheless oxygenated and cir-
culated by a machine.3 7
Given that heart and lung function lacks intrinsic importance,
wherein lies its significance? One explanation links heart and lung
function to the ability to sustain consciousness, viewing this function
as a medical indicator of a consciousness-based concept of life. An
alternate explanation might describe the significance of the heart
and lungs in purely biological terms, with reference to concepts of
life and death centered on the capacity to have either all or some
biological functions. Yet the implications of such concepts are
strongly counterintuitive. A person's body obviously need not re-
tain all of its natural biological functions for that person to be re-
garded as alive.38 Nor is the mere continuance of some biological
function, such as isolated cellular life or hair growth, sufficient to
avoid an ascription of death.3 9
36 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
37 Although one might say that such a person retains respiratory and cardiac func-
tion, albeit mechanically generated, cardiac and respiratory function itself is not neces-
sarily significant. Suppose that the person has been "dead" for over two hours-there
has been no cardiac or respiratory function for that time and the person's brain has died.
The person is then placed on a machine that oxygenates and circulates her blood. If
circulation and respiratory function are intrinsically important and the mechanical sup-
ply of these functions is irrelevant, then the person must be regarded as alive. That no
one would so regard the person demonstrates that cardiac and respiratory function is
not intrinsically important.
38 An otherwise intact person who has lost her legs is not dead.
39 No one believes that all of the body's features must cease to function for death to
occur. We have no hesitation in declaring persons dead even though hair and fingernail
growth as well as other cellular activity will continue for some time. See supra note 32.
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In its 1981 report, the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine proposed a concept of life requiring
the presence of integrated biological activity. This concept focuses on
the ability of "the body's physiological system.., to constitute an
integrated whole" rather than consciousness. 40 Bodily features nec-
essary to support integrated biological functioning are essential;
other features are not. Permanent cessation of the heart and lungs
or the "lower" brain4' constitutes medical indication of the satisfac-
tion of this concept of death. "[T]he heart, lungs, and brain ...
assume special significance" in sustaining "the integrated function-
ing of the organism as a whole"; they constitute "a triangle of inter-
related systems with the brain at its apex." 42
A concept of death which identifies "bodily integrity" as the de-
fining characteristic of life is problematic on several grounds. Ini-
tially, this concept provides a problematic answer to whether a
patient whose bodily systems are mechanically integrated is alive.
The President's Commission, for example, maintains that a person
retains bodily integrity as long as she retains some capacity to inte-
grate her body herself. This view attributes pre-eminence to the
lower brain's "overarching role as 'regulator' or 'integrator' of other
bodily systems."'43 A person with a mechanical heart would remain
alive because her still functioning lower brain preserves some ability
to integrate bodily systems autonomously. Yet a person who has
permanently lost lower brain function would be regarded as dead
despite the ability of medical technology to integrate her biological
functions artifically. Such a person has lost all ability to integrate
biological systems independently.
The President's Commission's views on artificial integration
support an unacceptable result. Suppose that a person's lower
brain, which regulates cardiac and respiratory function, dies, but the
upper brain, which makes consciousness and memory possible, sur-
40 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 32-39 (1981) [hereinafter DE-
FINING DEATH]. For advocacy of a concept of human life and death based on bodily
integrity, see GERMAIN GRISEZ & JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY
ANDJUSTICE 71-78 (1979); DAVID LAMB, DEATH, BRAIN DEATH, AND ETHICS (1985); Law-
rence C. Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 335, 353
(1975);James L. Bernat et al., On the Definition and Criterion of Death, 94 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 389 (1981). For critical discussions, see GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 45; VEATCH,
supra note 27, at 21-25.
41 For a discussion of the distinction between the "lower" and "upper" brain, see
infra part I.C.2.
42 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 33.
43 Id. at 35. See also David Lamb, Diagnosing Death, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 144, 146-47
(1978).
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vives.44 Bodily functions necessary to sustain the upper brain would
be mechanically integrated. 45 Under the concept discussed by the
Commission, such a person would be dead because she has lost all
capacity to regulate bodily systems autonomously. This conclusion
is troubling because the person would retain the capacity for
thought and memory.
Defenders of the bodily integrity concept might try to avoid the
ascription of death by allowing mechanical integration to substitute
completely for natural integration.46 This would imply, however,
that the accepted medical and legal definition of death is too broad
and that both passive and active euthanasia is now routine.47 It also
44 This is a conceivable variation of the "locked-in" syndrome. See infra note 65-66
and accompanying text. Doctors Youngner and Bartlett advance a more detailed hypo-
thetical making the same point:
After anesthetizing a 20-year-old-man, an unethical physician selectively
destroys all the brain stem and cerebral areas responsible for integration
and regulation of the body's subsystems. In a surgical tour de force not
possible in today's technology, the blood supply and neural connections
to the rest of the cerebral areas are left intact. The reticular activating
system and brain stem areas responsible for eye movement remain unaf-
fected. Although the ability to spontaneously regulate respiration, blood
pressure, temperature, hormonal balance, and other functions is lost,
these functions are carefully monitored and regulated by machines and
highly trained medical personnel. The patient is awake and alert, and
gives meaningful responses to questions by moving and blinking his eyes.
StuartJ. Youngner & Edward T. Bartlett, Human Death and High Technology: The Failure of
the Whole-Brain Formulations, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 252, 256 (1983). See also CHr
FLEMING, IF WE KEEP A SEVERED HEAD ALIE... DisCORPORATION AND U.S. PATENT
4,66,425 (1990) (contending it is now technologically possible to maintain a severed
head in a fully conscious state).
45 "Brain stem death leads to the cessation of functions that can, for a brief time, be
mechanically maintained." GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 73. In fact, cardiopulmonary
functions have been reported to survive for as long as 68 days after complete loss of
brain stem functions. Joseph E. Parisi et al., Brain Death with Prolonged Somatic Survival,
306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 14, 16 (1982).
46 Advocates of the bodily integrity concept disagree over whether life exists when
a patient has lost all capacity to integrate bodily functions naturally and bodily integrity
is supplied entirely artificially. For the view that such a patient remains alive, see Becker,
supra note 40, at 355; Bernat et al., supra note 40, at 391-92; Hans Jonas, Against the
Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death, reprinted in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
DEATH AND DYING, supra note 28, at 51, 53-54. For proponents of bodily integrity who
insist that a patient retain some ability to integrate her bodily functions naturally, see
GRISEZ & BOYLE, supra note 40, at 77; Lamb, supra note 43, at 146-47.
47 Virtually every state has adopted a whole-brain criterion for declaring death. See
infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. Under such a criterion, a patient who loses
lower brain function is considered dead even though the tasks performed by the lower
brain can be artificially supplied for as long as two months. See Parisi et al., supra note
45. If mechanical integration may substitute completely for natural integration, a pro-
ponent of the bodily integrity concept must accept three conclusions. First, she must
maintain that the whole-brain criterion wrongly regards many patients as dead. Con-
trary to the whole-brain criterion, patients who, due to the death of the lower brain, lack
the capacity to maintain circulation, respiration, blood pressure, and body temperature
but who can be artificially given these capacities must, be regarded as alive. Second, she
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exposes the artificial character of the bodily integrity concept. The
ascription of death to a person whose upper brain outlasts the lower
brain is troubling because the patient remains capable of conscious-
ness, memory, and thought, and not because she retains bodily in-
tegrity, albeit mechanically imposed.
This point anticipates the most fundamental criticism of the
bodily integrity concept: It completely fails to capture life's human-
ity and to establish a moral difference between humans and other
qualitatively different forms of biological life. According to the con-
cept's dictates, a patient who possesses bodily integrity, either natu-
ral or mechanically imposed, but who has lost the capacity for
consciousness and self-awareness, remains a live person. Yet such a
person has lost all ability to experience the world, including all
those experiences that give life its humanity, such as sensation, per-
ception of a self through time, choice between alternative courses of
action, reflection, communication, and emotion. In viewing inte-
grated biological functions as intrinsically important, wholly apart
from their role in sustaining consciousness, the bodily integrity con-
cept fails to distinguish persons from other, vastly different forms of
biological life. Amoebas, trees, and insects all have bodily integrity;
they all possess self-regulating biological systems.
It does not suffice to say that a human having bodily integrity is
different because she is a human, not a tree. This response fails to
furnish a morally relevant basis for explaining why humans having
bodily integrity qualify for different moral treatment than other or-
ganisms having bodily-biological integrity.48
must accept that euthanasia is widespread because artificial support that could maintain
bodily integrity is routinely withdrawn from or never administered to patients upon
death of the lower brain. Third, unless willing to support the creation of vast coma
wards in which brain dead patients, whenever possible, are artificially maintained, she
must maintain that both passive and active euthanasia are often justifiable.
The position that artificial integration may substitute completely for natural integra-
tion also implies that an artificially maintained decapitated body remains a live person.
This conclusion is, of course, strongly counterintuitive. GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 73.
Finally, if bodily integrity is not intrinsically important when it is artificially supplied
in its entirety, one would have difficulty understanding why it should be so when it is
artificially assisted only in part. See Green & Winkler, supra note 28, at 109 ("Machine
dependence in general has no bearing on one's status as alive or dead.").
48 As a matter of genetics, a human being obviously differs from other animals and
from plant and cellular life. But this difference, in and of itself, does not carry any moral
weight. One must explain why human beings deserve moral treatment and rights not
accorded to other beings. SeeJEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
167 (1990) ("membership in the human species cannot be a rational ground for a right
to life unless there is something about humans that warrants protection of their lives");
Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MOD-
ERN MEDICINE 159, 168-69 (Robert Hunt & John Arras eds., 1977) (distinguishing be-
tween the "moral" and "genetic" senses of "human being"); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION 19 (2d ed. 1990) ("To avoid speciesism we must allow that beings who are
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In addition, this response fails to explain why a permanently
unconscious human being qualifies for different moral treatment
than a "dead" human being whose "dis-integrated" body still pos-
sesses biological activity. In other words, what is morally significant
about biological integrity? Why should we not care about the bio-
logical life in and of a human being whether integrated or not?
The bodily integrity concept is so broad that it fails to yield a
moral difference between humans and trees. It is so divorced from
the moral background of the concepts of human life and per-
sonhood that it cannot provide an adequate account of them. The
bodily integrity concept is, in fact, useless.49
The possession. of consciousness and self-awareness is a morally
relevant difference between trees and human persons and between
dead and alive human beings. Perhaps for this reason, the Presi-
dent's Commission concludes its discussion of bodily integrity by
connecting it with the ability to think, interact, and respond to the
surrounding environment-all of which presuppose conscious-
ness.50 This represents an implicit concession that bodily integrity
is not itself constitutive of personhood and therefore is not part of
the concept of life and death. Because bodily integrity is necessary
to sustain the features that justify the attribution of a right to life, its
permanent nonexistence is a sufficient medical indicator of death.
The converse does not follow. On the contrary, the features defini-
tive of personhood can cease to exist despite the presence of bodily
integrity.5 1 Bodily integrity, though a necessary medical indicator of
personhood, is not a suffiient medical indicator. The permanent ab-
sence of bodily integrity, then, is not necessary as a medical indica-
tion of death.
similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life-and mere membership in our
own biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right."); cf. Fried-
man, supra note 28, at 952 ("Only persons, rather than all humans, have rights, and it is
only persons whose autonomy must be respected."). If one may assert that, without any
need for further explanation, membership in the human species, by itself, qualifies be-
ings for a right to life, then why may one not assert, also without explanation, that this
right is restricted to human beings of a certain race or national group.
49 Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 619 n.97.
50 The living differ from the dead in many ways. The dead do not think,
interact, autoregulate or maintain organic identity through time, for exam-
ple. Not all the living can always do all of these activities, however;, nor is
there one single characteristic (e.g., breathing, yawning, etc.) the loss of
which signifies death. Rather, what is missing in the dead is a cluster of
attributes, all of which form part of an organism's responsiveness to its internal
and external environment.
DEFINING DEmA, supra note 40, at 36 (emphasis added).
51 See supra notes 22-23, infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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2. Concepts Based On Consciousness
If not bodily integrity, what features do constitute life and per-
sonhood? This Article argues that a capacity for consciousness is a
necessary feature of any plausible concept of life. Permanent loss of
consciousness thus satisfies any plausible concept of death.
One might question whether consciousness is really part of the
concept of life. Unlike bodily integrity, consciousness furnishes a
basis for distinguishing human persons from qualitatively different
forms of biological life. Yet one might argue that consciousness,
like bodily integrity, is a mere indication of the features that define
personhood. A being cannot have thought, memory, communica-
tion, and a perception of the self through time without bodily integ-
rity. Similarly, a being cannot possess these features without
consciousness. Rather than bodily integrity or consciousness, these
features-capacities for thought, memory, communication, and a
perception of the self through time-arguably define personhood.
Unlike bodily integrity, however, consciousness is intrinsically
important. The ability to experience sensation derives from con-
sciousness. Without consciousness, a human being possessing bod-
ily integrity experiences no sensation.5 2 With consciousness, a
human being can experience sensation even while lacking the higher
order capabilities for communication, memory, and a perception of
self through time.5 3 The capacity to experience sensation has a
moral relevance that bodily integrity per se does not. The killing of
a being having the capacity to experience sensation therefore raises
moral qualms that the killing of other beings does not.54
52 See Am. Academy of Neurology, supra note 23 (patients in a persistent vegetative
state feel no pain);JohnJ. Paris & Anne B. Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absolute
Requirement to Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, 11 L. MED. & HEALm CARE
210, 211 (1983) (anencephalic babies, who are unconscious but possess rudimentary
bodily integrity, do not feel pain). The assertion that an unconscious entity cannot ex-
perience sensation is, for purposes of this Article at least, true by definition. As used in
this Article, the term "consciousness" means ability to experience sensation.
53 It is widely recognized that many animals possess consciousness and, hence, can
experience sensation but lack higher order capacities such as self-awareness. See generally
Animals, Science, and Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1990 (Strachan Donnelly &
Kathleen Nolan, eds.) (special supplement).
54 A being's ability to experience sensation has obvious relevance to utilitarian
moral analysis which, in some of its versions at least, seeks to maximize pleasurable and
minimize painful sensation. See generally WIu. KYMLmCKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 12-18 (1990); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 101-03
(1980) (discussing the role of animals in utilitarian thought). The relevance of sentience
is less clear under moralities built upon Kantian principles. Kantians conceive of moral
rights as flowing from a being's capacity for rational thought and autononous choice
rather than from sentience per se. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra, at 4-8, 69-103 (grounding
rights on the ability to engage in a rational dialogue over the just allocation of scarce
resources). See also infra note 60. Yet to account for the strong intuition that newborn
infants have moral rights, most Kantians ultimately do attribute moral relevance and
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Even if one concedes that consciousness is necessary for life, is
it sufficient?55 If a capacity for consciousness is both necessary and
sufficient, then one might be forced to draw the conclusion that all
conscious animals are persons, albeit not human ones. In fact, one
can make a potent argument that a capacity for consciousness is nec-
essary but not sufficient.56 In addition to a capacity for conscious-
ness, personhood arguably requires a capacity for self-awareness as
a continuous entity through time.57 Even these capacities for con-
sciousness and self-awareness might be thought insufficient. One
might consider capacities for social interaction,5" communication, 59
emotion, or rational thought6 as necessary. Conceivably, all of
these capacities together constitute life and personhood; all are nec-
essary, none alone is sufficient, and all are jointly sufficient.61
At this point in the argument, one need not resolve whether a
capacity for consciousness is sufficient to constitute personhood or,
rights to sentient beings lacking rationality. Perhaps the most common ploy attributes
moral rights to such beings based on the effects their treatment has on rational persons.
See infra note 81.
55 E.g., VEATCH, supra note 27, at 27 (Consciousness is insufficient because "[i]t de-
scribes what is essentially significant to the human life without any reference to other
human beings.").
56 For instance, imagine a being whose consciousness is a continuously renewing
tabula rasa, no sooner registering sensations than to discard them forever, without mem-
ory and without reflection. Such a being could experience the world but would possess
no memory, no ability to store and learn from experience, and no ability to acquire any
sense of self as a continuous entity. This being would be incapable of communication,
reflection, emotion, and meaningful behavior.
57 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXVII,
§ 9 (Alexander Fraser ed., 1894) (1st ed. London 1690); REIMAN, supra note 48, at 165,
168; Engelhardt, supra note 28, at 273-77 (assuming that personhood requires self-con-
sciousness); Goldberg, supra note 27 (conscious self-awareness key aspect of human per-
sonhood); Tooley, supra note 28, at 64; Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Persontood, in THE
IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 175, 178 (A. 0. Rorty ed., 1976).
58 VEATCH, supra note 27, at 28-30; Loren E. Lomasky, Being a Person-Does It Mat-
ter?, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 161, 170 (J. Feinberg ed., 2d ed. 1984); Goldberg,
supra note 27, at 680-83 & n.167; Kevin P. Quinn, Note, The Best Interests of Incompetent
Patients: The Capacity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL.
L. REV. 897, 901, 930-33 (1988).
59 Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN BioE-rIcs 217, 224 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1978).
60 ARIsTOTE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 265 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)
Now, in the case of animals, life is defined by their capacity for sense
perception, and in the case of man by the capacity for sense perception or
for thought. But a capacity is traced back to its corresponding activity,
and it is the activity that counts. Consequently, life in the true sense is
perceiving or thinking.
H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 105 (1986) ("self-conscious,
rational, free to choose"). Cf. A.I. MELDEN, RIGrrs AND PERSONS (1977) (capacity for
moral agency necessary). But see VEATCH, supra note 27, at 26-27 (rejecting rationality as
a necessary condition of personhood because it excludes infants and the senile).
61 CARRUTHERS, supra note 28, at 229-33, 237-40;Jane English, Abortion and the Con-
cept of a Person, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra note 58, at 151, 152-53.
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if not, which additional capacities are required.62 The important
point here is that any plausible concept of life requires the capacity
for consciousness as a necessary condition. This conclusion has the
important implication that when someone irretrievably loses this ca-
pacity, no reason remains for ascribing the moral rights of per-
sonhood to her. Under any plausible conception of life and death,
one may declare the patient dead and cease medical treatment.
3. Objections to a Consciousness-Based Concept
An intelligent appraisal of any concept of death must consider
possible objections. The paragraphs below address the three most
prominent criticisms of a concept of life and death based on
consciousness. 63
a. The "Quality of Life" Objection
A consciousness-based concept of death might be considered
too broad for incorporating impermissible "quality of life" consid-
erations. This concern is surely misplaced. A consciousness-based
concept of death does not distinguish among different quality levels
of conscious life. The only distinction drawn is between a conscious
being and a body that retains some biological functions but can
never attain consciousness. The phrase "quality of life" is wholly
devoid of meaning as applied to an insentient being.64 It makes no
sense to talk, for instance, of an amoeba's or a tree's quality of life.
Absent consciousness, no experiencing entity exists capable of hav-
ing a quality of life of any degree.
Rather than being overinclusive, a consciousness-based concept
of death is notable for what it excludes. Under such a concept, even
the most extreme physical disabilities do not render a person dead.
For example, a person in the "locked in" syndrome, while retaining
a normal or near-normal level of consciousness, may completely
lose the use of her body. She may not be able to move an eyelid, a
finger, or her tongue and may therefore lack any ability to communi-
cate.6 5 Although such a person's quality of life is abysmal, the
62 For a compelling argument that the concept of life should not include higher-
order capacities beyond consciousness, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
63 Other criticisms of a consciousness-based concept have been raised, including
the argument that such a concept implies that a body lacking consciousness may be
buried while still breathing. BRODY, supra note 29, at 87. For a response to this criti-
cism, VEATCH, supra note 27, at 31; GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 89-90.
64 See GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 107-08. Cf. Cranford, supra note 4, at 28 ("Patients
in a persistent vegetative state are not simply demented, but amented (a complete loss of
mental functions).").
65 For a description of this condition, see AMA Council, supra note 4, at 428; FRED
PLUM &JEROME B. POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 6 (3d ed. 1982).
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"locked in" person nonetheless remains a live "person" because she
retains consciousness.66
Much of the criticism of the breadth of consciousness-based
definition comes from opponents of abortion. They find a con-
sciousness-based concept of human life uncongenial because it im-
plies that the fetus is not actual human life early in its
development. 67 The available evidence indicates that the fetus does
not develop the cortical structure necessary to support conscious-
ness until, at the earliest, twenty to twenty-four weeks into the preg-
nancy.68 Abortion's opponents desire a concept of life broad
enough (and a concept of death narrow enough) to support the con-
clusion that the fetus is an actual person from the moment of con-
ception. This desire, of course, does not furnish a persuasive reason
to reject a consciousness-based concept of life. If opponents of
66 Extreme cognitive disabilities are also not disqualifying. Even the profoundly
retarded retain consciousness.' L.W. Sumner, A Third Way, in THE PROBLEM OF ABOR-
TION, supra note 58, at 84 ("Cognitive disabilities and disorders may impair a person's
range of sensibility, but they do not generally reduce that person to the level of a non-
sentient being. Even the grossly retarded or deranged will still be capable of some
forms of enjoyment and suffering .. "). Indeed, under a minimal concept of per-
sonhood requiring only consciousness, many animals qualify as nonhuman "persons."
SINGER, supra note 48, at 9-17. With continuing advances in computer technology, ma-
chines someday might similarly qualify as live "persons" under this definition. Some
argue that machines are on the verge of acquiring a capacity for consciousness.
Goldberg, supra note 27, at 673-80.
67 See Ken Martyn Finnis, Natural Law and the Rights of the Unborn, in ABoRTIoN AND
THE CONST-rTION 115 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987).
68 Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J.
639,'663 & n.134 (1986); Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 622 n.108, 624 n.1l0; Sumner,
supra note 66, at 87 ("A fetus is probably sentient by the conventional stage of viabil-
ity"); Gary B. Gertler, Note, Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus is Entitled to
Human Life Status, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061 n.4 (1986). See also D. GarethJones, Brain birth
and personal identity, 15 J. MED. ETHics 173, 177 (1989) (stating one could place brain
birth at 24-28 weeks but that this is an "arbitrary conclusion."); Comment, Technological
Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. Rav. 1194,
1207-20 (1982) (19-30 weeks); cf. Tooley, supra note 28, at 82-83 (under concept of
personhood requiring self-consciousness, not just consciousness, a newborn baby is not
a person).
That the fetus can support consciousness at 24 weeks furnishes an interesting justi-
fication for the most important aspect of Roe's trimester fi-amework. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). This gestational age roughly coincides with viability, which
Roe says marks the point when the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes
compelling and thus may be deemed to outweigh the mother's right to terminate her
pregnancy. Roe itself did not explain why the state's interest in protecting potential life
becomes compelling only after viability. Id. at 164. It simply defined viability, thereby
"mistak[ing] a definition for a syllogism." John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying WofY A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973). Roe thus leaves itself open to
Justice O'Connor's observation that "potential life is no less potential in the first weeks of
pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward." Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The analysis here suggests that via-
bility is important because it happens to coincide with the earliest moment at which the
fetus may be said to represent actual life.
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abortion wish to maintain that a fetus is an actual person from the
moment the egg becomes fertilized, they must articulate and defend
a concept of life supporting this conclusion. The discussion in this
section suggests that this task will be exceedingly difficult, if not im-
possible. 69 Even if opponents of abortion succeed in justifying the
bodily integrity concept, 70 it is doubtful that the fetus possesses this
characteristic from conception. The evidence indicates that a fetus
lacks autonomous capacity for bodily integrity until eight weeks ges-
tation, at the earliest.7 '
One can perhaps defuse the inclination of abortion's opponents
to criticize a consciousness-based concept of life and death by point-
ing to a more promising and defensible strategy. Although the fetus
does not become an actual person until sometime in the second half
69 See Rubenfeld,.supra note 29, at 625-26 (describing arguments standard in right-
to-life literature as "virtually unintelligible"). In arguing that the fetus constitutes an
actual human person from the moment of conception, John T. Noonan, Jr. makes two
arguments. He first points to the great difference between the probability that any given
spermatozoa or oocyte will be born and the probability that a conceptus will be born.
John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION,
supra note 58, at 9, 12. This observation, however, does not establish that a conceptus
constitutes actual life. It establishes only that a conceptus has a stronger potential for
becoming actual life. See Roger Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument, in THE
PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra note 58, at 43,46 ("It's as though someone were to look at
an acorn and call it an oak tree"). Professor Noonan's second argument is that the con-
ceptus is an actual human life because it has received the genetic code of a human being.
"A being with a human genetic code," he writes, "is man." Noonan, supra, at 13. This
argument, though, proves too much, because a human body everyone would regard as
dead still contains live, genetically complete cells. As Jed Rubenfeld has observed:
"Every cell in our bodies is genetically complete; every nucleus in every cell spells out
the same information about the 'entire constitution of the person.' Quite plainly, carry-
ing all the necessary genetic information about an individual human being cannot be
equivalent to being a human being." Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 625. In addition, Pro-
fessor Noonan's second argument falls into "speciesism" in presupposing that all
human beings deserve the strong right to life accorded to fully normal, adult human
beings and that only human beings have such a right to life. See supra note 48 and accom-
panying text.
70 In supporting their conclusion that the fetus is a live person, many "pro-life"
advocates appeal to a purely biological definition, such as the bodily integrity concept.
The problem is that no moral conclusions follow from a purely biological definition
formulated without regard for moral considerations. Asserting that a fetus is alive under
such a definition does not establish that a fetus has a moral right to life. For one discus-
sion of the fallacy of reasoning to moral conclusions from nonmoral definitions of life in
the abortion context, see Warren, supra note 48.
71 Jones, supra note 68, at 174 (discussing EEG findings indicating that fetus's
brainstem does not begin to function until eight weeks). An opponent of abortion could
avoid the conclusion that the fetus lacks the capacity for bodily integration by allowing
artificial integration to substitute completely for natural integration. On this view, it
would not matter that before eight weeks gestation the fetus lacks any capacity to inte-
grate its own body and must rely entirely on the mother for integration. Yet the view
that artificial integration may substitute completely for natural integration leads to seri-
ous problems in other contexts. See supra notes 44-47, infra notes 83-86 and accompany-
ing text.
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of the pregnancy, it is at all times a potential person.72 The conclu-
sion that someone who is dead is not eligible for the moral rights
attributed to persons follows from the permanent loss of conscious-
ness. A fetus, in contrast, does not yet have consciousness but soon
will. Opponents of abortion can plausibly argue that a being who
lacks a capacity for consciousness but will soon acquire this capacity
may claim the moral rights of personhood. 73 The permanently un-
conscious, of course, lack this potentiality.
72 This same argument does not apply to anencephalic babies. Such babies are
born without a cerebrum and therefore are not conscious nor capable of acquiring con-
sciousness in the future. Friedman, supra note 28, at 922. Under a consciousness-based
concept of life and personhood, such babies are never actual or potential persons. They
accordingly do not qualify for the moral treatment accorded to actual or potential life.
Like the permanently unconscious, they may be regarded as ineligible for a right to life.
But see James M. Humber, Statutory Criteria for Determining Human Death, 42 MERCER L.
REv. 1069, 1071 n.12 (1991) (characterizing this condusion as an "apparent
absurdity.").
73 Several Justices now advocate effectively overruling Roe on the ground that states
have a compelling interest in protecting the fetus's potential life. Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., & White & Kennedy, JJ.).
Cf. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 462 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at
viability or afterward.").
The argument that the fetus, as a potential person, can claim the moral rights of
personhood is more defensible than the claim that the fetus is an actual person from the
moment of conception. SeeJOHN KLEiNIG, VALUING LIx 194-208 (1991) ("The fact that
a fetus is not yet a full-fledged person does not exclude it from the domain of moral
considerability or render its moral standing merely prospective. By virtue of its potenti-
ality, its life should be accorded moral significance." Itt at 208.) RzIMN, supra note 48,
at 167 ("if the value of something is a reason for keeping it in existence, it is equally a
reason for bringing similarly valuable things into existence .... ). Cf John A. Robert-
son, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 446 (1990)
(arguing that an early embryo, although not itself a person or rights-bearing entity, de-
serves "special respect because it is genetically unique living human tissue that has the
potential to develop into a fetus and a newborn."). But is not without its own problems.
For rebuttals of this claim, see Tooley, supra note 28, at 77-82; Rubenfeld, supra note 29.
Cf. Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REv. BooKs, June 29, 1989, at 49, 52
(The interest in protecting potential life does not justify a total ban on abortion but
rather must allow a woman "ample time after discovery of her pregnancy to consider
whether she wishes to continue it, and to arrange a safe and convenient abortion if she
does not."). Cf REIMAN, supra note 48, at 165-67 ("[The difference between murder
and abortion is just the difference between the loss you would suffer now being con-
fronted with your death and the loss you suffered by not having been born in the seven-
teenth century." Id. at 166-67.). Rubenfeld, for instance, observes that if the interests
of a potential person support prohibitions on abortion, they also support prohibitions
on contraception. The logic of the potential person argument, in other words, subverts
both Roe and Griswold. Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 612-13. But see Philip E. Devine, The
Scope of the Prohibition Against Killing, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra note 58, at 21,
26-42 (attempting to avoid this conclusion). Rubenfeld also faults the "potential per-
son" argument for "covertly treating this supposed 'potentiality' as an actuality."
Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 600, 611-13. For another discussion of the relevance of the
fetus's potential capacity, see KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLrr-
ICAL CHOICE 131-37 (1988).
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b. The Slippeiy-Slope Objection
A critic of a consciousness-based concept of death might con-
cede that the concept is not overinclusive in its current form, but
view it as marking the beginning of a precipitous descent down a
slippery slope.74 Granted that consciousness is an essential attri-
bute of life, what is to prevent the addition of other "essential" char-
acteristics, such as self-awareness and communication? 75 As the list
of characteristics essential to life expands, so too does the implied
concept of death. Such expansion, the critic might urge, is danger-
ous and ought to be anticipatorily resisted by rejection of a con-
sciousness-based concept.
Several reasons support the conclusion that the danger of a
slippery slope should not cause rejection of a consciousness-based
concept of life and death. First, the slippery slope argument applies
to all concepts of death, not just one premised on consciousness.
The public articulation of any concept invites criticism and counter-
proposals, which raise the possibility that the concept will ultimately
undergo dangerous expansion. Some advocates of the bodily integ-
rity concept, for instance, define the concept of death narrowly so
that a patient whose integrity is artificially supplied remains alive. 76
Other proponents of bodily integrity define the concept of death
more broadly to include among the dead those brain-dead patients
wholly dependent on machines. 77 Similarly, the heart-lung criteria
have been broadened in the last two decades; virtually all states now
74 For effective statements of the slippery slope argument in the right-to-die con-
text, see Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right to Die?" When is There No
Constitutional "Right to Live?", 25 GA. L. REv. 1203 (1991) [hereinafter "Right to Die"];
Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958) [hereinafter Mercy-Killing]. See also DEFINING DEATH, supra note
40, at 39; LtmB, supra note 40, at 45. In his most recent article, Professor Kamisar dem-
onstrates how many of the limits on euthanasia, which its proponents advanced in the
1950s to win legal acceptance of their views, have now been discarded or relaxed by the
law. For a discussion of the logic of slippery slope arguments generally, see Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 H~Av. L. 1Ev. 361, 368-69 (1985); Wilbren van der Burg, The
Slippery Slope Argument, 102 ETHics 42 (1991).
75 As Professor Kamisar writes:
Does anyone really believe that if a number of states expanded their defi-
nition of "death" to include permanently unconscious patients, that
would be the end of it? Does anybody really doubt that ten or twenty
years down the road the definition would be expanded again? The next
time around, the definition of "death" would, at least, embrace elderly
incompetent patients who, though in extreme states of disability, are con-
scious-people such as Claire Conroy or Mary O'Connor, people who
would be described as "minimally responsive" or "barely conscious."
Kamisar, "Right to Die," supra note 74, at 1232. See also DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at
39 ("Opinions about what is essential to personhood vary greatly from person to person
in our society-to say nothing of intercultural variations").
76 See supra note 46.
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recognize the complete loss of brain function as constituting
death. 78 The potential for expansion is obviously not a peculiar fea-
ture of a consciousness-based concept.
Second, a concept of life requiring consciousness and no addi-
tional features is particularly resistant to expansion. The argument
for making consciousness a necessary feature of a concept of human
life is far stronger than arguments concerning higher-order features
such as self-awareness or rational thought. Newborn infants, while
conscious, lack these higher-order capacities. 79 Given both the vir-
tually universal intuition that newborn infants deserve a right to life
and the necessity of accounting for such intuitions,80 any attempt to
expand the concept beyond consciousness encounters great
difficulty. 8'
Just as important, a consciousness-based concept of life and a
concept of life requiring additional features differ in their amenabil-
ity to a quality of life objection. A concept of life requiring only
consciousness raises no quality of life concerns because such objec-
tions are meaningless with respect to insentient beings. It is rela-
tively easy to embrace a concept of life and death raising no quality
of life considerations. By contrast, however, a concept of life requir-
ing additional features raises quality of life concerns because it dif-
ferentiates among beings capable of experiencing sensation.
One encounters great difficulty defending a "consciousness
plus" concept of life against quality of life objections. Such a con-
cept implies that at least some conscious, incompetent patients are
dead; although conscious, they lack the requisite higher-order fea-
tures of, say, self-awareness or rational thought. One might accept
78 See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
79 Tooley, supra note 28, at 84.
80 GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 151 ("[I]t is neither illiberal nor irrational to hang
onto the basic starting point that the healthy newborn has a status equal to that of a
developed human being when all one yet believes is that extremely complex, highly ab-
stract, reasoned arguments seem to tip slightly in a different direction."). But see REi-
MAN, supra note 48, at 169 (If our intuitions about newborns conflict with a sound
argument "then they, and not the argument, must be brought in line").
81 Tom Regan, Introduction to MATERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 23-24 (Tom Regan ed.,
1980); Sumner, supra note 66, at 80. One might accept the conclusion that newborns are
not "persons" entitled to a right to life by virtue of that status but try to resist the
legitimacy of infanticide. It might be argued that newborns, although "nonpersons,"
have a right to life that derives from the consequences to persons of ascribing or not
ascribing newborns a right to life. See Stanley I. Benn, Abortion, Infantici&, and Respect for
Persons, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra note 58, at 135, 140-44; Warren, supra note
59. Even assuming that this line of argument succeeds in establishing that newborns
have some kind of a right to life, it would seem not to succeed with respect to the perma-
nently unconscious (who are not cute, cuddly, or in the process of developing into a full
person). See Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Jan. 31, 1991, at 14,
17 ("it is extremely implausible that allowing a permanently comatose patient to die...
will in any way erode a community's sense of the importance of life").
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that a fully competent person has a right to life but, in appropriate
circumstances, may "waive" that right and decide to end her life.
Although permitting such a waiver raises quality of life concerns, the
person has determinedfor herself that her own quality of life is insuffi-
cient to justify continued life. In contrast, waiving or overriding a
conscious, incompetent patient's right to life is more troubling.
Apart from the unusual situation when the patient has previously
addressed the issue through a living will, others must make the judg-
ment that the patient's quality of life is so abysmal that the patient's
right to life ought to be waived. It is even more troubling to con-
dude that a conscious, incompetent patient does not possess a right
to life that can be waived or overriden-i.e., that such a patient is
dead.
For both of these reasons-the relative strength of their sup-
porting justifications and their relative vulnerability to quality of life
objections-there is a dear, easily grasped, and morally relevant di-
viding line between an exclusively consciousness-based concept of
life and one requiring additional characteristics such as self-aware-
ness or rational thought.8 2
Third, the bodily integrity concept arguably creates a greater
danger of a slippery slope. As we have seen, proponents of bodily
integrity disagree about whether life exists when integration is sup-
plied completely through artificial means.83 Bodily integrity advo-
cates cannot use moral considerations as a basis for resolving this
dispute; they deliberately divorce their concept from morality.s4
The basic impetus for the bodily integrity concept, the desire to de-
fine human life broadly, pushes the concept's advocates towards the
position that artificial integration may substitute completely for nat-
82 The argument that a concept of life and personhood requiring only conscious-
ness includes all conscious animals may be objectionable. Yet the overinclusivity of this
concept does not supply a reason for choosing the competing bodily integrity concept.
The bodily integrity concept is even more overinclusive. As we have seen, it encompasses
plant and, indeed, all cellular life in addition to animals.
One possible solution to the supposed overinclusivity of a concept of life requiring
only consciousness might be the following: Although consciousness defines eligibility for
a right to life, the strength of that right varies depending on whether the conscious being
possess higher-order capacities such as self-consciousness, rational thought, etc. See
Norman C. Gillespie, Abortion and Human Rights, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra
note 58, at 94, 95-98.
83 See supra note 46.
84 GRIsEz & BOYLE, supra note 40, at 75, 77 (eschewing "a choice based on one's
evaluation of various human characteristics" in favor of "a theory which fits the facts"
and which "respects established usage so far as it goes"); LAMB, supra note 40, at 14
(commending integrated organism definition as a "biological concept" that "supersedes
ethical and religious-based concepts"); Becker, supra note 40, at 335, 348-52; Bernat et
al., supra note 40, at 390-91.
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ural integration.8 5 Yet, treatment enabling artificial preservation of
bodily integrity is uncontroversially withdrawn or never supplied in
numerous cases.8 6 Defined broadly to allow for complete artificial
integration, the bodily integrity concept thus implies that active and
passive euthanasia are already entrenched features of our medical
and legal practices. This seemingly dangerous conclusion requires
drawing slippery distinctions between permissible and impermissi-
ble euthanasia. Given their view that consciousness is irrelevant to
the definition of death, why advocates of the bodily integrity con-
cept would or should draw these distinctions with reference to con-
sciousness is unclear. By explicitly disassociating it from moral
considerations, advocates of the bodily integrity concept furnish no
basis for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible eu-
thanasia. They put themselves on a slippery slope without apparent
means of escape.
c. The Mind-Body Dualism Objection
A final objection to a consciousness-based concept of death is
that it posits an unacceptable Cartesian dualism of mind and body.
Hans Jonas, for instance, faults brain-oriented definitions of death
for reviving "the old body-soul dualism" and "deny[ing] the ex-
tracerebral body its essential share in the identity of the person."8 7
The body, Jonas argues, is so important to a person's identity that
the death of the body should be regarded as a necessary condition
for "death."
.One must recognize the inherent limits of this criticism. This
criticism cannot mean that a consciousness-based concept of death
renders the body irrelevant. Because certain bodily functions, in-
cluding "extracerebral" functions, are necessary to sustain con-
sciousness, a consciousness-based concept requires the death of
certain crucial aspects of the body. Body and consciousness are in-
extricably intertwined. 88 Nor can the criticism be that a conscious-
ness-based concept fails to require the cessation of all bodily
85 Two other considerations also push advocates of bodily integrity to the same
conclusion. First is the desire for a concept of life that will support the thesis that a fetus
constitutes actual life from conception. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
Second is the necessity for a response to the hypotheticals discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 44-47 and presented supra note 44.
86 See supra notes 45, 47.
87 Jonas, supra note 46, at 57. Accord GRISEZ & BOYLE, supra note 40, at 70-71; Rob-
ert L. Schwager, Life, Death, and the Irreversibly Comatose, reprinted in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
DEATH AND DYING, supra note 28, at 38, 44 (consciousness-based concept of death "un-
derplay[s] the importance of the human body to our idea of ourselves").
88 Cf Bernard Williams, Personal Identity and Individualization, in PROBLEMS OF THE
SELF 12 (1973) ("When we are asked to distinguish a man's personality from his body,
we do not really know what to distinguish from what.").
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functions. Even under the heart-centered definition of death that
Jonas defends, death still occurs though biological activity persists
for some time.89 Both heart-centered and consciousness-centered
definitions require the death of only certain aspects of the body.
They merely select different aspects. 90
4. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion might create the misleading impres-
sion that a consciousness-based concept of death is highly unusual
and controversial. In fact, such a concept finds widespread accept-
ance among recent thinkers who have addressed the matter.9' It is
also compatible with the ancient Greeks' notions of death92 and, un-
til recent medical advances, with the traditional heart and lung crite-
ria for death. 93 The crux of the modem debate is not so much with
the appropriate concept of death, as it is with the medical indicators
of death.
89 See supra note 32.
90 Jonas, then, must confront the formidable challenge of explaining why bodily
fimctions, not required for the sustenance of consciousness are an essential part of per-
sonhood. Jonas, of course, could appeal to the importance of bodily integrity, arguing
that consciousness is not a necessary condition for personhood. As we have seen, how-
ever, the bodily integrity concept is either useless because it yields no moral conclusions
or it effectively equates human persons with qualitatively different forms of biological
life, such as amoebas and trees. Surely the body is not so important that it should blind
us to the moral and ontological differences between human persons and plants.
91 ENGELHARDT, supra note 60, at 210-11; GERVAIS, supra note 31; VEATCH, supra
note 27; Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmakingfor Incompetents, 29 UCLA L.
REv. 386, 408 (1981); Green & Winkler, supra note 28; Quinn, supra note 58, at 930-31
("Consciousness is, without doubt, a necessary condition for the presence of per-
sonhood."); Sumner, supra note 66, at 83 (sentience confers "moral standing," i.e., a
right to life); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 442 & n.284; Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 623-24;
David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CoRNEL. L. REv. 850 (1986);
Tooley, supra note 28, at 65 ("[I]t seems to be a conceptual truth that things that lack
consciousness ... cannot have rights.").
92 The ancient Greeks thought that death occurred when the soul left the body.
VEATCH, supra note 27, at 20-21. "The fact that the Greek term pneuma has the dual
meaning of both breath and soul or spirit could be interpreted to imply that the pres-
ence of this animating force [i.e., soul] is closely related to (perhaps synonymous with)
breath." Id at 33. Absent a mechanical substitute for respiration, permanent loss of
breath means a permanent loss of consciousness.
93 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, reprinted in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
DEATH AND DYING, supra note 28, at 16 [hereinafter Harvard Report] ("From ancient times
down to the recent past it was clear that, when the respiration and heart stopped, the
brain would die in a few minutes; so the obvious criterion of no heart beat as synony-
mous with death was sufficiently accurate."); DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 15, 37-
38 ("The 'vital signs' traditionally used in diagnosing death thus reflect the direct inter-
dependence of respiration, circulation and the brain."); WALTON, supra note 35, at 29.
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C. The Medical Indicators of Death
Once the features justifying the attribution of a right to life have
been identified and the concept of death defined accordingly, one
must address how to identify what satisfies the concept in particular
cases. The concept of death proposed here treats consciousness as
essential to life; its permanent loss signifies death. Yet how can one
tell whether a given patient has irretrievably lost consciousness?
What are the medical indicators of a permanent loss of
consciousness?
1. Expansion of Traditional Heart-Lung Criteria: The Whole-Brain
Criterion
The debate over the appropriate medical indicators of death is
best understood against its historical background. 94 Until the last
several decades, virtually no controversy surrounded the medical in-
dicators of death. It was. universally agreed that death could be pro-
nounced only upon a diagnosis of irretrievable loss of heart and
lung function. 95 With the advent of artificial respirators and other
life-support systems,96 however, some patients maintained circula-
tion and respiration despite the loss of all brain function.97 Under
traditional heart-lung criteria, such patients remain alive.
Support began to develop for broadening the criteria of death
to include permanent loss of brain function. In 1968, an ad hoc
committee of the Harvard Medical School announced an influential
set of criteria for determining death. 98 Because the Committee's
proposed test seeks to identify the permanent loss of all brain func-
tion, it represents a "whole-brain" criterion of death.99 In the years
94 For an excellent discussion of the history of recent developments in the defini-
tion of death, see Goldberg, supra note 27, at 663-70. See also Friedman, supra note 28, at
925-31.
95 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 5.
96 These include "techniques [such] as intravenous hydration, nasogastic feeding,
[and] bladder catheterization." Id at 21.
97 Id. at 16 ("Thus, when artificial respiration provides adequate oxygenation and
associated medical treatments regulate essential plasma components and blood pres-
sure, an intact heart will continue to beat, despite loss of brain fiinctions."). See supra
notes 22-23.
98 Harvard Report, supra note 93.
99 Id. at 12-13. The Committee viewed its criteria as establishing "the characteris-
tics of a permanently nonfunctioning brain." Id at 12. The Committee proposed that,
excluding cases involving hypothermia and the use of depressant drugs, death is to be
declared when a patient exhibits: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsiveness; (2) no spon-
taneous movements or breathing; and (3) no reflexes. Id at 12. A fourth indicator,
taken to have confirmatory value only, is a flat EEG reading. Tests for these characteris-
tics are to be repeated within 24 hours. Id. at 13. For a description of other proposed
diagnostic procedures thought to confirm or disconfirm whole brain death, see VEATCH,
supra note 27, at 35-39; DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 25-29.
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following the Harvard Report, states began to enact statutory defini-
tions adopting a whole-brain criterion in one form or another. To-
day, whole-brain death is uniformly recognized by statute100 or by
judicial decision as a legal standard of death.' 0 ' The expansion of
medical indicators of death to include a whole-brain criterion has
received nearly universal support from the medical profession 0 2
and ethicists, as well as from lawmakers.' 03
2. The Controversy Over the Whole-Brain Criterion: The Status of
Those in a "Persistent Vegetative State"
A controversy has developed over whether the medical indica-
tors of death, particularly those pertaining to brain function, should
be expanded further. The dispute involves a distinction between
upper and lower, parts of the brain. ° 4 The lower portion of the
brain, the brain stem, governs mechanical bodily functions such as
breathing and heart-beat. The upper portion of the brain, the cor-
tex and neocortex, allows for consciousness, memory, thought, and
self-awareness.
When a person is in what the medical profession calls a "persis-
tent vegetative state," the lower brain survives largely intact but the
upper brain is badly compromised. Oxygen deprivation typically
100 For code citations to 36 of these statutes, see Friedman, supra note 28, at 928
n.58. See also Robert S. Olick, Brain Death, Religious Freedom, and Public Policy: New Jersey's
Landmark Legislative Initiative, I KENNEDY INST. Emcs J. 275, 285 n.1 (1991) (listing sev-
eral more recent enactments).
101 VEATcH, supra note 27, at 49; Olick, supra note 100, at 275-76. For a discussion
of the widespread legal acceptance of the whole brain criterion, see Smith, supra note 91,
at 852-56.
102 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 10 (noting that all of the physicians testifying
before the Commission "concurred that a statutory definition of death should encom-
pass irreversible loss of brain functions").
103 Id. at 11 (noting that leaders of the "right to life" movement do not oppose
statutes making total brain death a sufficient condition of death).
104 The brain has three general anatomic divisions that perform different
tasks. The cerebrum is usually referred to as the "higher brain" because
it controls consciousness, thought, language, memory and feeling. The
cerebellum is the structure responsible for the regulation and coordina-
tion of complex voluntary muscular movement. The brainstem, which is
composed of the midbrain, the pons and the medulla oblongata, is also
known as the "lower brain" because it controls the spontaneous, vegeta-
tive functions such as respiration, blood pressure, temperature, swallow-
ing, yawning and neuroendocrine control.
Friedman, supra note 28, at 921 n.20. For other discussions of the distinction' between
the upper brain and the lower brain and a description of the condition of patients whose
lower brain essentially survives while the upper brain dies, see Cranford, supra note 4, at
27-28; DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 15; GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 10-14; Smith,
supra note 91, at 856-58.
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causes such a state.10 5 Cells in the upper brain are more sensitive to
oxygen loss than those in the lower brain. When oxygen depriva-
tion lasts between approximately six and thirteen minutes, the lower
brain may essentially survive while the outer layers of the upper
brain effectively die.106
Patients in the resulting persistent vegetative state, while often
possessing the capacity for spontaneous respiration and circulation,
lack the capacity for consciousness. They also lack other capacities
dependent upon consciousness such as memory, self-awareness,
thought, and emotion. Such patients are apparently "awake," be-
cause they "may exhibit spontaneous, involuntary movements such
as yawns or facial grimaces, their eyes may be open and they may be
capable of breathing without assistance."10 7 Yet these patients are
not aware and do not feel pain or other sensations because "any
apparent wakefulness does not represent awareness of self or
environment."108
A proponent of a consciousness-based concept of death would
be highly inclined to conclude that such insentient patients are
dead. Nevertheless, because the whole-brain criterion requires the
death of both the upper and lower brain, the law currently treats
such patients as live persons. Some proponents of a consciousness-
based concept accordingly advocate replacing the whole-brain crite-
rion with a "neocortical" or "upper" brain criterion, which would
recognize the loss of function in those parts of the brain sustaining
consciousness as constituting death.10 9 No state has yet expressly
adopted a higher brain, neocortical, or consciousness-based stan-
dard of death. 10
3. The Case for Refusing to Expand the Whole-Brain Criterion
One can defend the whole-brain criterion as an appropriate
medical indicator of life and death under the bodily integrity con-
cept. Yet to the extent that refusal to expand the whole-brain crite-
105 Other causes include head injury, low blood sugar, and degenerative neurologic
conditions such as Jakob-Creutzfeldt disease, Alzheimer's disease, and anencephaly.
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 177-81.
106 DEFINING DEATh, supra note 40, at 17-18; Cranford, supra note 4, at 27-28;
VEATCH, supra note 27, at 39-41 (discussing empirical evidence that lower brain can sur-
vive when upper brain dies).
107 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 18.
108 Id.
109 VEATCH, supra note 27, at 34; Smith, supra note 91.
110 Friedman, supra note 28, at 929. Although states have not embraced a higher
brain criterion dejure, the virtually unanimous cases permitting the withdrawal of treat-
ment from such patients arguably represent a de facto acceptance of such a criterion. See
infra note 219.
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ion rests on the bodily integrity concept, the preceding section
requires its rejection.
A refusal to expand the whole brain criterion might also be de-
fended on the ground that it furnishes the only truly reliable means
of determining the permanence of a patient's loss of conscious-
ness. 1  According to a report of the President's Commission, med-
ical science cannot reliably establish whether an unconscious
patient, who has suffered only partial loss of brain function, has per-
manently lost consciousness.1 12 Any attempt to draw such a conclu-
sion, the Committee implicitly maintains, will inevitably result in the
false diagnosis of some patients as dead-as having permanently
lost consciousness. One can avoid false diagnoses of death only by
cautiously specifying medical indicators of death that require loss of
the whole brain function, not just some portions of it.
This is a powerful argument. False positives may be tolerable
in other contexts, but not with respect to a pronouncement of
death. Given its utter finality and the complete inability to correct
the error, an erroneous conclusion that a patient is dead seems far
worse than an erroneous conclusion that she is alive.1 13
111 See ENGELHARDT, supra note 60, at 211 ("[O]ne may still wish not to employ
higher-brain-center-oriented tests for determining death, even though one accepts as an
intellectual point a higher-brain-center-oriented concept of death. The basis may be a
fear of an inordinate number of false positive determinations of death."); DOUGLAS N.
WALTON, ETmICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1987) (accepting con-
sciousness-based concept of death but arguing that whole-brain criterion ought not to
be expanded because an upper-brain criterion is insufficiently reliable); Smith, supra
note 91, at 878 n.143 (citing other sources taking this position).
112 First, . . . it is not known which portions of the brain are responsible for
cognition and consciousness; what little is known points to substantial
interconnections among the brainstem, subcortical structures and the ne-
ocortex. Thus, the "higher brain" may well exist only as a metaphorical
concept, not in reality. Second, even when the sites of certain aspects of
consciousness can be found, their cessation often cannot be assessed with
the certainty that would be required in applying a statutory definition.
DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 40. See also LAMB, supra note 40, at 43. Interestingly,
the President's Commission concluded in a later report that "some patients' uncon-
sciousness can be reliably predicted to be permanent." DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 173.
113 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Heath, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1990) (clear and
convincing evidence standard appropriate for determination that patient would want
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn); DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 22 ("The social
and legal as well as medical consequences attached to a determination of death make it
imperative that the diagnosis be incontrovertible."); WALTON, supra note 111, at 81-82
("[M]orally speaking, it is even more important that there be not even the least shred of
likelihood of positive error.").
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4. Expanding the Whole-Brain Criterion: From the Persistent
Vegetative State to the Permanently Unconscious State
Although the foregoing argument is logically sound, one of its
premises is questionable and another false.
Begin with the questionable notion that virtual certainty should
be required of a diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness. Requir-
ing the highest degree of certainty has two consequences. First, it
reduces the incidence of false positives (i.e., false declarations of
death) and rescues patients who otherwise would have been diag-
nosed erroneously to have permanently lost consciousness. Second,
it increases the number of false negatives (i.e., false declarations of
continued life) and treats as alive many patients who actually have
permanently lost consciousness. The degree of certainty one re-
quires of a diagnosis of death will reflect one's perception of the
relative costs and frequency of these false positives and false
negatives. 114
If no costs flowed from a false negative, then nothing less than
complete certainty would suffice for a conclusion that a patient has
permanently lost consciousness. In fact, from the patient's perspec-
tive, no cost is associated with being falsely declared alive. Such a
patient can have no experiences.' 15 There are, however, other
costs, most notably prolonged suffering of the family." 16 One would
have to be a callous Kantian to dismiss these costs as irrelevant, 117
especially when the patients whose lives are at stake presumably
care very much about their families' suffering.18
I In addition to these costs, a requirement that one diagnose per-
manent unconsciousness with the highest certainty produces sus-
pect benefits. Such a requirement avoids false positives, but those
false positives may involve patients who recover consciousness only
114 Cf Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91
CoLuM. L. REV. 1369, 1406-09 (1991) (discussing "error-allocation" aspect of concep-
tions of accurate adjudication).
115 This has led some commentators to conclude that it is in the best interests of a
permanently unconscious patient to be maintained alive. The patient, lacking exper-
iences, does not suffer and there is always a chance, however small, that the patient's
condition has been misdiagnosed. See, e.g., Kamisar, Right to Die, supra note 74, at 1236-
37.
116 For a description of the effect that maintenance of a permanently unconscious
patient has on the family, see infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text. Other costs
include the resources devoted to maintaining the patient and the opportunity cost of
those resources. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at
183. Veatch makes the puzzling suggestion that a false negative is "a moral affront to
the dignity of the individual" because it "treat[s] a corpse as if it were a living person."
VEATCH, supra note 27, at 22.
117 For a discussion of the view that consequences may play a role in deontological
moral thinking, see ToM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).
118 See infra note 152.
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to suffer from severe disabilities. 1 9 A requirement of the highest
certainty, then, is questionable not only because it leads to an enor-
mous number of false negatives 120 that unnecessarily prolong the
family's suffering, but also because the very few false positives 12' it
eliminates may produce little, if any, benefit.
Some will undoubtedly object to this analysis because it weighs
the lives of some against the costs those lives impose on others.' 22
One must consider, however, that requiring less than virtual cer-
tainty does not entail killing a given patient whom we know will
regain consciousness. Rather, it requires foregoing an exceedingly
remote possibility that any given patient will regain consciousness.
In other contexts, we willingly force fully conscious persons to risk
death in order to produce redeeming benefits. Thirty-seven states
have capital punishment 23 despite the inevitability that innocent
persons will be executed.' 24 Young people are sent to war for rea-
119 DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TRATMErr, supra note 14, at 182-83:
[Tihe few patients who have recovered consciousness after a prolonged
period of unconsciousness were severely disabled. The degree of perma-
nent damage varied but commonly included inability to speak or see, per-
manent distortion of the limbs, and paralysis. Being returned to such a
state would be regarded as of very limited benefit by most patients; it may
even be considered harmful if a particular patient would have refused
treatments expected to produce this outcome.
See also BucmNA & BROCK, supra note 5, at 130-32; PLUM & POSNER, supra note 65, at
339-40; Berrol, supra note 23, at 283 ("Long-term follow-up on PVS patients demon-
strates that some develop a level of psychologic contact with their environment, putting
them into the category of severe disability, but at the worst end of that category, with no
substantial hope for developing cognitive processes."). But see Rodney H. Falk, Physical
and Intellectual Recovery Following Prolonged Hypoxic Coma, 66 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 384
(1990) (reporting case of patient who was in a persistent vegetative state for four weeks
and eventually had a virtually complete recovery); E. Shuttleworth, Recovery to Social and
Economic Independence From Prolonged Postanoxic Vegetative State, 33 NEUROLOGY 372, 373
(1983) (reporting patient who recovered after seven weeks in persistent vegetative state
and ultimately became "independent, socially adapted, and gainfully employed").
120 See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
121 Id
122 Peter McL. Black, M.D., PhD., Predicting the Outcome from Hypoxic-Ischemic Coma:
Medical and Ethical Implications, 254JAMA 1215, 1216 (1985) ("It is a kind of analysis that
is explicidy consequentialist; furthermore, it views patients as expendable for the greater
good if there is little hope of their return to consciousness."); Berrol, supra note 23, at
284; Kamisar, Mercy-Killing, supra note 74, at 1007-08 (arguing that one may justify im-
posing a risk of loss of life only by pointing to an expected saving in lives rather than
mere relief of pain).
123 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 362 (1989).
124 Ernest van den Haag, one of the death penalty's staunchest defenders, has
written:
I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice
will occur even in capital cases.
Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking,
lighting, or construction, cost the lives of some innocent bystanders. We
do not give up these activities, because the advantages, moral or material,
outweigh the unintended losses. Analogously, for those who think the
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sons other than that of preventing a greater loss of human life.
Even those who oppose the death penalty and war do not oppose
the building of bridges despite the substantial certainty that some
workers will die. It is simply not true that when error results in loss
of human life we make every effort to minimize the error's incidence
regardless of cost. We do not place an infinite value on human
life. 125 In this and in other contexts, costs and benefits influence the
extent of our efforts to protect life.
Even if one finds a requirement of the highest certainty appro-
priate, another premise of the whole-brain criterion's defense must
be rejected. This premise holds that the whole-brain criterion is the
only reliable means of ascertaining the permanence of a loss of con-
sciousness. No quick, definite, easily administered litmus test cur-
rently exists for determining whether each and every unconscious
patient has permanently lost consciousness.1 26 Over time, however,
one can sometimes reliably diagnose a loss of consciousness.1 27
It is highly reliable to conclude that a patient in a persistent
vegetative state as a result of hypoxia-ischemia has permanently lost
the capacity for consciousness. 28 Over the last twenty years, ap-
proximately 100,000 patients have lapsed into a persistent vegeta-
death penalty just, miscarriages ofjustice are offset by the moral benefits
and the usefulness of doing justice.
Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1664-65
(1986).
125 Just as an individual or a society is not obligated to continue the search
for a lost hiker or a shipwrecked sailor indefinitely, regardless of cost, so
neither society nor the individual's family can be reasonably viewed as
being obligated to engage in ceaseless efforts to "save" an individual
whom we believe-beyond a reasonable doubt-to be permanently
unconscious.
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 5, at 131.
126 Youngner & Bartlett, supra note 44, at 258; Cranford, supra note 4, at 30. "The
primary basis for the diagnosis of persistent vegetative state is the careful and extended
clinical observation of the patient, supported by laboratory studies. Persistent vegeta-
tive state patients will show no behavioral response whatsoever over an extended period
of time." Am. Academy of Neurology, supra note 23, at 125. Tests of some confirmatory
value include CAT scans, positron emission topography (PET) scans, and the EEG.
Cranford, supra note 4; Bryan Young et al., Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State:
Similarities and Contrasts, 16 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL Sci. 388, 390-91 (1989). Cf Smith,
supra note 91, at 879-83 (arguing that PET scanning "now offers the scientific capability
of accurately diagnosing metabolic brain function and neocortical death"); VEATCH,
supra note 27, at 40 (suggesting that EEG results can be used to diagnose permanent
unconsciousness reliably).
127 See infra notes 131, 137.
128 See Am. Academy of Neurology, supra note 23, at 125 ("The diagnosis of perma-
nent unconsciousness can usually be made with a high degree of medical certainty in
cases of hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy after a period of 1 to 3 months."); DECIDING
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 173 ("some patients' uncon-
sciousness can be reliably predicted to be permanent"); AMA Council, supra note 4, at
428.
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tive state due to brain-injury caused by "hypoxia-ischemia," the
inadequate delivery of oxygen by blood circulation.' 29 Of these,
only four reported cases resulted in even partial recovery;' 30 by all
reports, the remaining patients continued in a persistent vegetative
state until death.' 3 '
The reliability of the conclusion that patients in a hypoxia-
ischemia-induced persistent vegetative state have permanently lost
consciousness arguably exceeds the reliability with which the whole-
brain criterion performs its task. 132 One might nonetheless object
that "highly reliable" is not reliable enough.
Even if one considers a .004% risk of error unacceptable, the
class of patients can be narrowed to satisfy any objection. No re-
ports exist of recovery from an hypoxia-ischemia-induced persistent
vegetative state lasting longer than twenty-two months.' s A con-
clusion that a patient, remaining in such a state for more than two
years, has permanently lost the capacity for consciousness is as cer-
tain as medical certainty can be. To resist this conclusion on the
ground that it lacks a sufficient degree of certainty one must em-
129 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2868 n.8 (1990) (prin-
cipal dissenting opinion).
130 Falk, supra note 119; Gary A. Rosenberg et al., Recovery of Cognition After Prolonged
Vegetative State, 2 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 167 (1977); Shuttleworth, supra note 119; Bruce D.
Snyder et al., Delayed Recovery From Postanoxic Persistent Vegetative State, 14 ANNALS NEUROL-
OGY 152 (1983). There is also one reported recovery in Japan. Kenichiro Higashi et al.,
Five-year Follow-up Study of Patients with Persistent Vegetative State, 44J. NEUROLOGY, NEURO-
SURGERY & PSYCH. 552, 553 (1981).
131 See David E. Levy et al., Predicting Outcome From Hypoxic-Ischemic Coma, 253 JAMA
1420 (1985). These authors examined 210 cases of coma caused by hypoxia-ischemia.
Of the 15 patients who were in a vegetative state one-month after the injury, none
regained consciousness. Id. at 1425.
132 The reliability of existing legal definitions is not beyond question. "[R]eports do
surface of brain-dead patients 'returning to life.'" Friedman, supra note 28, at 960 &
n.221. See VEATCH, supra note 27, at 37-39 (supposed reliability of whole brain criterion
rests on questionable evidence). But see DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 25-30. Some
have tried to discount known erroneous declarations of death under the whole-brain
criterion by attributing errors to a lack of care in applying the recommended diagnostic
criteria, rather than to the criteria themselves. Friedman, supra note 28, at 960 & n.221.
See PLUM & POSNER, supra note 65, at 320-22 (listing common errors in applying whole-
brain criterion). The source of the error, however, should not matter. The conse-
quences of the error matter, and they remain the same no matter what the source of
error. There are reasons for thinking that the criteria for diagnosing a persistent vegeta-
tive state are less amenable to incorrect application than those for determining whole-
brain death. A diagnosis of whole-brain death can be made and confirmed within a 24-
hour period. See supra note 99. A diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state is made over
the course of months.
133 Snyder et al., supra note 130. See Falk, supra note 119 (recovery after four weeks
in persistent vegetative state); Rosenberg, supra note 130 (recovery 17 months after ini-
tial injury); Shuttleworth, supra note 119 (recovery after seven weeks). See also Higashi et
al., supra note 129, at 553 (noting recovery of patient in Japan eight months after initial
injury).
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brace standards of certainty so demanding that they preclude any
reliance on current medical knowledge to declare death.13 4
This is not to say that it is always possible to identify with the
highest certainty which brain-injured patients have and have not
permanently lost the capacity for consciousness. When a persistent
vegetative state results from head trauma rather than a disruption of
blood oxygen, patients have a better, though still remote, chance of
recovery after a long delay.135 In this and other situations, the con-
clusion that a patient has permanently lost the capacity for con-
sciousness may-be highly likely but may still lack the degree of
medical certainty thought necessary.13 6 The point remains, how-
134 If the handful of reported occurrences of cognitive recovery in patients
with PVS are divided by the total estimated number of PVS cases in this
country, the odds of recovery are less than I in 1000. The risk of prog-
nostic error from widespread use of the above criterion is so small that a
decision that incorporates it as a prognostic conclusion seems fully
justifiable.
AMA Council, supra note 4, at 428. See also DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 82
("[E]thical concern over the accuracy of the criteria used to establish a standard and the
certainty of the resulting diagnosis can be expressed about both standards-brain or
heart-lung-or indeed about any standard."); authorities cited supra note 132 (noting
that the whole-brain criterion produces errors).
It is true that judgments about the permanence of unconsciousness are in principle
fallible, but as the philosopher Anthony Flew has observed:
[W]hen the objection takes the form of a pretended refusal to take any
decision in matters of life and death on the basis of a judgment which
theoretically might turn out to have been mistaken, it is... unrealistic
and arbitrary .... It is an inescapable feature of the human condition that
no one is infallible about anything, and there is no sphere of life in which
mistakes do not occur. Nevertheless we cannot as agents avoid, even in
matters of life and death and more than life and death, making decisions
to act or to abstain. It is only necessary and it is only possible to insist on
ordinarily strict standards of warranted assertability, and on ordinarily
exacting rather than obsessional criteria of what is beyond reasonable
doubt.
Anthony Flew, The Principle of Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE, Supra
note 48, at 225, 231-32.
135 In one study, seven percent of those diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state
one month after a head injury eventually recovered sufficiently to be classified as "in-
dependent, although disabled." BRYAN JENNETr & GRAHAM TEASDALE, MANAGEMENT OF
HEAD INJURIES 311 (1981). Recovery is more common in children than adults. For pa-
tients less than 20 years old, the chances of recovery remain significant for one year after
the head injury. Albino Bricolo et al., Prolonged Posttraumatic Unconsciousness, 52J. NEURO-
SURGERY 625, 632 (1980); C.A. Pagni et al., Long-Term Results in 62 Cases of Post-Traumatic
Complete Apallic Syndrome, 36 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA 37, 40-41 (1977). In the Nether-
lands, one patient, who was 18 years old at the time of injury, emerged from her persis-
tent vegetative state 30 months after injury. W.F.M. Arts et al., Unexpected Improvement
After Prolonged Posttraumatic Vegetative State, 48 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PsYCH.
1300 (1985). See also Justina Tanhehco & Paul E. Kaplan, Physical and Surgical Rehabilita-
tion of Patient After 6-Year Coma, 63 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. REHABILITATION 36 (1982).
136 See Bonnie Steinbock, Recovery from Persistent Vegetative State? The Case of Carrie
Coons, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1989, at 14 (reporting case of patient in a per-
sistent vegetative state resulting from causes other than hypoxia-ischemia who recov-
ered a year after the initial injury); Takashi Tsubokawa et al., Deep-brain Stimulation in a
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ever, that it is sometimes possible to conclude with certainty that
consciousness has been permanently lost. 3 7
When one can conclude that a patient in a persistent vegetative
state has permanently lost consciousness, the patient may be
deemed permanently unconscious. Thus, the concept of death out-
lined in the preceding section is satisfied and death may be
pronounced.
D. Conclusion
As a conceptual matter, death occurs when a person perma-
nently loses the capacity for consciousness. The principal rival to
this concept, bodily integrity, fails to explain why human persons
possess a moral right to life that other forms of integrated biological
life do not. Depending on the standard of certainty one adopts, the
current state of medical science may not allow a determination of
whether some patients currently in a persistent vegetative state have
permanently lost the capacity for consciousness. For such patients,
death may be pronounced only if the patient has permanently lost
either cardiac and respiratory function or function of the whole
brain. In many other cases, however, such as in Cruzan, the causes
and duration of the persistent vegetative state make it possible to
conclude with the highest assurance that the patient has perma-
nently lost consciousness. Under any plausible concept of life and
death, such patients should be declared dead despite the continua-
tion of certain mechanical bodily functions.
Thus, all right-to-die cases cannot be thought of in the same
terms, as involving a patient's right of autonomy. The strongest ar-
gument for withdrawing treatment from the permanently uncon-
scious does not, as the state courts have unanimously supposed,
stem from deference to the patient's autonomy, to her previously
expressed desires or values. Indeed, this argument is demonstrably
weak, given that the patient, in her formerly conscious state, usually
Persistent Vegetative State: Follow-up Results and Critia for Selection of Candidates, 4 BRAIN INJ.
315, 323 (1990) (although no patients in a hypoxia-ischemia-induced persistent vegeta-
tive state responded to deep-brain electrical stimulation, some patients whose PVS re-
sulted from other causes did respond).
137 In addition to those cases involving a hypoxia-ischemia-induced persistent vege-
tative state lasting longer than two years, permanent unconsciousness can be reliably
diagnosed in other settings. Friedman, supra note 28, at 961-62 (a diagnosis of perma-
nent unconsciousness in anencephalic babies "is completely accurate."); DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 460 (letter of Fred Plum, M.D.):
In conditions such as brain tumor, Alzheimer's disease, or other progres-
sive dementias, loss of consciousness for a period lasting as long as one
month dictates a hopeless prognosis.... I know of no example either by
direct contact or anecdotal report of such a patient who has ever recov-
ered any measure of cognition.
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will not have devoted much, if any, consideration to how she should
be treated in the event of permanent unconsciousness. 138 Rather,
the strongest argument stems from the conclusion that the perma-
nently unconscious are, like artificially maintained brain-dead pa-
tients, already dead. This same argument does not apply with
respect to either competent patients or conscious, incompetent pa-
tients, whom this Part has shown cannot defensibly be regarded as
dead.
The principle of autonomy that preoccupies the conventional
way of thinking can be used as a basis for granting a right-to-die to
competent patients. Although such cases necessarily involve quality
of life judgments, the patient makes these judgments for herself;
obeisance to the patient's autonomy arguably requires that her
judgments control. This autonomy argument, however, is far
weaker respecting conscious but incompetent patients. Unlike com-
petent patients, these patients cannot themselves make these inevi-
tably unsettling quality of life judgments. Absent a specific advance
directive from the patient, is exceedingly difficult to derive a right
to die from autonomy in these cases.' 3 9
The conventional way of thinking about the right-to-die thus
yields a substantially distorted picture by making the patient's au-
tonomy the cornerstone of all right-to-die cases. It treats cases in-
volving permanently unconscious and conscious, incompetent
patients as essentially alike, as involving an equally problematic in-
quiry into what the patient would choose. In so doing, it undiscrimi-
natingly lumps cases where the justification for the right-to-die is
strongest, cases involving permanent unconsciousness, with cases
where the justification is weakest, cases involving conscious, incom-
petent patients. This, unfortunately, makes withdrawal of treatment
from permanently unconscious patients seem less justifiable than it
actually is and disguises the wrenching difficulty associated with
conscious, incompetent patients.
II
THE DEFINITION OF DEATH AND THE CONsTrrUrION
A conclusion that permanently unconscious patients are dead
would significantly alter the analysis of their legal plight. The inter-
138 See infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
139 See Robertson, supra note 5, at 1145-46; Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying,
79 GAL. L. REv. 1121, 1146 (1991). Cf Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 43, 99-100 (1990) ("It is hardly inconsistent with the antipaternalism central to
liberal legalism to claim that whether an individual would 'want' to be kept alive in a
vegetative state cannot be presumed but can only be garnered from the individual's
objectively manifested desires").
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ests and rights of the patient-the focal point of the Justices in
Cruzan and of the state courts-would recede into the background.
Those of the family, which the law now treats as irrelevant, would
move into the forefront. Additionally, most of the countervailing
state interests identified by the Justices and state courts would sim-
ply disappear. The interests in preserving life, preventing suicide,
and conforming the decision to the patient's hypothetical desires all
would be exposed as chimerical.
No state, however, currently recognizes permanent uncon-
sciousness as constituting death. Of course, the analysis developed
in the preceding Part could be used as the basis for revisions of ex-
isting statutory definitions of death. But as long as these definitions
of death remain unrevised, one must consider whether the Constitu-
tion would ever require that state law definitions of death yield to
one based on a permanent loss of consciousness. This Part accord-
ingly examines whether a permanently unconscious patient or her
family possesses a constitutional right to define the terms upon
which her death is determined.
A. A Consciousness-Based Definition of Death and the
Rational Basis Test
Substantive due process and equal protection require that the
government have a rational basis for its actions. 140 Perhaps one
could argue that the whole-brain criterion lacks such a basis as ap-
plied to the permanently unconscious. Indeed, such a criterion is
irrational in this context. One cannot justify treating the perma-
nently unconscious as alive by appealing to the bodily integrity con-
cept of life and death. Such a concept is either useless because it
supports no moral conclusions or fails to distinguish human persons
from plants and amoebas. Nor can one rationally defend treating
the permanently unconscious as alive on the ground that the whole-
brain and heart-lung criteria are the only reliable medical indicators
of a permanent loss of consciousness. Whatever the level of cer-
tainty demanded, a patient can sometimes reliably be diagnosed as
having permanently lost consciousness despite the functioning of
the heart, lungs, and the lower brain. On close reflection, then, ex-
isting standards of death seem not only wrong, but also indefensible
as applied to the permanently unconscious.
140 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (due process); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978) (same); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (equal protection); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (same); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697-98, 1713-14 (1984).
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The rational basis test, however, does not require close reflec-
tion and, as a result, existing legal definitions of death easily pass
muster. First take substantive due process. The argument here
would be that existing definitions of death violate the nonfunda-
mental liberty interest the patient or her family members have in
structuring their lives free of governmental interference. 4 1
Although the Court has said infringements on this nonfundamental
libertarian right must possess a rational basis, it has given govern-
ment extraordinary leeway in defining the class of persons whose
liberty it constrains. 142 The question thus becomes whether the
government's treatment of a defined class of persons is rational.
The argument that the whole-brain criterion is irrational as ap-
plied to the permanently unconscious mistakenly presumes that the
government and the Court are obligated to focus on the plight of
these particular patients. States have defined the class of affected
persons more broadly than this: existing legal definitions of death
apply to all cases, not just the tiny handful involving permanent un-
consciousness. As a response to the general problem of declaring
death, existing definitions are clearly rational. They generate virtu-
ally no controversy outside the few cases involving permanent un-
consciousness. The rational basis test does not demand that states
utilize rules that work perfectly in every case; the rules need only
advance the state's interests in the class of affected cases. 143
Equal protection provides a better vehicle for forcing the Court
to address the particular plight of the permanently unconscious. An
equal protection claim generally requires the Court to focus on the
141 As a carryover from the Lochner era, the Court recognizes a substantive due pro-
cess liberty interest on the part of individuals to engage in consensual transactions free
of governmental interference. The Lochner Court called this interest "freedom of con-
tract" and required states to have strong justification for overriding it. E.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children' Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Rather
than repudiating the existence of this interest, the modern Court has simply declined to
treat it as fundamental. It has demanded only that restrictions on the interest be ration-
ally related to a permissible governmental end. See cases cited supra note 140. Cf.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
785, 789-93 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (seeking to devalue a woman's liberty interest
in choosing to have an abortion to a nonfundamental interest subject to the rational
basis test); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-72 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same);
see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTmoNAL LAw 567-86 (2d ed. 1988).
142 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) (discussing an
"as applied" challenge to statute). Cf Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)
(in applying rational basis test to evaluate reach of Congress's legislative powers, major-
ity notes that "courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the
class.") (citation omitted); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (examining rationality of statute respecting class of activity statute itself defined);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (same).
143 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88 ("[tlhe law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional.").
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legitimacy of governmental discrimination between societal groups.
Here the claim would be that states cannot justify disparate treat-
ment of the permanently unconscious and those who have perma-
nently lost either heart and lung or whole-brain function. Under
existing equal protection jurisprudence, the analysis would begin
with the recognition that the two societal groups in question-the
permanently unconscious and those fitting within existing defini-
tions of death-constitute nonsuspect as opposed to suspect or
quasi-suspect classes.144 Courts would accordingly evaluate dis-
crimination between them under the deferential rational basis test
rather than strict or heightened scrutiny.
States could thus legitimize their failure to recognize perma-
nent unconsciousness as death simply by pointing to the novelty of
this concept and to the arguable difficulty of its application. 45 It is
settled law that the rational basis test permits the government to
adopt a rule discriminating against a nonsuspect group when a
nondiscriminatory rule would be more difficult to administer. 46
Although these considerations give existing definitions of death
the requisite rational basis, the Court might not feel the need to
144 Under its equal protection jurisprudence addressing discrimination against soci-
etal groups, the Court distinguishes among three types of groups: "suspect," "quasi-
suspect," and "non-suspect." When government intentionally discriminates against
.,suspect" or "quasi-suspect" groups, the Court employs a form of heightened judicial
review. African Americans constitute the archetypal "suspect" class eligible for the pro-
tections of "strict scrutiny." The Court has extended the groups deserving of height-
ened protection beyond African Americans by identifying the characteristics of that
group which justify treating intentional discrimination against its members as presump-
tively invalid. These "traditional indicia of suspectness" include whether the group is
"saddled with... disabilities," San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 1, 28 (1973); is "relegated ... to a position of political powerlessness," id.; suffers
from "a history of purposeful unequal treatment," id.; or possesses "an immutable char-
acteristic" bearing little relation to proper governmental purposes, Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
None of these criteria really applies here. One might argue that the permanently
unconscious are politically powerless. Yet the benefitted group, those who meet ex-
isting legal standards of death, are also politically powerless. This is certainly not a case
of the politically powerful burdening the powerless. Arguably the refusal to regard the
permanently unconscious as dead saddles them with the disability of a life in a hospital
bed. Yet given that the permanently unconscious have no experience, it is hard to see
this as a disability. Suffice it to say that an attempt to draw an analogy between race,
ethnicity, and gender, on the one hand, and the permanently unconscious, on the other,
is badly strained. Existing definitions of death do not "circumscribe a class of persons
characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation" so as to "create or reflect any spe-
cial likelihood of bias on the part of the ruling majority." New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979).
145 E.g., Cranford, supra note 4, at 29-30 (comparing the certainty with which whole-
brain death and permanent unconsciousness may be diagnosed); VEATcH, supra note 27,
at 40-41 (describing difficulty of determining permanent unconsciousness); WALTON,
supra note 35, at 81-84 (same).
146 See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976).
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recite them. It could simply observe that no state has yet adopted a
definition of death which encompasses the permanently uncon-
scious. The Court certainly would not use the rational basis test to
require each and every state to amend its existing definition of
death.
The rational basis test thus permits states to treat the perma-
nently unconscious as alive. This conclusion is hardly surprising;
the rational basis test imposes virtually no meaningfil constraints
on government behavior.
B. A Consciousness-Based Definition, the Right of Privacy, and
the Free Exercise of Religion
Any successful constitutional challenge to the refusal to regard
the permanently unconscious as dead must have as its premise that
refusal's interference with some fundamental right. The right of pri-
vacy furnishes the best potential source for such a right. This sec-
tion accordingly explores whether a permanently unconscious
patient or her family possesses a privacy right to define the terms on
which the patient's death is determined.' 47
The complexity of the ensuing analysis makes worthwhile a pre-
view of its outlines. The interests of the permanently unconscious
patient and her family are discussed separately. The first subsec-
tion shows that it is only when a permanently unconscious patient
has a living will or its functional equivalent that she may be deemed
to have any interest at stake. Whether this interest assumes consti-
tutional dimensions depends on the meaning of the right of privacy.
Finding no coherent understanding of constitutional privacy in
the Court's decisions, the discussion here develops two alternate in-
terpretations. It concludes that a permanently unconscious pa-
tient's living will qualifies for protection only under one of those
interpretations. This novel interpretation links constitutional pri-
vacy to a reformulated understanding of the First Amendment's
147 Although others have argued that individuals ought to have a right to define-the
terms upon which their deaths are decided, they have not explored the argument's con-
stitutional underpinnings:
As with many philosophical and religious disagreements in our society,
we have a well-established method for dealing with diversity. It is to al-
low free and individual choice as long as it does not directly infringe on
the freedom of others and does not radically offend the common moral-
ity. When dealing with a philosophical conflict so basic that it is literally a
matter of life and death, the best solution may be individual freedom to
choose among different philosophical concepts within the range of what
is tolerable to all the interests involved.
VEATCH, supra note 27, at 54. See also GERvAIS, supra note 31, at 211-14 (proposing that
statutory definitions of death contain a "conscience clause" allowing individuals to
choose their own definition).
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guarantee of free exercise of religion. The discussion then turns to
close family members, arguing that their interests fit within either
formulation of the privacy right. The final subsection addresses the
countervailing governmental interests.
1. Constitutional Privacy, Free Exercise, and the Interests of a
Permanently Unconscious Patient: The Enforceability of a
"Living Will"
A discussion of whether a permanently unconscious patient
may claim a fundamental constitutional right to decide whether she
should be regarded and treated as dead must confront two ques-
tions. First, given the conclusion in Part I that a permanently un-
conscious patient is dead, how can such a patient claim any interest
in the matter? Second, if such patients do possess an interest, does
it qualify for constitutional protection?
a. The Interest of a Permanently Unconscious Patient
One encounters initial difficulty in attributing any rights or in-
terests to the permanently unconscious.1 48 Part I's conclusion that
such patients are dead appears to undermine any argument that a
constitutional right is at stake. For how can a dead person have con-
stitutional rights? One response is that presuming a permanently
unconscious patient dead begs the very question to be decided. Yet
this response solves one problem by creating another; presupposing
that the permanently unconscious are live persons also begs the
question. It seems, then, that we have reached an intellectual im-
passe: We can neither presume a permanently unconscious patient
dead, and therefore incapable of bearing rights, nor presume her
alive, and therefore capable of bearing rights.
This impasse can be broken by putting the question of life or
death to one side. Instead of relying on preconceived notions of the
legal, moral, or ontological status of the permanently unconscious,
one can focus on the descriptive reality of that condition. Does it
make any sense to attribute rights or interests to a patient who has
permanently lost consciousness, whether or not we regard such a
patient as alive or dead? Or, more precisely, can such a patient be
deemed to have any interest in deciding whether she should be re-
garded as alive or dead?
The answer would seem to be no. Neither the maintenance nor
withdrawal of medical support can affect the permanently uncon-
scious-they are incapable of thought, pain, or any other kind of
experience. It seems absurd to think of such a patient as having any
148 See supra note 5.
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interest in whether she is regarded as dead or alive.1 49 This conclu-
sion and the analysis that supports it are sound as far as they go; a
permanently unconscious person, at a point of permanent uncon-
sciousness, does not and cannot herself have any interests. 50
Yet this analysis overlooks that a person, while conscious, can
have an interest in how she will be treated in the event she lapses
into permanent unconsciousness.1 ' Consider, for example, a per-
son who firmly believes that a permanently unconscious patient re-
mains alive. That person might well be deeply disturbed that life
support will be withdrawn should she ever become permanently un-
conscious. Someone who is convinced that the permanently uncon-
scious are dead presumably recognizes that nothing can affect her in
such a state. Yet she might nonetheless find the thought of contin-
ued life support profoundly troubling because of the suffering it
would cause her family.152
149 At the very least, a necessary condition for having interests would seem to
be the capacity to experience pleasant and unpleasant sensations. Inter-
ests, in other words, presuppose consciousness, and are properties of the
sort of thing that has or is a self, that is, a subject of experience. It thus
makes no more sense to attribute an interest in continued life to a persist-
ently vegetative person than it does to attribute such an interest to a
plant.
Rhoden, supra note 5, at 400.
150 For a contrary view, see Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Exile and PVS, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 1990, at 5. Appealing to the importance of social interaction,
Schneiderman contends that in maintaining the permanently unconscious, "we are iron-
ically condemning them to an existence long recognized by society as equal to if not
worse than death." Id. He then concludes that it should not matter that the patient is
unaware of this "banishment." He observes that "[ain elderly woman being drained of
her life savings by an unscrupulous lawyer is the victim of a harmful act whether or not
she recognizes it." Ide This, however, is a faulty analogy. The elderly woman might not
realize what her lawyer is doing while he does it. Yet she can, and probably will, become
aware of the lawyer's act and its consequences in the future. A permanently unconscious
patient, of course, will never be affected by the "banishment" to which she is
"condemned."
151 Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia,
15 AM.J. L. & MED. 381, 414-15 (1989) ("It is reassuring and useful for every citizen to
know that, in the event he or she becomes permanently unconscious, human dignity will
be respected. People care now about the prospect of future maintenance in a debili-
tated, helpless state." Id. at 415.).
152 Ronald Dworkin has nicely described why such a person might care about how
she is treated and regarded if she should ever become permanently unconscious:
If the only things people worried about, or wanted to avoid, were
pain and other unpleasant physical experiences, then of course they
would be indifferent about whether, if they became permanently coma-
tose, their bodies continued to live or not. But people care about many
other things as well. They worry about their dignity and integrity, and
about the view other people have of them, how they are conceived and
remembered. Many of them are anxious that their relatives and friends
not have to bear the burdens, whether emotional or financial, of keeping
them alive. Many are appalled by the thought of resources being wasted
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It makes some sense for the state to honor the respective wishes
of these persons. Once a given person enters a permanently uncon-
scious state, her welfare cannot then be affected by whether the state
respects the wishes she expressed while conscious. But whether the
state honors her wishes can affect the welfare of other, still con-
scious persons who seriously consider, resolve, and actively care
about how they wish to be treated in the event of permanent uncon-
sciousness. The welfare of those persons might be significantly di-
minished by the state's refusal to respect the permanently
unconscious patient's wishes, for it raises the troubling prospect
that they will be similarly treated contrary to their wishes should
they ever lapse into such a condition.
This, one might suppose, is the reason why the law recognizes
that a person has an interest in having her will enforced after she
dies. It is not that a person has any interest after death in the distri-
bution of property she owned while alive. The interest derives from
the fact that the former person, while alive, benefited from the
knowledge that following her death her property would be distrib-
uted in accordance with her wishes. 153
This discussion should make clear that a permanently uncon-
scious patient may be deemed to possess an interest in the manner
of her treatment only when she has a living will or its functional
equivalent.i 4 A "living will" indicates that the person has contem-
on them that might be used for the benefit of other people, who have
genuine, conscious lives to lead.
These various concerns explain the horror so many people feel at the
idea of existing pointlessly for years as a vegetable.
Dworkin, supra note 81, at 14, 16. See Ira Mark Ellman, Can Others Exercise an Incapacitated
Patient's Right to Die?, 20 HASTiNGS CENERa REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 47, 50 ("ITihe pa-
tient may have wanted to spare her family the terrible burden of continued vigil when
recovery is unlikely .. "). Thus, the principal motivation for executing a will specifying
how a person is to be treated in the event of permanent unconsciousness is really no
different than that for executing a will distributing property. Both evince a person's
concern for close family members who survive the person's permanent loss of sentience.
153 Promises made to individuals who subsequently die are enforced by the
law after their death, as are testamentary dispositions, even though en-
forcement (or lack of it) cannot be said to benefit (or harm) the dead
person. This practice, however, flows from the interest we all have while
yet alive that our wishes after death be respected. The interests survive
the person, but their origins lie in the sentient mind of the person who
once held them.
Friedman, supra note 28, at 953 (footnote omitted).
154 The phrase "functional equivalent" of a living will should be understood against
the background of its purpose. The phrase seeks to identify those whose welfare, while
conscious, is substantially affected by their expectations regarding whether medical and
legal practices will honor their treatment wishes in the event of permanent unconscious-
ness. For a case where the patient lacked a living will but should be deemed to have had
its functional equivalent, see Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1980). There the patient, who had been an active member of the State Euthanasia
Council, stated that she wanted to make a living will and did not wish to be kept alive as
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plated the possibility of permanent unconsciousness-that the per-
son cares deeply about the matter and has made a deliberate choice
regarding how she would wish to be treated in such a state. Beyond
this, it furnishes a strong indication that the person is aware of the
pertinent medical and legal practices and thus can be affected by
them. It also indicates that the person's concern over the matter is
active and enduring rather than fleeting.
These are the persons whose welfare is significantly affected by
whether the state honors the previously expressed treatment wishes
of the permanently unconscious. 155 Once becoming permanently
unconscious, a given patient can no longer be affected by her treat-
ment. But a patient who has a living will may be deemed to have an
interest at stake. Enforcement of her will enhances the well-being of
other conscious persons who care deeply about whether their wishes
will be respected should they lapse into permanent unconscious-
ness. The patient who has a living will, in effect, stands as the repre-
sentative of these other persons.15 6
In contrast, it makes little sense to try to construct and honor
the wishes of patients who lack a living will or its equivalent. The
easiest situation involves those who never consider how they wish to
be treated in the event of permanent unconsciousness. 15 7 Medical
and legal practices respecting the permanently unconscious obvi-
a "vegetable." hI. at 1338 n.2. Although this patient did not have a living will, it is safe
to conclude that her welfare was substantially affected by her expectations regarding
whether the state would respect her wishes. She had seriously considered the issue and
resolved how she should be treated in the event of permanent unconsciousness. As
evidenced by her membership in the Euthanasia Council, she was aware of the pertinent
medical and legal practices, and her concern was active and ongoing rather than fleeting
and insubstantial. For another case in which the patient arguably had the functional
equivalent of a living will, see In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y.) (patient had
expressed his views in context of formal, classroom discussion of the Quinlan case), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
155 See Martha Henderson, Beyond the Living Will, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST 480 (1990)
(a study of nonterminally ill persons living in a retirement community showing that the
advance planning of medical decisions through a living will decreased anxiety about
death).
156 Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-73 (1991) (discussing doctrine of
third-party standing); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. Rxv. 277
(1984).
157 See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (Ariz. 1987)
("the record in this case is barren of any evidence that Rasmussen expressed her medical
desires in any form prior to becoming incompetent"); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga.
1984) (infant in a permanently unconscious state); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (same); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. 1984) (patient had
never expressed views on the subject, though a relative and a friend testified that pa-
tient's general beliefs indicated that he would want treatment to be withdrawn); In re
Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984) (46-year-old patient who was severely retarded
since birth, attaining a mental age of one); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482
A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) ("At no time has Sandra expressed an opinion
on the use of extraordinary life-support systems on patients with no reasonable hope of
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ously can have no effect on the welfare of such persons. The same is
true of persons who contemplate how they wish to be treated but
who remain unaware of the pertinent medical and legal practices.1 58
Somewhat different considerations apply respecting persons
prompted to consider their treatment wishes by media reports of
actual cases. 159 Such persons presumably have some awareness of
medical and legal practices regarding the permanently unconscious.
When they form a view about how they would wish to be treated,
their welfare might well be influenced by their expectation of
whether medical and legal practices will honor their views, however
informally expressed. It makes sense, though, to distinguish among
such persons based on whether their concern is active and substan-
tial or transient and insubstantial. Medical and legal practices re-
specting the permanently unconscious may influence the welfare of
those who, like the patient in Cruzan, contemplate the matter only in
passing. 160 But the effect will very likely be fleeting and insubstan-
tial. In contrast, medical and legal practices are likely to have a sig-
nificant effect on persons who take the trouble to execute a living
will or who otherwise demonstrate an ongoing, active, and serious
concern for how they will be treated in the event of permanent
unconsciousness.
Initially, a rule holding that a patient has an interest only when
a living will exists might be a somewhat crude device for identifying
and promoting the welfare of those who are actively concerned with
whether the state will respect their treatment wishes. But once this
recovery"); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (Wash. 1983) (relatives testified about what
the patient "would" have decided).
158 See Joseph v. Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987).
159 E.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 442 (NJ. 1987) (patient, while conscious, had
stated that she would not want to be maintained in a state like Karen Ann Quinlan upon
hearing news reports of the Quinlan case); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y.) (patient,
while conscious, had discussed news reports of the Quinlan case), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981).
160 According to originally testimony presented to the trial court, Nancy Cruzan told
a friend that she would not want to live as a "vegetable." She displayed some awareness
of medical and legal practices respecting the permanently unconscious, stating that "she
hoped that people in her family knew that she wouldn't want to live [as a vegetable]
because she knew it was usually up to the family whether you lived that way or not."
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2874 n.19 (1990) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting) (quoting trial testimony). But this conversation lasted only a half an hour.
The thought of existing as a vegetable was evidently transient; she did not thereafter
communicate her desire not to be sustained in such a state to family members. Cf Yale
Kamisar, The Right to Die, supra note 74, at 1208 n.26 (describing additional evidence
adduced before the trial court after the United States Supreme Court's decision). For
other cases in which the patient, while conscious, expressed fleeting concern with how
he or she would be treated in the event of becoming permanently unconscious, see, e.g.,
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 632 n.22 (Mass. 1986) (pa-
tient had expressed views on five occasions); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me.
1990) (patient had expressed views on two occasions).
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rule has been publicly adopted, it will perform its task more effec-
tively. Those who are aware of medical and legal practices and who
are actively concerned with how they will be treated if they become
permanently unconscious will execute a living will, knowing that
they must do so for their desires to be respected. Those who are
either unaware of such practices or who are not actively concerned
with the matter will not bother. In a similar manner, the law of wills
and trusts is not concerned with the intent of a decedent who lacks a
written will but instead distributes her property according to statu-
tory succession formulas. 16'
The conclusion that the permanently unconscious patient who
lacks a living will can claim no interest furnishes a basis for criticiz-
ing a key aspect of the logic found in right-to-die cases and underly-
ing substituted judgment proposals. The Justices in Cruzan 162 and
all state courts that have addressed the matter165 reason that be-
cause a competent patient possesses a right to refuse medical treat-
ment, an incompetent patient, including one who is permanently
unconscious, must also possess this right. On this logic, the only
difficult question concerns how the incompetent's right can be exer-
cised.' 6 4 This question leads inescapably to "substituted judgment"
161 Cf John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. Rv.
489, 490-503 (1975).
162 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (majority opinion); id at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 E.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987)
("Other jurisdictions have unanimously concluded that the right to refuse medical treat-
ment is not lost merely because the individual has become incompetent and has failed to
preserve the right."); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (Wash. 1983) ("An incompetent's
right to refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so. No court has
denied an individual this right because of incompetency to exercise it."); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.) (patient's right to privacy "should not be discarded solely on
the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice"), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
164 E.g., In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952 (Me. 1987) ("Courts have wrestled with
the difficulty of protecting the right of self-determination in cases where the patient who
has previously made no controlling medical decision has come into a persistent vegeta-
tive state and is therefore no longer able to make or communicate any personal deci-
sion."); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924-25
(Fla. 1984); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 384.
Although state courts have unanimously extended a competent patient's right to
refuse medical treatment to permanently unconscious patients, they have disagreed
about how that right may be exercised. They have disagreed about the circumstances in
which judicial approval of a decision to withdraw medical treatment must be obtained.
Compare In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (I1. 1989) (judicial approval
always required) and In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665 (judicial approval must be obtained
when family, physicians, and hospital ethics committee do not concur) with Bludworth,
452 So. 2d at 926 (judicial approval not necessary so long as family and physicians
concur); compare In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (judicial intervention necessary when patient
has always been incompetent) with In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Wash. 1984)
(rejecting this position). On when a patient's prior statements are probative of what she
would decide in her present permanently unconscious state, compare In re Jobes, 529
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or "surrogate decisionmaking" proposals. Because the incompetent
patient cannot make a decision and rarely has a living will, someone
else must "construct" or "ascertain" the patient's decision. Substi-
tuted judgment and surrogate decisionmaking proposals, which
have been embraced by courts165 and extensively discussed by
scholars,' 6 6 make this decision either by adopting a subjective test,
which attempts to incorporate the patient's own statements and val-
ues, 167 or an objective test, which identifies the patient's "best inter-
ests" independent of the patient's own values. 168
A.2d 434, 443 (NJ. 1987) (patient's prior statements reacting to the use of life-support
were too "remote, general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances") with In re
Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (relying on a 16-year-old's reaction to highly
publicized case). On whether treatment decisions for the patient should be made in the
first instance by family members or by a legally appointed guardian, compare In re Colyer,
660 P.2d at 742 (suggesting that guardian must be appointed) with In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d
at 1377 (rejecting this suggestion and permitting family to make decision). On whether
life-support may be withdrawn only upon "clear and convincing" evidence that the pa-
tient would desire this, compare In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) ("The inter-
ested parties need not have clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intentions;
they need only 'render their best judgment' as to what medical decision the patient
would want them to make.") with In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 300.
165 See cases cited infra notes 167, 168.
166 Rhoden, supra note 5; Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of SubstitutedJudgment, 100 YALE LJ. 1 (1990);JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER
ALEINncorr, MODERN CONSTTrruToNAL THEORY: A READER 542 (2d ed. 1991); Kamisar,
Right to Die, supra note 74, at 1233-40; Robertson, supra note 5, at 1142-44, 1191-96;
Ellman, supra note 152; Buchanan, supra note 91; Dresser, supra note 5; Martyn &
Bourguignon, supra note 8, at 837-42; Quinn, supra note 58; Norman L. Cantor, Conroy,
Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 570-58 (1985).
167 E.g.,John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926
(Fla. 1984) ("The means developed by the courts to afford this right to incompetent
persons is the doctrine of'substitutedjudgment.' Under this doctrine close family mem-
bers or legal guardians substitute their judgment for what they believe the terminally ill
incompetent persons, if competent, would have done under these circumstances.");
Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634-35 (Mass. 1986) ("mhe
primary goal of the substituted judgment standard is 'to determine with as much accu-
racy as possible the wants and needs of the individual involved.' "); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d at 664; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 385-94.
Even absent a living will, some courts have found the evidence of what the patient
would have chosen so clear that they view themselves as merely enforcing a decision the
patient made while conscious rather than as constructing a substituted judgment. In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950, 952 (Me. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
168 See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987)
("Where no reliable evidence of a patient's intent exists ... the surrogate decisionmaker
assesses what medical treatment would be in the patient's best interests."); In re Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Minn. 1984) (decison must be based on the patient's "best inter-
ests"); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1984) (same); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 396-97 (discussing difference between subjective
and objective tests); Robertson, supra note 5 (arguing for a best interests test).
Interestingly, Professor Rhoden argues that an objective test is meaningless as ap-
plied to the permanently unconscious:
We cannot empathetically imagine unconsciousness, because a life bereft
of all goals, values, and even sensations is simply too far outside our
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The debate over the proper formulation and application of sub-
stituted judgment proposals is pointless. Scholars and courts worry
about whether the constructed decision will accurately match what
the patient would have chosen (in the case of a subjective test) or
the patient's true best interests (in the case of an objective test).169
All concede that the effort to construct a decision is fraught with
difficulty.1 70 Yet even if an "accurate" decision can be made, there
is no reason to care about it. Such a decision could have no current
or future effect on the patient because of the patient's permanent
unconsciousness. Unless the patient has a living will, such a deci-
sion will not significantly advance the welfare of others who might
become permanently unconscious in the future.
The syllogistic equation between the rights of competent and
incompetent patients and the resulting substituted judgment pro-
posals attribute interests to patients who really have none. Worse
range of experience .... Indeed, the answer to the question "What is currently
beneficial or burdensome to a comatose patient?" is "Nothing."
Id. at 399 (emphasis added). Yet, having noted that the permanently unconscious can-
not be affected by their treatment or nontreatment, Professor Rhoden nonetheless de-
clines to abandon the project of trying to construct a decision reflective of the patient's
interests. She instead recommends that close family members be entrusted with decid-
ing the matter as they think the patient would have. Id. at 437-39.
This Article draws the conclusion logically implied by Professor Rhoden's quoted
observation. Given that there is no reason to care about what the patient would have
decided if she could, the decision should be remitted to family members who remain
close and caring. The family, however, should be permitted to make the decision based
on its own interests rather than on wholly fictitious ones imputed to the patient.
169 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990) ("Not all
incompetent patients will have loved ones available to serve as surrogate decisionmakers
.... A State is entitled to guard against potential abuses in such situations."); Conserva-
torship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 855 (Cal. App.) ("To delegate an incompetent
person's right to choose inevitably runs the risk that the surrogate's choices will not be
the same as the incompetent's hypothetical, subjective choices"), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
958 (1988); Robertson, supra note 5, at 1191 (substituted judgment "gives the proxy no
guidance in how to infer the patient's choice when previously competent, thus making it
likely that the substituted decision will serve the proxy's own interests rather than the
patients"); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 440; Harmon, supra note 166, at 65; Ellman, supra
note 152, at 49-50; Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 8, at 839; Buchanan, supra note
91, at 393-97; Dresser, supra note 5, at 379-82, 388-90 (criticizing attempts to construct a
decision based on wishes patient expressed while competent, including even a living
will, on the ground that "a[n] effectively different person exists by the time the life and
death situation arises"); James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Sirens' Lure of Invented Con-
sent: A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decisionmaking for Legally-Incapacitated Older Per-
sons, 42 HASTINGs LJ. 779, 808-09, 812-14 (1991) ("Because of a patient's unexpressed
goals and desires, a surrogate may be unable to correctly determine the most likely deci-
sion a patient would have made.").
170 Kamisar, Right to Die, supra note 74, at 1238 ("ascertaining what a person would
have decided if she miraculously became competent and aware of her present plight 'is a
quixotic enterprise in the absense of clearcut prior expressions by the patient' ") (quot-
ing Cantor, supra note 166, at 412); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 390-93, 399-410; Martyn &
Bourguignon, supra note 8, at 837 ("Respecting the personal choice of a permanently
unconscious or incompetent patient calls for greater skill, sensitivity, and tenacity.").
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than this, the conventional perspective devalues the interests truly at
stake, those of the family, treating those interests as irrelevant, self-
ish, and dangerous.' 71
b. The Constitutional Status of the Patient's Interest: Making
Sense Out of the Privacy Morass
Does a permanently unconscious patient's interest in enforce-
ment of her living will rise to the level of a fundamental constitu-
tional right?172 The interest cannot be squeezed into the prevailing
understanding of any of the specific rights enumerated in the Con-
stitution. The most likely basis for protecting this interest is the
unenumerated right of privacy, which the Court has discerned vari-
ously in the due process clause, the "penumbras" of textually speci-
fied rights, and the Ninth Amendment. The problem, however, is
that the Court's decisions fail to articulate a coherent view of the
privacy right.
The confusion currently reigning in the law of constitutional
privacy should not debilitate further analysis. One response to the
current disarray, possibly favored by a few of the Justices, 73 would
be to abandon the whole enterprise of elaborating an unenumerated
right of privacy. Yet most of the Justices accept the existence of a
171 Bopp & Avila, supra note 169, at 814 ("[i]nvented consent invites 'incompetent
patients' genuine interests to be quietly and conveniently subordinated to the interests
of others' ") (quoting Dresser, supra note 5, at 390).
172 It might be thought that the living will statutes adopted by numerous states mean
that the constitutional issue of a living will's enforceability is not very important as a
practical matter. As of 1989, however,
nearly half of the 39 states that have adopted living-will statutes ... spe-
cifically exclude artifical nutrition and hydration from the category of life-
sustaining treatment that may be refused. In only one state-Utah-does
the law provide that a person may give a directive to withdraw or with-
hold nutrition and hydration in a living will.
Moreover, "[i]n most states, a living will only becomes operative after its maker has
become 'terminally ill,' usually defined as suffering from an illness that will result in
death 'within a short time regardless of the application of medical procedures.' " Kamisar,
supra note 5, at 27.
173 Justice Scalia has intimated that he regards the notion of unenumerated rights
and substantive due process as an illegitimate, nonoriginalist invention. But he has said
that as a Justice he will not be compelled to reject these doctrines outright because he
can resist extending them by concluding that extensions lack the requisite support in
tradition. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring); Antonin Scalia, Onrgnalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. Rav. 849, 864 (1989). Other Justices have also expressed
disquiet with unenumerated rights and substantive due process. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786, 790-91 (1986)
(White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Rather than discarding these doctrines altogether,
these latter Justices wish to dilute their meaning by making unenumerated or substan-
tive due process rights subject to the toothless rational basis test. Id. (right of abortion
is nonfundamental and hence, subject to the rational basis test); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
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fundamental privacy right.174 Most commentators defend the exis-
tence of unenumerated rights generally175 and a fundamental right
of privacy in particular.176
This Article accepts the existence of a constitutionally based
right of privacy and seeks to develop the strongest interpretations of
that right's scope. Scholars should not restrict their efforts to refin-
ing the doctrinal details of the Court's vision of the Constitution.
They bear a particular responsibility enriching our constitutional di-
alogue by conceiving, developing, and defending alternative visions.
After unsuccessfully searching the cases for a meaningful concep-
tion, the following paragraphs accordingly sketch out two separate
views of constitutional privacy. The first view, which commentators
have already begun to articulate, is organized around whether the
consequences of the choice in question shape the entire direction of
one's daily life. The other view, which has been only dimly per-
ceived thus far, sees the privacy right as an aspect of the First
Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion. A permanently
unconscious patient's living will falls within the latter, and not the
former, view of privacy.
174 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring) (indicating apparent support for Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing funda-
mental unenumerated right of privacy). During his confirmation hearings, Justice Sou-
ter embraced a fundamental unenumerated right of privacy in general and the result in
Griswold in particular. Neil A. Lewis, Souter Comments in Approving Way on Activist Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at Al.
175 Commenting on a symposium on the Ninth Amendment, Suzanna Sherry de-
clared: "[Tlhe preliminary debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment is essen-
tially over. Despite the diversity of views expressed in the Symposium, all but one
contributor agreed that the ninth amendment does protect judicially enforceable un-
enumerated rights. The real question now must be how to identify those rights."
Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1001, 1001 (1988). See also, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide
Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amend-
ment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitu-
tion, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1161-67 (1987); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1217 n.12 (1990) (citing a lengthy list of
sources). For dissenting views, see id. at 1217 n.14 (citing sources).
176 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1533 (1988) ("The Bork
nomination hearings have made clear that 'privacy' . . . enjoys broad popular support as
a constitutional value."). See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING
THE CONSTITUTION 45-60 (1991); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 231-81 (1986);Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
But see, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 113-15 (1990); Ely, supra note
68, at 929-37.
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i. The Incoherence of the Court's Understanding of Privacy
In seeking to give content to constitutional privacy, the Justices
have employed two distinct approaches. One approach seeks to
elaborate the privacy right in accordance with an underlying princi-
ple or value. The other seeks to structure elaboration of unenumer-
ated rights in accordance with "deeply rooted traditions." Neither
approach has succeeded. The Justices have failed to articulate a
meaningful principle, 77 and their use of tradition has been wholly
arbitrary, without any discernible method.
a. Principle
Consider first the Justices' unsuccessful efforts to specify a
meaningful principle underlying the privacy right. The leading de-
cision in Griswold v. Connecticut,178 which invalidated a Connecticut
anticontraception statute as it applied to married couples, is notori-
ously ambiguous in its simultaneous emphasis of different themes.
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court relies in part upon what has
been called "informational privacy," the shielding of the intimate de-
tails of one's life from public scrutiny.17 9 Other aspects of the opin-
ion, however, stress autonomy, an individual's freedom to make
choices about how to order her life.' 80
Subsequent decisions build primarily on the theme of auton-
omy, but are remarkably unclear on the dimensions of the autono-
mous decisionmaking the Constitution protects.' 81 In Roe
v. Wade, 18 2 for instance, the Court declared opaquely that "the right
has some extension to... marriage.... procreation .... contracep-
tion.... family relationships.... child rearing and education" and
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy."' 8 3 Yet the Court did not undertake to
explain why the right encompasses such decisions.'8 4 Its observa-
177 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 739 ("At the heart of the right to privacy, there has
always been a conceptual vacuum."); Norman Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy,
55 U. Cai. L. REV. 1181, 1186-88 (1988).
178 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
179 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms f6r telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"). See TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 176, at 112-13; Ely, supra note 68, at 930 (characterizing Griswold as a
case involving "governmental snooping").
180 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-25 (1974);
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 445, 484-85 (1983).
181 Henkin, supra note 180, at 1424-33.
182 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183 Id. at 152-53.
184 Roe's failure to articulate a governing principle has been noted by several com-
mentators. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973); Ely, supra
19921
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tions regarding the extreme hardship an unwanted pregnancy and
child brings upon a woman' 85 might suggest that the right protects
decisions having an important effect on an individual's life. TheJus-
tices, however, have essentially discarded any effort to develop this
notion.
More recent cases are even less clear. In Bowers v. Hardwick,18 6 a
five justice majority held that the right of privacy does not "confer[]
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 187
In an opinion betraying disquiet with the very existence of
unenumerated constitutional rights, 88 the majority listed the
choices the Court previously had~held to be within the privacy right,
allotingjust a few words for each of the Court's past decisions. 189
The majority concluded its cursory description of those decisions by
asserting that they protected choices related to "family, marriage,
and procreation." 190 The majority saw "no connection" between
these areas and homosexual sodomy.' 91 As Jed Rubenfeld has ob-
served, "[I]t was as if the Court had said, 'We in the majority barely
understand why even these three areas are constitutionally pro-
tected; we simply acknowledge them and note that they are not in-
volved here.'"192
Beyond identifying choices relating to "marriage, family, and
procreation" as possible candidates for protection, the majority
note 68, at 932 n.79; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 233, 274
(1977). For more recent commentaries, see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Tribe's Judicious Femi-
nism, 44 STAN. L. REv. 179, 187 (1991) (reviewing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)); PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 158 (1982) ("No
reason is given why the right-to-privacy cases establish a right to that less than private
experience, an abortion .... ).
185 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
186 478 U.S. 286 (1986).
187 Id. at 191.
188 The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution.... There should be
... great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [due process],
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental. Otherwise, the Judicary necessarily takes to itself further
authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. For a criticism of this reasoning, see TRIBE & DORF, supra
note 176, at 57 ("refusing to recognize a right so as to protect the Court's reputation
seems . . .plainly illegitimate").
189 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
190 Id. at 191.
191 Id.
192 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 748. See also Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hard-
wick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 653 (1987) (describing
majority opinion as "little more than judgment by pigeonhole.").
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made no further effort to discern a unifying principle at work in pre-
vious privacy decisions. It did not even begin to explain why choices
about these three areas may deserve protection while choices in
other areas do not. Nor did it try to explain why, within these three
areas, certain choices, such as the abortion decision, are protected
but others, such as a decision to have an adulterous relationship, are
not.193
The dissenters in Hardwick likewise failed to articulate a coher-
ent understanding of constitutional privacy.'9 4 Although the dis-
sent first described the right as " 'the right to be let alone,' "195 it
could not have seriously meant for this description to suffice. Con-
ceived this broadly, the right would be all-encompassing; it would
include all decisions an individual makes about every aspect of her
life.' 96 The dissent did advert to narrower formulations of the right;
it spoke of the right of citizens to "make[e] choices about the most
intimate aspects of their lives.' 97 Yet the dissent neglected to de-
fine the key term "intimate," thereby rendering it impossible to
make principled judgments regarding which decisions qualify for
constitutional protection. The dissent did link sexual intimacy with
"the development of the human personality."1 9 8 But this vague
connection furnishes no real guidance outside the context of sexual-
ity, because the dissent did not explain why or how sexuality is
"key" to personality.' 99
193 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 748-49; David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legiti-
macy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 862 (1986). For a compendium of
the scholarly commentary on Bowers, see Earl M. Maltz, The Court, the Academy, and the
Constitution: A Comment on Bowers v. Hardwick and its Critics, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 59, 60-
61 n.4 (attributing all criticism of Bowers to frustrated expectations "that judicial activism
will inevitably advance the left-center political agenda"!).
194 For an amusing recognition of the difficulty of identifying the privacy principle at
stake in Hardwick, see WILLmAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES, COM-
MENTS, QUESTIONS 415 (7th ed. 1991) ("What Shall We Call This Segment-The Right
to Engage in Homosexual Sodomy? Adult, Consensual Sexual Conduct in the Home?
The Automony of Private Sexual Choices? Sexual Expression and Control of One's
Body? Unconventional Sexual Lifestyles? The Right to Control One's Intimate Associa-
tions? The Right to be Let Alone?").
195 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
196 Ely, supra note 68, at 932 ("I suppose there is nothing to prevent one from using
the word 'privacy' to mean the freedom to live one's life without governmental interfer-
ence. But the Court obviously does not so use the term. Nor could it, for such a right is
at stake in every case."). Cf Kelley v.Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249, 250 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (" 'Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct the individual is
free to pursue,'" including "one's interest in dressing according to his own taste." (cit-
ing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954))).
197 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199 Rubenfeld calls this idea the "personhood thesis." Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at
750. This thesis holds that "a person must be free to 'define himself.'" Id. at 753.
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The various opinions in Cruzan serve only to further obscure
the meaning of constitutional privacy. Neither the majority opinion
nor the principal dissenting opinion mentioned the Court's previous
privacy decisions, 200 conveying the surreal impression that those de-
cisions simply do not exist. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion merely assumed, without deciding, "that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 201 Yet by
expressly refusing to locate this assumed right in "a generalized
constitutional right of privacy, ' 20 2 the majority raised doubts about
the existence of an unenumerated privacy right and the vitality of
the entire line of cases recognizing it. The Court preferred to view a
competent patient's assumed right to refuse lifesaving medical treat-
ment as a substantive liberty interest protected by due process. 203
"[S]ome acts, faculties, or qualities are so important to our identity as persons-as
human beings-that they must remain inviolable, at least as against the state." Id. The
crucial task, which the Bowers' dissenters did not adequately perform, is to furnish an
explanation of which acts, faculties, or qualities are this important and why.
200 The Court's opinion merely contained a single citation to Bowers and, in fact,
expressly disavowed reliance on "a generalized constitutional right of privacy ...."
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7 (1990). The dissent
cited some of the privacy cases but neglected to discuss them. Id. at 2864-65. Justice
O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion, added a separate concurring opinion in
which she mentioned "the 'freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life.'"
Id. at 2858 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)).
201 Id at 2852. Although the majority opinion merely assumed arguendo the exis-
tence of this right, a majority of the Justices were willing to affirm forthrightly the right's
existence. Id. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 2865-2867 (Brennan, Mar-
shall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2883-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast
with ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and White, who assumed the right's
existence, and with justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, who
affirmed the right's existence, Justice Scalia denied the existence of a constitutional right
on the part of a competent patient to refuse life-saving treatment. Id at 2859-63 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
A majority of the Justices appeared to subscribe to the conclusion that an incompe-
tent patient, no less than a competent one, possesses a right to refuse life-saving treat-
ment. The four dissentingJustices all took this position. Id at 2867 (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("Nor does the fact that Nancy Cruzan is now incompetent
deprive her of her fundamental rights") and id at 2890 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor strongly suggested that an incompetent patient possesses such a right. I. at
2857 ("[T]he Court does not today decide the issue whether a State must... give effect
to the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker.... In my view, such a duty may well be
constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment ... should [she] become incompetent").
Of course, the utility of this "Justice-counting" is uncertain given the departures of
Justices Brennan and Marshall from the Court.
202 Id. at 2851 n.7.
203 Id. One could read the majority's opinion as relocating the titular basis of cases
such as Griswold without implying any rejection of their substantive result or basic rea-
soning. The Court's conspicuous omission of the privacy cases, however, suggests that
it sought to distance itself from both the reasoning and results of those cases and to limit
them to their facts, if not overrule them altogether at some future time.
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The majority, however, failed to explain how this and other substan-
tive liberty interests can be derived from due process. 20 4 It also ex-
pressed no view about the strength of the assumed liberty interest
relative to competing governmental interests. Further, the majority
did not address whether this and other unenumerated substantive
liberty interests are "fundamental," thereby requiring that counter-
vailing interests survive strict scrutiny, or are "nonfundamental,"
like the remnants of LochnerIs205 right of freedom of contract so that
countervailing interests must merely satisfy the deferential rational
basis test. 20 6 Cruzan thus leaves the law of unenumerated rights and
constitutional privacy in considerable disarray.
204 A competent person's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment obviously is
not found in the text of the Constitution. One approach to creating such a right would
be to draw out the implications of the privacy cases to see whether they would support
such a right. Yet this approach was ruled out by the majority's evident unwillingness to
place any reliance on these cases. The majority did declare that a competent person's
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment "may be inferred from our prior decisions"
pertaining to the integrity of the body. Id at 2851. Likewise, Justice O'Connor found a
protectable liberty interest in the Court's "decisions involving the State's invasions into
the body." Id at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is unclear whether these Justices
mean merely to convey respect for the dictates of precedent or to affirmatively embrace
a conception of privacy centered on the inviolability of the body. Such a conception
seems somewhat inconsistent with the following statement from Roe:
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amid that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close rela-
tionship to the right to privacy as previously articulated in the Court's
decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this
kind in the past.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). More important, the Justices in the majority
failed to explain why the Constitution protects an unenumerated due process right to
shield the body from unwanted governmental intrusion.
Nor did the dissentingJustices in Cruzan articulate any meaningful principle under-
lying the unenumerated right of bodily integrity. Like Justice O'Connor in her concur-
rence and the majority in its opinion, the dissenters merely asserted the existence of the
right, citing to past cases. Rather than appealing to' a principle, Justice Brennan's dis-
sent and Justice Scalia's concurrence rely on societal traditions. For a discussion of
these Justices' use of tradition, see infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
205 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See supra note 141.
206 The majority observed that a liberty interest in taking a particular action does not
necessarily imply a right to so act. To ascertain whether a person's liberty interest has
the force of a right, the Court reasoned, one must balance that interest against the rele-
vant state interests. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52. The majority declined to specify the
state's interests, although it left no doubt that it thought those interests weighty. It
declared, "[Tihe dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would
inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that [liberty] interest is constitution-
ally permissible." Id at 2852.
The Court did not directly express any view regarding whether the state's interests
must be compelling, important, or merely legitimate to override this liberty interest.
Instead, it remained curiously noncommittal about both the nature of the balancing pro-
cess and its outcome, merely assuming argnendo that the liberty interest would out-
weigh whatever interests the state could assert. The Court's opinion contained none of
the phrases suggestive of strict scrutiny such as "less restrictive means" and "compelling
governmental interest." In fact, some of its language is evocative of the rational basis
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Taken together, the Court's opinions establish a principle that
each person has a right to make certain fundamental decisions for
herself, free of governmental coercion. The cases, however, fail to
give meaningful content to the term "fundamental," which forms
the very heart of this principle. At least some choices pertaining to
family, marriage, procreation, and, for the Hardwick dissenters, sex-
ual intimacy are apparently "fundamental." But the decisions do
not explain why; they fail to specify any value or concept that can be
used to identify "fundamental" choices. Lacking this, one cannot
possibly determine whether a person's decision to define "death"
for herself is so fundamental that the right of privacy protects it.
b. Tradition
A number of the Justices' opinions have eschewed the effort to
identify an underlying principle, appealing instead to tradition. 20 7
Yet tradition cannot and should not be the touchstone of constitu-
tional privacy.
The majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick208 illustrates the in-
tractable problems associated with reliance upon tradition. In up-
test. Id at 2853 ("Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard") (emphasis added); id.
("Missouri has permissibly sought to advance these interests") (emphasis added); id. at
2854 ("the Constitution does not require general rules to work faultlessly"). See Robert-
son, supra note 5, at 1173-75. The tenor of its discussion of the interests supporting
Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard appears to suggest a balancing test
occupying an intermediate position between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test.
Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying an intermediate standard of review).
Justice Brennan's dissent, in contrast, endorsed the "least restrictive means," if not the
"compelling" governmental interest, component of strict scrutiny. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2864.
The plurality opinion in Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 516-21
(1989), also leaves doubt over whether any fundamental unenumerated rights exist and,
if so, the proper test for evaluating restrictions on them. See Walter Dellinger & Gene B.
Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
83 (1989).
207 Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961), is the fore-
runner of this approach, although even earlier traces of it can be found. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improve-
ment Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1856). For more modem appeals to tradition in the elabo-
ration of unenumerated substantive due process rights, see Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Haislip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1041-43 (1991); id. at 1046, 1047-54 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865-67 (principal dissenting opinion); idt at 2859-62 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-31 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-93 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
383-85 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-95 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring); 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55
U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1171-74 (1988) (discussing role of tradition in Court's unenumer-
ated rights jurisprudence).
208 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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holding a Georgia statute that makes sodomy a crime, the Court
declared that the elaboration of constitutional privacy must hew to
"deeply rooted" traditions. 20 9 Instead of a "deeply rooted" tradi-
tion supporting the claimed right of homosexual sodomy, the ma-
jority found long-standing prohibitions against sodomy.210
The majority, however, failed to specify any method for using
tradition. Methodological questions abound. One set of questions
centers on the criteria a practice must satisfy to qualify as a constitu-
tionally cognizable tradition. How long must a practice have been
entrenched for it to qualify? How many states must subscribe to the
practice before it becomes "deeply rooted"? Must government ex-
plicitly recognize and approve of the practice by statute or judicial
decision, or is it sufficient that the practice be entrenched in private
circles without official acknowledgement and approval? Does wide-
spread and long-standing agreement on generalized and abstract
values qualify or-only agreement on very specific societal or legal
practices? 211
Once a tradition has been identified, another set of method-
ological questions arises regarding its permissible use.212 When, if
ever, is it permissible to identify a value underlying a tradition and
follow the implications of that value even though those implications
are not themselves supported by a tradition? May those implica-
tions be given the force of constitutional law when they conflict with
other traditions? How should conflicts between traditions be
resolved?213
These questions are far from academic. Depending on one's
definition of "deeply rooted tradition," one can view Hardwick as
involving at least two different sets of conflicting traditions. The
first involves the tradition of formal proscription of sodomy and the
perhaps more recent tradition of refusal to enforce this proscrip-
tion.214 The second set consists of the tradition of governmental
209 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
210 IL at 192-94.
211 Cf Sunstein, supra note 207, at 1173 ("In the hard cases, part of the question is
whether the tradition should be read at a level of generality that draws the particular
practice into question.").
212 , TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 100 ("[E]ven when we discover a clear histori-
cal tradition it is hardly obvious what the existence of that tradition tells us about the
Constitution's meaning.").
213 Many commentators contend that methodological problems such as those identi-
fied in the text render futile any attempt to use tradition as an objective, neutral basis for
constitutional interpretation. SeeJOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 60-63 (1980).
For an attempt to work out a methodology for using tradition as a basis for the specifica-
tion of unenumerated rights, see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MicH. L. REv. 981, 1039-1050 (1979).
214 The criminal prohibitions cited by the majority as establishing a tradition gener-
ally did not single out homosexual sodomy, but instead applied to all acts of sodomy.
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noninvolvement in consensual sexual intimacy generally and the
competing tradition of intolerance of homosexuality. 215 The major-
ity did not attempt to provide the means for deciding whether any of
these practices qualify as "deeply rooted traditions," or for resolv-
ing a conflict between them assuming they do qualify. Nor did the
majority explain whether and how the Court's past privacy decisions
can plausibly be viewed as emerging from deeply rooted
traditions.2 16
The import of tradition also presents problems with respect to
the constitutional status of a permanently unconscious patient's liv-
ing will. The issue of whether and how a person in a persistent veg-
etative state may refuse lifesaving medical treatment has only arisen
quite recently, as a result of medical advances. 217 Given the novelty
of the precise issue at hand, one might suspect that no discernible
tradition addresses it. Yet several relevant traditions arguably exist.
For example, the uniformity with which existing legal defini-
tions of death exclude the permanently unconscious arguably repre-
sents a tradition rejecting the notion that such patients may be
regarded as dead. Despite its attractive simplicity, though, this con-
clusion is quite vulnerable. By and large, legal definitions of death
exclude the permanently unconscious because their drafters were
simply unaware of a more inclusive alternative. Interestingly, most
of these definitions incorporate the Harvard Committee's whole-
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homoseauality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073,
1082-89 (1988). Such prohibitions are now virtually never enforced. Georgia, in fact,
declined to prosecute Hardwick under its sodomy statute and conceded that no one had
been prosecuted under the statute for several decades. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188; see also
id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The history of nonenforcement suggests the
moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual con-
duct."). Cf Lupu, supra note 213, at 1044 ("[A] conscious and purposeful tradition of
nonregulation" can demonstrate "recognition of a liberty as fundamental.").
215 See TRIBE, supra note 141, at 1427-28. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
141 (1989) (BrennanJ., dissenting) (characterizingJustice Scalia's tradition-bound view
of due process as creating "a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.").
216 Cf Sunstein, supra note 207, at 1173 ("There is no established tradition of pro-
tection of abortion, marital privacy, or use of contraception."). Of course, the majority's
failure to explain how tradition can support the Court's previous privacy decisions may
indicate that the majority believes that those decisions cannot be derived from tradition
and therefore were wrongly decided.
As Jack Balkin has noted, there are competing traditions found at different levels of
generality respecting all of the privacy issues the Court has addressed and many other
constitutional issues as well. J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal and the Politics of Deconstruc-
tion, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1617-18, 1624 (1990). See also GREENAWALT, supra note
73, at 165 ("What we may have, more precisely, is more than one statable consensus;
numerous consensuses may be cast, and they may be at different levels of generality and
in terms of differential degrees of acquaintance with the facts.").
217 GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 2.
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brain criterion, which the Committee arguably viewed as including
patients in a permanently comatose state. 218 In fact, the high de-
gree of uniformity among state court decisions allowing treatment
to be withdrawn from the permanently unconscious arguably evi-
dences a tradition supporting a patient's right to define the terms
upon which her death is decided. 21 9
Justice Scalia has enjoined courts to "refer to the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified." 220 Even indulging the con-
troversial assumption that this interpretive methodology makes
218 The Committee entitled its report: "A Definition of Irreversible Coma." In the
first sentence of the report, the Committee declared its purpose: "to define irreversibe
coma as a new criterion of death." Harvard Report, supra note 93, at 11. It is true that the
Committee went on to specify criteria for identifying "those comatose individuals who
have no discernible central nervous system activity." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). But the
Committee's report contains no evidence of a deliberate intent to exclude, much less a
justification for excluding, those who permanently lack consciousness but retain some
vegetative brain activity. Indeed, the conflict between the Committee's stated aim of
identifying irreversibly comatose patients and its whole-brain criterion precipitated con-
fusion in the medical field over whether the permanently unconscious were to be re-
garded as dead. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SuSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at
173.
219 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 666, 667-70:
"[W]hile death was defined in terms of the whole brain, legal decisions
on the cessation of treatment, including that of mechanical feeding, rec-
ognized that treatment could end not only when the whole brain was
dead, but also when the higher brain alone was destroyed.
So in the space of a few decades, a remarkable consensus has devel-
oped in the medical and legal communities that those who have been per-
manently deprived of self-awareness by cessation of higher brain
functioning can be allowed to die.
An outsider to our society would be justified in concluding that in
our practice, if not our laws, we treat those with an irreversible loss of
consciousness as dead.
All of the cases cited supra note 13 allowed withdrawal of life-support from the persist-
ently vegetative patient. See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2887-88 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that prior to the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision in Cruzan, "an unbroken stream of cases ha[d] authorized procedures
for the cessation of treatment of patients in persistent vegetative states"); Martyn &
Bourguinon, supra note 8, at 828 & n.59. In addition, an impressive array of medical-
ethical commissions has endorsed the permissibility of the withdrawal of life-support
from the permanently unconscious. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 14; AMA Council, supra note 4; Inst. of Medical Ethics Working Party on the
Ethics of Prolonging and Assisting Death, Withdrawal of Life-support from Patients in a Persis-
tent Vegetative State, 337 LANCET 96 (1991); Am. Academy of Neurology, supra note 23;
HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987); U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, INSTITUTIONAL PROTOCOLS FOR DECISIONS ABOUT LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS
(1988).
220 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
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sense as a general matter, 22' here it is singularly unhelpful.
Although traditions addressing the right to define one's own death
can be found, they are conflicting.
Traditions of a more general nature similarly fail to resolve the
issue. A competent person's traditional right to refuse medical
treatment 222 could conceivably support the principle that each per-
son has a right to resolve questions having a direct bearing on her
personal fate, her life or death. A person's right to define "death"
for herself could be viewed as a corollary of this principle. The
problem, though, is that the traditional prohibition against suicide
seemingly contradicts the principle that each person may resolve
questions having a direct bearing on her life or death.223
The Court's opinions do not even begin to resolve the tensions
that exist between these various traditions. 224 Indeed, Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion appealed to one tradition,225 ignoring the
other;226 Justice Scalia's opinion appealed to the tradition Justice
Brennan ignored, 227 essentially ignoring the tradition on which Jus-
tice Brennan relied. 228 These unprincipled uses of tradition, made
221 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who joined every other aspect ofJustice Scalia's
plurality opinion, wrote a concurring opinion for the sole purpose of disassociating
themselves from the footnote in which Justice Scalia announced this methodology.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring). Thus, only Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Scalia's proposed method for using tradition. For
critiques ofJustice Scalia's proposed methodology, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1057 (1990); Balkin,
supra note 216, at 1614-18; Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 206, at 90-92.
222 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relied upon this tradition. Cruzan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2865-67 (principal dissenting opinion).
223 This "tradition" was the crux of Justice Scalia's separate concurring opinion.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-63. State courts have declared that the withdrawal of support
from a permanently unconscious patient is not suicide because it "merely allows the
disease to take its natural course .... '" Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d
674, 685 (Ariz. 1987) (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985)). See
McConnell v. Beverley Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. 1989)
(citing other cases). Yet given that permanently unconscious patients can survive for
years, often with only the provision of nutrition and fairly routine medical care, this
reasoning seems badly strained. See Flick, supra note 139, at 1126-29 (discussing tension
between the principle of patient autonomy animating the right-to-refuse treatment and
prohibitions against suicide).
224 For an explanation of how other courts have tried to reconcile the right to refuse
medical treatment with the prohibition against suicide, see Cantor, supra note 166, at
549-50.
225 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[F]reedom from unwanted
medical attention is unquestionably among those principles 'so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" (quoting Synder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934))).
226 The principal dissent did not mention suicide. See id. at 2863-78.
227 Id at 2860-63 (discussing prohibitions against suicide).
228 Justice Scalia did discuss "the claimed right to refuse medical treatment," id. at
2861, but, without explanation, declined to characterize such a right as within any tradi-
tion. He instead criticized such a claimed right as logically inconsistent with prohibi-
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inevitable by the fact that conflicting traditions can virtually always
be found at different levels of generality, 229 confirm John Hart Ely's
observation that "'tradition' can be invoked in support of almost
any cause." 230
Even assuming that the Court could develop a principled meth-
odology, a theory prescribing the use of tradition would be objec-
tionable on other, more fundamental grounds. The notions of
"tradition" and "consensus" are interrelated. A given practice rep-
resents a "tradition" only if it is supported by a stable consensus for
a substantial period of time. The practice enjoys the support of a
"consensus" only if virtually everyone accepts it. In other words,
traditions require the continuous support of a supermajority, not just
such support at a given point in time.23 1 It subverts the whole point
of antimajoritarian constitutional guarantees to limit their meaning
to "tradition," to practices accepted by a supermajority over the
course of decades. 23 2 If unenumerated constitutional civil liberties
exist, tradition cannot codify their content.
The Justices have been unable to formulate a consistent meth-
odology for applying notions of tradition to resolve privacy issues.
tions against suicide. I& at 2861-62. Cf Balkin, supra note 216, at 1613-25 (critiquing
Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan's conflicting uses of tradition in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.).
229 See supra note 216 and infra note 233.
230 ELY, supra note 213, at 60. See Balkin, supra note 216, at 1618 (the inevitable
conflicts among traditions necessitate normative judgments); TRIBE & DORF, supra note
176, at 106 (a tradition-bound approach necessarily "imports values surreptitiously-
claiming all the while only to be discovering values that are, as it were, out there is
societal traditions"); Sunstein, supra note 207, at 1173 ("Tradition cannot by itself be
controlling in close cases, and the constitutional question must be answered instead by
an inescapably normative inquiry into how the relevant tradition is best characterized.").
Despite Justice Brennan's reliance on tradition in Cruzan, he has elsewhere recognized
its inherent malleability. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137-38 (1988) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541, 549
(1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is
arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is even more
debatable.").
231 Lupu, in his effort to specify a principled methodology for the use of tradition,
makes this quite explicit. He writes:
To... be confident [that a claim qualifies for constitutional protection as
an unenumerated fundamental liberty], the Court must decide that the
claim satisfies two related tests:
1) Historically, American institutions must have recognized the iiberty claim
as one of paramount stature.
2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a level of high
priority.
Lupu, supra note 213, at 1040-41.
232 John Ely makes the point nicely: "'[I]f the Constitution protects only interests
which comport with traditional values, the persons most likely to be penalized for their
way of life will be those least likely to receive judicial protection,' and that flips the point
of the provisions exactly upside down." ELY, supra note 213, at 62 (footnote omitted).
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They have neither specified the criteria a practice must satisfy to
qualify as a tradition, addressed the permissible uses of tradition,
nor prescribed the appropriate resolution of conflicts between tradi-
tions. Many privacy issues, including the one this Article addresses,
involve several arguable traditions, some of which conflict with one
another. 23 3 This failure to formulate a methodology necessarily
makes any use of tradition ad hoc and result-oriented. Beyond this,
See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); TRIBE & DORF, supra
note 176, at 57.
Lupu has an interesting response to this argument. He asserts that the use of tradi-
tion to determine the content of unenumerated rights is consistent with the nature of
the Constitution:
For what is the Constitution itself, if not a collection of "[enduring] value
judgments of the majority," interpreted and applied by courts so as to be
"the vehicle for protecting minorities from the [momentary] value judg-
ments of the majority"? The entire body of the Constitution, amend-
ments and all, is a series ofjudgments by an extraordinary majority that
limit the power of future political majorities.... [Tradition played a vital
role in the very creation of the Constitution.
Lupu, supra note 213, at 1042 (footnote omitted). See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2
(plurality opinion) ("Nor do we understand why our practice of limiting the Due Process
Clause to traditionally protected interests turns the clause 'into a redundancy.' . . . Its
purpose is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional
values-not to enable this Court to invent new ones") (quoting L at 141 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
The problem with Lupu's argument is that it proves too much. Lupu contends that
tradition must be used as a basis for unenumerated rights because otherwise their elabo-
ration is too countermajoritarian (hence illegitimate) and subjective. The dangers of
countermajoritarianism and subjectivity exist when defining not only unenumerated
rights but also notoriously ambiguous enumerated rights such as freedom of speech and
equal protection. The logic-of-Lupu's position implies that, when ambiguous, the mean-
ing of textually specified rights should be limited by tradition. This view would greatly
circumscribe the meaning of constitutional civil liberties and would require the rejection
of vast areas of established constitutional doctrine.
Lupu might respond that the meaning of enumerated rights was once supported by
the requisite tradition, became part of the fabric of constitutional law, and need not
thereafter be construed according to tradition. But this response seems unavailing be-
cause the notion of unenumerated constitutional rights has also been supported by the
requisite tradition, becoming part of constitutional law (witness the Ninth Amendment
and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Of course,
the text does not tell us what those rights are. But neither does the text specify the
implications of ambiguous enumerated rights.
233 The problem of conflicting traditions seems as pervasive as it is insoluable (at
least in a nonarbitrary fashion). See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (noting
that two conflicting sets of tradition bear on the treatment of intimate homosexual acts);
supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text (noting that conflicting traditions of both a
specific and general nature bear on the treatment of permanently unconscious patients);
supra note 216 (noting conflicting traditions pertaining to marital use of contraceptives
and to abortion); infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text (noting that those who
drafted and ratified the equal protection guarantee had conflicting views regarding the
purpose of that guarantee and the lawfulness of racial segregation in the public schools).
See also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 13 (1960) (The "pro-
pensity to hold contradictory ideas simultaneously is one of the most significant qualities
of the American political mind at all stages of national history").
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the use of tradition would be objectionable even if it could be made
workable. The meaning of constitutional privacy should not depend
on the approval of supermajorities.
ii. Privacy as the Right to Make Life-Altering Decisions
The incoherence of the Court's understanding of constitutional
privacy necessitates alternatives. Jed Rubenfeld's brilliant article on
constitutional privacy furnishes one alternative conception of pri-
vacy's underlying principle. 23 4
Rubenfeld argues that the privacy right consists of a person's
freedom from having government make decisions whose conse-
quences "inform the totality of [her] life." 235 The privacy right pre-
234 Others have sought to explain privacy's underlying principle in accordance with
an updated version ofJohn Stuart Mill's thesis concerning "self-regarding" acts. Fein-
berg, supra note 180; Gerety, supra note 184, at 274-81. On this view, a person may do
what she pleases so long as her actions cause no direct nonconsensual injury to third
parties. Because no acts are truly "self-regarding" in the sense that they have no effects
on others, Mill's modern defenders reformulate the principle. Joel Feinberg, for in-
stance, says that under this principle, an individual has a right to take actions "that do
not seriously impinge on the important interests of other people .... Feinberg, supra note
180, at 464 (emphasis added). Feinberg admits that this conception of privacy differs
from that found in the Court's cases, which protect "pivotally central life decisions." lId
at 490. But, he argues, the conception implicit in the Court's cases is difficult to give
content and leads to arbitrary results:
Many writers have complained that Mill's self-and-other-regarding test is
a difficult one to make precise and workable, but its difficulties are minor
compared to those involved in giving application to the criterion of "cen-
tral," "pivotal," or "fecund" interests, or those "inseparable from the
concept of ordered liberty," or those that express a person in "some es-
sential and important way." As the experience of the Supreme Court has
shown, it is difficult to apply a restricted concept of personal sovereignty
in ways that do not seem arbitrary.... The correlative of vagueness in a
criterion is arbitrariness in its application.
Id. at 491 (footnote omitted). Whether or not a Millian conception is less vague than the
Court's ill-defined conception, it fails to protect an essential social dimension of per-
sonhood. As Tribe writes:
[F]reedom to have impact on others-to make the "statement" implicit in
a public identity-is central to any adequate conception of the self. To
confine fundamental rights to activities having no effects on others, or to
acts of consenting persons having no effects beyond their circle, is to evis-
cerate such rights-first, because virtually any action has non-trivial con-
sequences beyond any perimeter defined in advance; and second,
because the generation of such consequences is essential to personhood
as virtually everyone experiences it.
TRIBE, supra note 141, at 1303 (footnote omitted). See also Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at
756-61 (dismissing the Millian conception because nearly all self-regarding acts may
possibly offend or harm others).
235 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 784.
The distinctive and singular characteristic of the laws against which the
right to privacy has been applied lies in their productive or affirmative conse-
quences. There are perhaps no legal proscriptions with more profound,
more extensive, or more persistent affirmative effects on individual lives
than the laws struck down as violations of the right to privacy.... At the
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vents the government from prohibiting abortion, for example,
because the prohibition's consequence, forced motherhood, con-
sumes a woman's daily life.23 6 Rubenfeld casts the right in negative
terms-as encompassing a person's freedom from having the gov-
ernment make decisions whose consequences control her daily life.
Instead one might formulate the right in positive terms-as encom-
passing a person's freedom to make decisions whose consequences
determine the shape and preoccupations of her daily life.23 7 It is
intriguing to consider whether these two formulations view the
same principle from different perspectives or state substantively dif-
ferent principles. For present purposes, however, this question is
not pertinent. Neither formulation accords constitutional status to a
permanently unconscious patient's living will.
This conclusion might seem puzzling at first. Consider the pri-
vacy right in positive terms, as a person's freedom to make life-alter-
ing decisions. What decision could produce consequences more
life-shaping than a person's decision to have life-support with-
drawn? Alternatively, consider the matter from Rubenfeld's "nega-
tive-right" perspective, which concentrates on the government's
capacity "to direct and to occupy individuals' lives" through law
rather than on a person's positive freedom to shape her identity.
Does not a governmental decision to treat permanently unconscious
patients as alive alter their lives, forcing them "into a particular, all-
consuming, totally dependent, and indeed rigidly standardized
life-the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical
machinery, and tended to by medical professionals"? 238
f These ostensibly appealing ways of considering the problem
fail because they address the decisikon's effect on a person after she
enters a permanently unconscious state. As we have seen, nothing
affects a patient in such a state; lacking consciousness, the patient
has no experiences. A patient's interest in enforcement of a living
will does not stem from the effect it will have on the patient. Rather,
it stems from the effect that the enforcement or nonenforcement of
simplest, most quotidian level, such laws tend to take over the lives of the
persons involved: they occupy and preoccupy. They affirmatively and
very substantially shape a person's life; they direct a life's development
along a particular avenue. These laws do not simply proscribe one act or
remove one liberty; they inform the totality of a person's life.
Id. Rubenfeld's view is suggested opaquely by Roe, which stressed the life-altering con-
sequences of a governmentally forced decision to become a mother. See supra note 185
and accompanying text.
236 "For a period of months and quite possibly years, forced motherhood shapes
women's occupations and preoccupations in the minutest detail; it creates a perceived
identity for women and confines them to it .... Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 788.
237 For the classic discussion of "negative" and "positive" freedom, see ISAIAH BER-
LIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969).
238 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 795.
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living wills has on the welfare of other, conscious persons who ac-
tively care about whether the state will respect their treatment
wishes.
The interest in the enforcement of living wills does not fit
within either the negative or positive formulations of privacy men-
tioned above. Granting persons the positive freedom to decide
whether they should be regarded as dead in the event of permanent
unconsciousness might well affect the welfare of conscious persons
to some degree. But this freedom can hardly be said to have life-
shaping consequences. Nor would permitting government, rather
than individuals, to make this choice pose the danger of "creeping
totalitarianism" against which Rubenfeld's negative conception
guards.23 9 The effects of the government's refusal to enforce living
wills are hardly comparable to the effects of laws the Court has held
to violate constitutional privacy.240 A person might be somewhat
troubled by the knowledge that the government, not her living will,
decides what shall become of her in the event she lapses into perma-
nent unconsciousness. Yet her freedom to structure her daily life is
almost completely unaffected. The government's refusal to enforce
living wills does not impede her freedom, while conscious, to decide
which occupation t6 pursue, whether to become a parent,24' with
whom to associate, 242 and which values to teach her children. 243
iii. Privacy as the Free Exercise of Religion
If a person has a constitutional right to decide whether she
should be regarded as dead in the event of permanent unconscious-
ness, that right cannot rest on the life-shaping consequences of that
decision. It must instead derive from the decision's protectable
character. This section outlines a view of constitutional privacy that
focuses on a decision's character rather than its consequences. It
239 By disregarding the wishes that a permanently unconscious person expressed
while conscious, government would not "standardize" the lives of those who actively
care about whether their wishes will be respected, forcing them into singular, normal-
ized, functional molds and "direct[ing their] development along a particular avenue."
Id. at 784.
240 Robertson, surpa note 5, at 1180-81 ("the satisfaction and certainty that arises
from controlling one's own future in this way is not so central to personal autonomy and
identity that it deserves fundamental right status").
241 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
242 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down law forbid-
ding nonnuclear family from living together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(striking down law forbidding interracial marriage).
243 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down law requiring
children to attend public elementary schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(striking down law forbidding teaching of foreigu languages to any student who had not
completed the eighth grade).
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proposes understanding constitutional privacy as an aspect of the
First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion.
It urges a novel view of free exercise that is both broader and
narrower than the one that now prevails. The conventional wisdom
holds that while all actions traceable to a sincere belief in a
"God" 244 qualify for presumptive free exercise protection, the ac-
tions of atheists or agnostics never do. On the view this section pro-
poses, not all actions traceable to a belief in God qualify for this
protection while some of the atheist's and agnostic's actions do.
This view interprets the free exercise guarantee as protecting re-
sponses to certain quintessentially religious questions, whether or
not those responses may be traced in each case to a belief in the
existence of a god or sacred reality.
This revised view of constitutional privacy and free exercise,
though deeply appealing, is problematic. It is nonetheless the view
one must accept if a permanently unconscious patient's interest in
enforcing her living will is to assume constitutional dimensions.
It is natural that one would turn to the First Amendment's free
exercise clause in seeking a home for the right of privacy. 245 Other
constitutional civil liberties allow government to regulate action and
merely prescribe the means it must use in doing so. 246 The First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech generally protects a
person's right to express belief. Yet it generally does not protect
244 It would be wrong to suggest that only actions traceable to a belief in "God,"
narrowly defined, qualify. The Supreme Court does not require belief in God in the nar-
row sense of belief in a particular kind of sacred, transcendent reality. In Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961), for instance, the Supreme Court declared that a
"religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment need not be based on "a belief in
the existence of God." The Court noted that "[a]mong religions in this country which
do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others." Id. at 495 n. 11.
This Article uses the term "God" in the broad sense, as referring to a supreme being or
some other transcendent, sacred reality.
Rather than trying to identify exactly what the conventional view of "religion" in-
cludes, it is more useful here to focus on what it excludes. The conventional view-the
view that appears to predominate among recent commentators and on the Court-ex-
cludes all beliefs of the atheist and agnostic. See infra notes 259, 270-76 and accompany-
ing text. By contrast, the free exercise view of privacy would define some of the atheist
and agnostic's beliefs as religious. These would be beliefs of the atheist and agnostic
that address quintessentially religious questions.
245 For mention of a possible link between the right of privacy and free exercise of
religion, see RMCHARDS, supra note 176, at 143-46; Philip B. Heyman & Douglas E. Barze-
lay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765, 773-75
(1973).
246 The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, for example, place no limits on the
actions government may declare criminal. They instead limit how government may in-
vestigate and prosecute activity deemed criminal.
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illegal action premised on belief.247 The free exercise guarantee,
however, goes beyond this. It not only protects the right to express
religious belief, but also protects a right to "exercise" those beliefs.
Understood in light of its text, history, and purposes, the guarantee
of free exercise gives a person a presumptive right to act on sincere
religious belief even when that action is proscribed by otherwise
valid law.248 Employment Division v. Smith,24 9 the Supreme Court's re-
cent and closely divided decision to the contrary, is simply wrong.25 0
Unlike most other constitutional civil liberties, both free exercise
and constitutional privacy put certain activities beyond govern-
ment's regulatory reach.
An appealing argument can be made that the definition of life
and death is "religious" within the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause. Of course, when a person's definition is traceable to a belief
in God there can be no doubt of its fitting within the presumptive
free exercise right. Imagine the following case, which closely resem-
bles an actual case recently decided in Minnesota. 25 1 In her former
247 Freedom of speech, for example, enables a person to say that the political system
is hopelessly corrupt and that, absent violence, nothing will change. But it affords no
protection when the person takes violent action in support of those beliefs.
248 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
249 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
250 Prior to Smith, the free exercise clause was understood to preclude government
from making or enforcing any law insofar as it burdens the exercise of a sincere religious
belief unless doing so is the least restrictive means of attaining a compelling governmen-
tal objective. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972); McConnell, supra note 248, at 1416-17. Smith rejects this view, holding that "the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263-64 n.3 (1982). According to
Smith, the only function of the free exercise clause is to bar deliberate governmental
discrimination against religiously motivated conduct.
For utterly devastating criticisms of Smith's reasoning and result, see Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109
(1990); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. CT. REV. 1. See also TRIBE & DORF,
supra note 176, at 93-95. In response to the perceived error of Smith, Congress is consid-
ering a legislative correction of the decision through the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1990. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). This bill, which is supported by
an extraordinarily diverse coalition of organizations ranging from the American Civil
Liberties Union to the National Assocation of Evangelicals, see Oliver S. Thomas, Restor-
ing Free Exercise and Preventing Religious Fraud: A Response to Milner Ball, 20 CAP. U. L. REV.
67, 68-69 (1991), did not come to a vote during the 101st Congress.
251 The case involves Helga Wanglie, a retired Minneapolis schoolteacher who was
in a persistent vegetative state until her death in 1991. A county-run hospital petitioned
a court to appoint an independent guardian to make medical decisions for her so that
the respirator enabling her body to function could be removed. Her husband opposed
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conscious state, a permanently unconscious patient expresses agree-
ment with the bodily-integrity concept of death. She does so based
upon the teachings of her Lutheran religion. She executes a living
will whose terms reflect such a definition of death. When the pa-
tient lapses into permanent unconsciousness, the state resists en-
forcement of her living will. Consistent with the consciousness-
based definition of death urged in Part I, it seeks to treat the patient
as dead and to terminate all life-support. Under the view of the free
exercise guarantee prevailing before Smith, this woman would have a
presumptive free exercise right to have her death defined in accord-
ance with the terms of her living will.2 52 Absent very important gov-
ernment interests, the state's consciousness-based definition of
death would have to yield.
But must existing "whole-brain" definitions of death yield to
the living will of an atheist who subscribes to a consciousness-based
definition? Under the understanding of free exercise now widely ac-
cepted, the atheist's definition would not be considered "religious"
because it does not ultimately rest on a faith in a "God." 253 This
atheist's definition, however, is religious provided that we focus on
the nature of the question addressed rather than on whether the an-
swer presumes belief in a "God." Certainly the definition of life and
death is the kind of deep question about human existence that has
traditionally been the domain of religion. The definition of life and
death is inextricably intertwined with the very meaning of life. A
person's definition can be expected to reflect what it is she thinks
gives life its value: ability to have sensation, to think, to make moral
choices, to interact with others, to have faith in God.254 In addition,
the termination of life-support. Although Mrs. Wanglie did not have a living will, her
family maintained that she told them that, as a devout Lutheran, she favored every effort
to maintain life. Edward Walsh, Recasting "Right to Die' Public Hospital Seeks to End Life
Support, WASH. PosT, May 29, 1991, at Al; Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASnNGS CENTER
REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 23-35. The court eventually denied the hospital's petition to
wrest control over Mrs. Wanglie's fate from her husband. See Alexander Morgan
Gapron, In re Helga Wanglie, HASTNGS CENTER REP., Sept-Oct. 1991, at 26.
252 Cf In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (conscious and competentJeho-
vah's Witness had a free exercise right to refuse life-sustaining blood transfusions); In re
Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965) (same); Charlotte K. Goldberg, Choosing Life
After Death: Respecting Religious Beliefs and Moral Convictions in Near Death Decisions, 39 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 1197 (1988) (arguing patients who reject the whole-brain criterion as too
broad have a constitutional right to have their "death" determined in accordance with
the traditional heart-lung criteria).
253 See infra notes 259, 270-76 and accompanying text.
254 AM9LIE 0. RORTY, MIND IN ACTION 27-46 (1988) (discussing how conceptions of
a "person" vary between and within historical periods based on moral notions of what is
intrinsically important about life); VEATcH, supra note 27, at 54 (describing definition of
death as involving basic philosophical and religious disagreements); Rhoden, supra note
68, at 668 (describing "the definition of personhood [as] that murky, unscientific con-
glomerate of biological, philosophical and theological claims").
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this question could not be more intimately tied to a person's own
ultimate fate.255 These matters are quintessentially religious. 256
In distinguishing between the believer and the nonbeliever's re-
sponses to quintessentially religious questions, the accepted view of
free exercise seems arbitrary. The Supreme Court evidently agreed
in the famous conscientious objector cases25 7 when it defined reli-
gion as including belief which "occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God." 2 58
255 Cf Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2868 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("Dying is personal. And it is profound.").
256 [IThe question when human life truly begins asks not for a discovery of
the point at which the fetus possesses an agreed-upon set of characteris-
tics which make it human, but rather for a decision as to what characteris-
tics should be regarded as defining a human being. And, at least at this
point in the history of industrialized Western civilization, that decision in
turn entails not. an inference or demonstration from generally shared premises,
whether factual or moral, but a statement of religious faith upon which people will
invariably differ widely.
Tribe, supra note 184, at 21 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Cruzan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[N]ot much may be said with confidence about
death unless it is said from faith, and that alone is reason enough to protect the freedom
to conform choices about death to individual conscience."); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (freedom of religion "embraces the right to maintain theories of
life and of death and of the hereafter"), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
257 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
258 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. Seeger and Welsh construe the conscientious objector ex-
emption found in § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. 50
U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958). The express language of the exemption required belief in
"a Supreme Being" and excluded "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code." The Court nonetheless concluded that this
statutory language indudes a nonbeliever's beliefs when they perform a function in her
belief system analogous to that of religiously derived beliefs. See also Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1 1 (1961) (suggesting that humanism is a "religion"). Justice
Harlan, concurring in Welsh, characterized this extreme manipulation of the statutory
language as an attempt to "avert the collision between [the statute's] plainly intended
purpose and the commands of the Constitution." Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354. Commenta-
tors also view Seeger and Welsh as reflecting the Court's notion of the constitutional
meaning of "religion." Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 589; Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 260-61 (1989); Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion
Special?: Reconsidering the Accomodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 158-59 (1990); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1063-66 (1978).
Other commentators criticize the Court's definition of religion in the conscientious
objector cases as amorphous and overly broad. Ingber, supra, at 261-62; Choper, supra,
at 593-94.
Like the Court in these two cases, some commentators find arbitrary a distinction
between the conscientious views of believers and nonbelievers on the morality of war
and other subjects. RICHARDS, supra note 176, at 141-42; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RxGrrs SERIOUSLY 200-01 (1977); GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 231-41 (arguing that
with respect to moral questions not resolvable through commonly accessible, secular
reasons, it is arbitrary to distinguish between answers based on secular and religious
sources and to hold that laws giving religiously inspired answers unconstitutionally es-
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For purposes of its free exercise jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has since retreated from a definition of religion that encompasses a
nonbeliever's responses to quintessentially religious questions. 259
But one can view aspects of the right of privacy as giving nonbe-
lievers a right to act on their responses to such questions and, in so
doing, effectively broadening the definition of religion under the
free exercise clause. 260 In this way, the free exercise guarantee, op-
erating under the guise of constitutional privacy, affords presump-
tive protection to responses to quintessentially religious questions
about human existence regardless of whether those responses are
traceable to a belief in a "God.'261
There are, then, preliminary grounds for thinking that the guar-
antee of free exercise of religion will support aspects of the right of
tablish religion); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 357, 388-90 (1989-1990); Gey, supra note
258, at 167 ("[t]here is no constitutional justification for using the free exercise clause to
prefer religiously motivated behavior over nonreligious behavior."); Norman Dorsen,
The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 863 (1986); Olick, supra note
100, at 280-81; Note, supra note 258, at 1075 ("[F]idelity to the purposes of the free
exercise clause demands that any concern deemed ultimate be protected, regardless of
how 'secular' that concern might seem to be.").
259 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (distinguishing between the
"deep religious conviction" of the Old Order Amish and the "philosophical and per-
sonal rather than religious" views of Henry David Thoreau). See also id at 247-49
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (noting conflict between Yoder and Seeger). See Ingber,
supra note 258, at 262 (discussing "suggestions of a judicial retreat from a concept of
religion broad enough to cover all aspects of individual conscience"); Gey, supra note
258, at 160 (noting Court's "refusal to carry the Seeger rationale beyond its original
facts"); McConnell, supra note 248, at 1491 n.420 (describing Seeger and Welsh as "the
only, instance in the Court's history that it extended religious exemptions to persons
with essentially secular claims of conscience").
260 RiCHARDS, supra note 176, at 144 ("Constitutional privacy... ha[s] been devel-
oped in part to fill the constitutional lacuna left by the Court's unprincipled narrowing
of the constitutional concept of religion.").
261 Although this view has not previously been well developed, it is not entirely
novel. As Professor Mansfield said more than twenty five years ago, "[Ilt is the funda-
mental character of the truths asserted, and the fact that they address themselves to basic ques-
tions about the nature of reality and the meaning of human existence, that is the primary reason
for characterizing a belief in these truths as religious." John H. Mansfield, Conscientious
Objection-1964 Term in Religion and the Public Order 3, 10 (1966) (emphasis added).
See also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted):
One's views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more impon-
derable questions-the meaning of life and death, man's role in the Uni-
verse, the proper moral code of right and wrong-are those likely to be
the most "intensely personal" and important to the believer. They are
his ultimate concerns. As such, they are to be carefully guarded from
governmental interference.
See Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 603, 660-63 (1987); Ingber, supra note 258, at 271-72; Note, supra note 258, at
1073-74 (briefly noting Mansfield's approach). Cf GREENAWALT, supra note 73 (arguing
that whether legal action premised on religiously inspired belief violates the Establish-
ment Clause depends on the nature of the question to which the belief is addressed).
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privacy, including a person's right to define the terms upon which
her death will be decided.
a. Attractions
Locating the privacy right in the free exercise clause holds con-
siderable attraction. First, it links Roe and Cruzan in a profound sym-
metry. These cases involve essentially the same issue at opposite
ends of the life-cycle. Cruzan involves the right of the individual ver-
sus the government to decide the terms upon which one's death is
decided. Roe concerns the right of the individual versus the govern-
ment to decide whether the fetus constitutes actual life during the
early stages of its development. 262 The free exercise view of privacy
outlined here would grant both the believer and nonbeliever a pre-
sumptive right to resolve these symmetrical questions of an essen-
tially religious character. 263 This is not necessarily to say that Roe
262 In deciding whether a state's interest in protecting life overrides the mother's
fundamental privacy right to choose an abortion, the Roe Court noted the many diver-
gent definitions of life's beginnings. 410 U.S. at 60-61. The Court disavowed adoption
of any of these definitions, stating: "When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary
... is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id. at 159. Critics of Roe nonethe-
less maintain that by holding that a state's interest in protecting life becomes compelling
only after the fetus has become viable, the Court effectively did adopt a particular defini-
tion of life. See Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy"
Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79,
115 (1988) ("Only by judicially imposing the view that fetuses are not human did Roe
make abortion a right and foreclose its opponents from exercising their otherwise com-
monplace power to act through the government to protect what they plausibly take to be
human life");John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV.
668, 672-73 (1984). The best view, however, is that rather than endorsing the view that
the fetus does not constitute an actual life before viability, Roe says that before viability
the mother, and not government may decide the fetus's status. 410 U.S. at 162 ("We do
not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the
pregnant woman.").
263 It is certainly not novel to recognize the religious character of the abortion ques-
tion. See Dworkin, supra note 73, at 49:
Is the human fetus a person from the moment of conception? That ques-
tion has been argued by theologians and moral philosophers and ordi-
nary people for many centuries. It cannot be resolved by legal research
or scientific evidence or conceptual analysis; it will continue to divide
people, as it divides Americans now, so long as deep disagreements re-
main about God and morals and metaphysics.
See also GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 120-37 (arguing that any resolution of the moral
status of the fetus, "religious" or not, must "go beyond commonly accessible reasons");
David AJ. Richards, Constitutional Privacy, Religious Disestablishment, and the Abortion Deci-
sion, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 148, 171-73 (Jay L. Garfield & Patri-
cia Hennessey eds., 1984); Thomas I. Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change
Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court: The Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 129, 131
(1982) ("That judgment rests upon faith, religious dogma, or a fundamental value at the
basis of a philosophical system. For most of us, the question of when human life begins
is a matter of religious judgment."); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1026 n.249 (1984). The religious character of the question of the
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was rightly decided. As noted earlier, unlike cases involving the per-
manently unconscious, abortion involves potential life.264 In addi-
tion, a living will determines one's own status; with abortion, the
mother resolves that of the fetus. 265
A second attraction of this view is that rooting constitutional
privacy in the free exercise clause blunts the criticism that privacy
lacks a textual basis. Privacy's proponents have had embarrassing
difficulty in explaining how they can eke a general right of privacy
out of the constitutional text, which does not expressly recognize
any such right. Many have found wholly unpersuasive justice Doug-
las's attempt in Griswold to find such a right in the "penumbras" and
"emanations" of various specific guarantees. 266
fetus's status initially led Professor Tribe to maintain that prohibitions against abortion
constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Tribe, supra note 184, at 18-32.
He has since retreated from this position, not so much because he now regards views
concerning the fetus's status as nonreligious but rather because his overly broad notion
of establishment "on reflection, . . . give[s] too little weight to the value of allowing
religious groups freely to express their convictions in the political process .... TRIBE,
supra note 141, § 15-10, at 1350.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980), the Court rejected an argument
that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal funding of abortion, establishes reli-
gion by "incorporat[ing] into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church concern-
ing the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life commences." Id at 319. This
argument implicitly distinguishes between "religious" and "secular" responses to abor-
tion and contends that the Hyde Amendment was religiously inspired. This Article's
thesis rejects this distinction, contending that all responses to the abortion question are
religious within the meaning of the First Amendment. This thesis obviates the need, felt
by the Court in Harris and by Professor Tribe in his 1973 article, to address the extent to
which abortion legislation is the product of organized religion or the beliefs of believers.
Because all responses to the abortion question qualify as religious, the only questions
are whether abortion legislation establishes religion, see infra note 322 and accompanying
text, or interferes with a person's right to freely exercise her religious beliefs, cf Harris,
448 U.S. at 320-21 (declining to reach free exercise argument on grounds of absence of
standing).
264 Even assuming that privacy gives a woman a right to decide whether the fetus
constitutes actual life, the interest in protecting potential life at least arguably justifies a
prohibition on abortion. The resolution of this question requires one to confront the
issue of who decides the weight to be given the interest in protecting potential life: the
individual, the legislature, or the Court. Of course, if the weight to be given potential
life versus actual life is a quintessentially religious question or if an abortion restriction
is a mere subterfuge for a decision that the fetus at all times constitutes actual life, the
free exercise view of privacy outlined here requires that the individual decide the matter.
For a discussion of the potential life argument, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
265 See infra notes 334-35 and accompaning text.
266 E.g., Henkin, supra note 180, at 1421-22 (emphasis added):
Although it is not wholly clear, Justice Douglas's argument seems to go
something like this: since the Constitution, in various "specifics" of the
Bill of Rights and in their penumbra, protects rights which partake of
privacy, it protects other aspects of privacy as well, indeed it recognizes a
general, complete right of privacy.
... A logician, I suppose, might have trouble with that argument. .4
legal draftsman, indeed, might suggest the opposite: when the Constitution sought to
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Impressive efforts have been made to demonstrate that the
Ninth Amendment recognizes the existence of constitutional rights
not specifically enumerated in the constitutional text.267 Even if
fully persuasive, these efforts fall short of establishing a textual basis
for an unenumerated right of privacy. The text of the Ninth Amend-
ment furnishes no basis at all for deciding which rights might qualify
for constitutional protection. Privacy's textual claim seems no
greater than that of any other unenumerated right one might con-
ceivably propose.
In much the same vein as Justice Douglas, others have sought to
ground privacy in the assumptions underlying the Constitution as a
whole or in some of its particular provisions. David Richards finds
privacy in a "background right" of conscience undergirding the
First Amendment.268 Jed Rubenfeld describes privacy as a" 'tran-
scendental' doctrine of constitutional law, in the Kantian sense of
that word.... a- doctrine necessary to the very possibility of...
constitutional democracy. ' 269 One senses that these explanations
satisfy only the already converted; a more direct connection be-
tween privacy and the text would more successfully quell contro-
versy over the right's constitutional standing. A free exercise
perspective on privacy furnishes such a connection.
Finally, such a perspective is attractive because it diminishes an
apparent discrepancy in the treatment of believers and nonbe-
lievers. The Court's most recent decisions appear to reject the no-
tion that a nonbeliever's views may sometimes qualify as "religious"
for purposes of the free exercise clause. 270 Commentators have also
defined "religion" as categorically excluding the atheist's or agnos-
tic's beliefs. 27' Belief stemming from reason alone, so-called "secu-
lar belief," does not qualify as "religious" even when that belief is
protect private rights it specified them; that it explicitly protects some elements of pri-
vacy, but not others, suggests that it did not mean to protect those not mentioned.
See also Ely, supra note 68, at 935-36 (a fundamental right of privacy, understood as pro-
tecting a right to make choices affecting one's life, "is not inferable from the language of
the Constitution, the framers' thinking .... any general value derivable from the provi-
sions they included, or the nation's governmental structure" (citations omitted)).
267 See supra note 175.
268 RICHARDS, supra note 176, at 231.
269 Rubenfeld, supra note 176, at 805.
270 See supra note 259.
271 See Ingber, supra note 258, at 292; Choper, supra note 258 (defining as "reli-
gious" only those beliefs a person thinks have "extratemporal consequences"; that is,
those beliefs whose observance or nonobservance a person thinks will influence her
destiny after death); McConnell, supra note 248, at 1488-99. But see Kent Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753, 762 (1984) (proposing an
"analogical approach" under which "courts should decide whether something is reli-
gious by comparision with the indisputably religious"); Note, supra note 258 (equating
"religion" with a person's "ultimate concerns").
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directed to questions of an indisputably religious character. Under
this view, a person who asks whether God exists and answers affirm-
atively has a presumptive right to "exercise" this religious belief,
but a person who answers the same question negatively receives no
protection from the free exercise guarantee. 272
What is the rationale for treating the believers and nonbe-
liever's responses to the same questions differently? The rationale
typically advanced asserts that while the believer's responses stem
from an extrapersonal, transcendent source outside the individual's
control, 273 the nonbeliever's responses are "manifestations of mere
individual will or judgment." 274 Civil government must yield to the
believer's responses because the source of such responses precedes
and is superior to civil government. 275 The nonbeliever's actions, in
contrast, must always yield to government's commands, for the
political process furnishes the appropriate means for resolving con-
flicting beliefs and values of a "personal" nature.276
This rationale for giving the believer a presumptive right to act
on her responses to quintessentially religious questions applies
equally to the nonbeliever's responses. The nonbeliever's re-
sponses may be as "externally imposed" from a transcendent au-
thority as the believer's. 277 An atheist or an agnostic will rarely
justify her position as "mere individual judgment." Instead, the ul-
timate source of such "secular" belief is said to be principles of rea-
soning transcending the individual and having sovereignty over
government. 278
The notion that principles of reason transcend the individual
and take precedence over civil government is not alien to our consti-
tutional traditions. 279 It is implicit in the natural law philosophy
272 McConnell, supra note 248, at 1499-1500.
273 Id. at 1497. See Ingber, supra note 258, at 281-88.
274 McConnell, supra note 248, at 1499. See Ingber, supra note 248, at 282 (noting
that all religious beliefs are not seen "as matters of individual choice and evaluation").
275 McConnell, supra note 248, at 1496-99; Ingber, supra note 258, at 283-87.
276 Ingber, supra note 258, at 283-84; McConnell, supra note 248, at 1498-99.
277 GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 158 ("A nonreligious judgment, as well as a reli-
gious one, may be felt to be 'compelled' by some moral order outside oneself."). Alter-
natively, if the real concern is for psychic harm, the violation of a deeply held "secular"
view on a matter central to a person's belief system may cause as much harm as would a
violation of a belief ultimately traceable to a belief in God. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise
and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 793 (1986).
278 Cf Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE LJ. 997 ("Liberalism is in-
formed by a faith (a word deliberately chosen) in reason as a faculty that operates inde-
pendently of any world view.").
279 In the first sentence of the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom he presented
to the Virginia legislature in 1779, Thomas Jefferson declared: "IT]he opinions and
belief of men depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence pro-
posed to their own minds ...... THE FoUNDERS' CONsT. 77 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987).
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that animated many of those traditions, including the Bill of Rights
and, more particularly, the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's privileges or Immunities Clause-the claimed sources
of constitutional privacy. 280 Fidelity to the overriding purpose of
free exercise, then, arguably requires protection of both believers
and nonbelievers' responses to quintessentially religious
questions. 28 '
A proponent of the free exercise view of privacy can reply per-
suasively to the several objections that might be lodged against this
conclusion. One objection might note that a nonbeliever's re-
sponses may not always derive from the transcendent claims of rea-
son. But nor do a believer's always derive from the transcendent
authority of God. Evangelists, after all, talk of "choosing" God.
When pressed to justify their faith, many believers respond by say-
ing that it "works" for them, that it improves the overall quality of
their lives.28 2 Actions whose ultimate basis lies in such a pragmatic
280 ALFRED H. KELLY Er AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTTUTON 38-39 (6th ed. 1983):
Natural law theory held that certain eternal principles were inherent in
the very structure of the universe which the positive law of a state, in
order to be regarded as true law worthy of being obeyed, must embody
or affirm.
... The natural law tradition thus lay at the foundation of American polit-
ical thought.
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TION 258-71 (1990) (influence of natural law tradition on Reconstruction Amendments);
Sherry, supra note 175, at 1127 (influence of natural law on founders of the Original
Constitution); Edward S. Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928). See also JAMES TURNER, Wrrnourr GOD, WrrnouT
CREED 42-72 (1985) (noting the intimate relationship among reason, natural law, and
God in the thought of many American believers during the founding period).
Michael McConnell concedes that "natural law may be viewed as higher authority
than positive law" but contends that "[c]ontroversies arising from natural law claims will
take the form of disputes over what natural law is. Neither the individual's nor the gov-
ernment's interpretative power is presumptively superior." Michael McConnell, Ac-
comodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 15. Yet the views of a believer can also be
reduced to an "interpretation" of God's commands. Indeed, the term interpretation
might even more appropriately characterize the believer's claims, which often stem from
a particular reading of a complex, written text. Cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FArH 9-53 (1988) (developing analogy between interpretation of the Constitution and
of religious texts and traditions). As for government's competence to adjudicate be-
tween competing claims, the notion that government is competent to decide the validity
of the nonbeliever's reason-based views on ultimate questions such as God's existence
but incompetent to decide the validity of the believer's faith-based views seems very
strange.
281 Cf. McConnell, supra note 248, at 1493 (citations omitted) (emphasis added):
"The historical materials uniformly equate 'religion' with belief in God or in gods, though
this can be extended without distortion to transcendent extrapersonal authorities not envisioned in
traditionally theistic terns."
282 GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 73-75 ("When people must decide about claims
that gravely affect their lives and are not subject to easy external confirmation, they
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calculation of personal interest can hardly be said to derive from a
higher, transcendent authority. The responses of both believers and
nonbelievers to quintessentially religious questions often, but not
always, appeal to a transcendent, extrapersonal source.
Another objection might maintain that the emphasis contempo-
rary thinkers place on limitations of reason 2 3 undermines reason's
claim as a transcendent source of authority. Yet this point applies
equally to the believer. Many contemporary theologians likewise
stress the imperfect and unstable character of a believer's "faith
knowledge. ' 28 4 One cannot help but think that the modem empha-
sis on reason's incompleteness makes secular beliefs more like reli-
gious beliefs. 285 A proponent of the free exercise view of privacy
would thus be able to effectively rebut an argument that a nonbe-
liever's responses do not fit within the purpose of free exercise be-
cause reason's authority is not transcendent.
A final objection might deny the relevance of the supposed pur-
pose of the free exercise guarantee, relying instead on an appeal to
that guarantee's "original meaning." This objection would assert
that, whatever their purpose(s), those who drafted and ratified the
First Amendment conceived of the term "religion" as encompassing
only the believer's responses and not the nonbeliever's. 286 Even if
one accepts both this historical assertion and originalism, the objec-
tion is not necessarily persuasive. Its force depends on how one
formulates originalism. It is persuasive if originalism requires that
the founders' views concerning a provision's applications prevail
over the logical implications of the purposes they attributed to it.
understandably give great weight to their own personal experiences, to what feels right
for them.").
283 See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970) (science); JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHIcs: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15-49 (1978)
(ethics);JEAN VAN HEIJENOORT, FROM FREGE TO GODEL, SOURCE BOOK ON MATHEMATICAL
LOGIC, 1879-1931 (1966) (reprinting Godel's original 1931 paper elaborating his incom-
pleteness theorem) (logic and mathematics).
284 Levinson, supra note 280, at 21 (observing that modem theologians tend to em-
phasize "encountering" God over cognitive beliefs about God and emphasize "the basic
inability of language to capture knowledge about God").
285 Cf PAUL TILLICH, BIBILICAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE REALITY
64-66 (1972) (developing an analogy between philosophical and religious faith and con-
version); KUHN, supra note 283, at 204 (describing paradigm shifts in science as suprara-
tional "conversion").
286 McConnell, supra note 248, at 1493 (footnote omitted) ("The historical materials
uniformly equate "religion" with belief in God or in gods .. "); Ingber, supra note 258,
at 250 (footnote omitted) ("There is no doubt that to the framers religion entailed a
relationship between human beings and some Supreme Being."); Note, supra note 258,
at 1060. Given that there really were no acknowledged atheists or agnostics during the
founding, TURNER, supra note 280, at 44, conclusions concerning the drafters' and ra-
tifiers' views on the proper treatment of nonbelievers seem quite anachronistic.
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But it would seem to fail if our primary allegiance belongs to the
founders' broader purposes. 28 7
The latter formulation of originalism seems the more plausi-
ble.288 For example, those who enacted the Equal Protection Clause
287 Those who argue that the founders did not intend for the free exercise guarantee
to protect nonbelievers rely on the drafters' rejection of a formulation of the First
Amendment protecting "a right of conscience." Ingber, supra note 258, at 251-52; Mc-
Connell, supra note 248, at 1488-96. Professor McConnell argues that two explanations
can be attributed to the drafters' decision. First, they might have rejected a "right of
conscience" in favor of a guarantee of "free exercise of religion" because they wished to
confine the protections of free exercise to believers as opposed to those whose conscien-
tious views derived from secular moral or political philosophy. Second, they might have
seen no difference between the formulations because they understood the "right of con-
science" to include only the believer's views. Professor McConnell concludes that "it
does not matter which explanation-redundancy or intentionality-is correct, for under
either explanation, nonreligious 'conscience,' is not included within the free exercise
clause." McConnell, stipra note 248, at 1495. But see supra note 286 (suggesting that this
conclusion is anachronistic).
One can accept both this historical evidence and the inferences McConnell draws
from it, yet still assert that an originalist understanding of free exercise requires some
protection of the nonbeliever. Grant, for example, that the founders intended to protect
the believer and not to protect the nonbeliever. Further assume, as discussed in the
text, that the reasons the founders chose to protect believers also apply to nonbelievers.
Which "intent" has the force of law? Is it the intention to promote the values that the
founders thought to justify protecting believers or the intention not to protect nonbe-
lievers? The answer depends on how one formulates originalism. In theory, an original-
ist would want to answer this methodological question in accordance with the founders'
"interpretive intent," that is, their intent respecting how future generations should in-
terpret particular provisions of the Constitution or the Constitution as a whole. See, e.g.,
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885
(1985). This methodological question also implicates the debate over the "levels of gen-
erality" at which constitutional principles or values should be defined. See, e.g., BORK,
supra note 176, at 148-51; Tribe & Dorf, supra note 221; see also infra note 288.
288 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("[i]t is the purposes
of those guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] and not their text, the reasons for their state-
ment by the Framers and not the statement itself" that apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). For general discussions of the differ-
ence between an originalism that focuses on specific societal or legal practices the ra-
tifiers expected a given provision to permit or prohibit and one that focuses on the
general values the ratifiers understood the provision to enshrine, see Stephen L. Carter,
Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and BattleforJustice, 69 T.x.
L. REV. 759, 785-88 (1991) (distinguishing between "value choices" underlying the
Constitution's language and the founders' "expectations"); Ronald Dworkin, Bork'sJuris-
prudence, 57 U. Cut. L. REv. 657 (1990); David A.J. Richards, Book Review of Bork: The
Tempting of America, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373, 1380-82 (1990) (distinguishing between the
"founders' denotations" and more abstract values or concepts);. Originalists sometimes
apply different formulations without recognizing the difference, much less bothering to
justify the particular formulation relied upon at the time. Compare BORK, supra note 176,
at 9, 213 (death penalty is obviously constitutional because the text of the Constitution
indicates ratifiers' belief in legitimacy of this particular penalty) with id. at 162-63:
In short, all that a judge committed to original understanding requires is
that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not
with a conclusion but with a major premise. That major premise is a prin-
ciple or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile legis-
lation or executive action. (emphasis added)).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment evidently did not doubt the lawful-
ness of racial segregation in public schools. 28 9 Yet Brown v. Board of
Education290 is almost universally perceived as having rightly ig-
nored the drafters' and ratifiers' view on this particular application
of equal protection in favor of the more general values they thought
the provision embodied.291 The drafters' use of majestically general
language suggests that we should identify and follow the values they
thought underlay a particular provision rather than their expecta-
tions regarding its application in particular contexts. 292 Just as the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause determines its meaning, so
also the meaning of the free exercise guarantee depends on its
aim.293 This aim might be conceived as that of protecting actions
directly traceable to a source whose authority transcends that of
government 294 or, alternatively, of preventing the psychic harm
flowing from violation of beliefs lying at the core of an individual's
belief system.295 On either view, the purpose of free exercise re-
quires protection of both a believer's and nonbeliever's responses
to quintessentially religious questions.296
289 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
H v. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1955). See WILuAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 135 (1988) ("Historians who conclude
that most Americans in 1866 favored segregated schools are probably correct in their
assessment.").
290 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
291 According to Bickel, for example, the evidence that the drafters and ratifiers did
not expect the Equal Protection Clause to reach segregation "is as clear as such evidence
is likely to be." Bickel, supra note 289, at 59. Yet Bickel concludes that the Brown Court
rightly declined to enforce these expectations because the drafters and ratifiers would
not have intended for the equal protection guarantee to be construed in this way. The
evidence, Bickel declares, shows "an awareness on the part of these framers that it was a
constitution they were writing, which led to a choice of language capable of growth." Id
at 63. For discussions of the relationship between Brown and originalism, see Richards,
supra note 288, at 1379-82; Carter, supra note 288, at 777-78.
292 E.g., Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 574-75, 579
(1983).
293 Garvey, supra note 277, at 782 ("We cannot have a vigorous and consistent reli-
gious jurisprudence without some articulated notion of the reasons for protecting reli-
gious freedom.").
294 See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
295 Choper, supra note 258, at 597-601; Garvey, supra note 277, at 792-94.
296 Garvey, supra note 277, at 793-95; Marshall, supra note 258, at 383-85. Garvey
posits a third possible aim of the free exercise guarantee, that of avoiding civil disobedi-
ence. He suggests that suppression of religiously motivated conduct threatens to pro-
duce civil disobedience and accompanying harms such as "disproportionate investment
of enforcement resources" and "loss of respect for the law." See also Stephen Pepper, A
Brieffor the Free Exercise Clause, 7J. L. & REL. 323, 346 (1989) (purpose of religion clauses
is to "ensure civil peace"). According to Garvey, "[t]he most rational way for the legal
system to proceed in such cases, therefore, would be to avoid civil disobedience by rec-
ognizing a religious exemption at the outset." Garvey, supra note 277, at 797. Like the
two values discussed in the text, this value also would seem to support extending free
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In short, under the prevailing understanding, the believer has a
presumptive free exercise right to take action premised on her re-
sponse to quintessentially religious questions; the nonbeliever does
not. A free exercise view of the privacy right diminishes this dispa-
rate treatment, whose consistency with the ultimate aim of free exer-
cise seems quite suspect.
b. Problems
Along with these powerftil attractions, the effort to link privacy
to the free exercise clause raises some vexing problems. By broad-
ening one aspect of the definition of "religion," it threatens to ex-
pand the scope of free exercise and establishment to an extent that
makes both become unworkable or unacceptable.
Consider first the danger of expanding free exercise beyond the
limits of acceptability and workability. One could object that if the
free exercise guarantee presumptively protects a person's responses
to quintessentially religious questions, then it must protect even
outlandish responses. This objection seems quite weak, because it
applies equally to the prevailing understanding of free exercise.297
Both the view proposed here and the prevailing understanding deny
protection to actions that cannot be tolerated by requiring sincerity
exercise protection to action motivated by the claims of "secular" conscience. See Pep-
per, supra, at 347 (listing three characteristics of religious belief, all of which secular
beliefs can also satisfy). The suppression of conduct motivated by a nonbeliever's
deeply felt conscientious beliefs can also produce civil disobedience. Recognizing this,
Garvey argues that suppression of believer-based conduct is unusually likely to produce
civil disobedience. He tries to make this argument by drawing an analogy between be-
lievers and the insane. Like an insane person, a believer is unable to conform with the
dictates of the law because he is not a free, rational agent. This argument is difficult to
square with Garvey's point that
[a] pacifist who believes that killing is absolutely wrong may act from a
conviction that he has a duty to his fellow man that is in no sense reli-
gious. But it is difficult to show how such an obligation is any less bind-
ing than the parallel claim of a Quaker whose duty has a religious source.
Garvey, supra, at 795.
297 The objection would assert that because the prevailing understanding affords
presumptive protection to all action motivated by beliefs derived from faith in a God, it
must protect such beliefs even when they are quite bizarre or potentially harmful.
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of belief298 and refusing to treat the free exercise right as
absolute.299
A more substantial objection flows from a problem thought to
inhere in any argument-asserting the arbitrariness of a distinction
between the responses of believers and nonbelievers. Once one ob-
literates the distinction between "secular" and "religious" con-
science, the concern is that the free exercise guarantee covers all
action based on sincerely held beliefs. This, it is justly feared, in-
vites anarchy by requiring that virtually all controversial govern-
ment action survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.300 Indeed, those
who argue the arbitrariness of distinctions between the believer's
and nonbeliever's responses generally avoid the danger of anarchy
by concluding that free exercise protects no action not already pro-
tected by freedom of speech.30 1 This conclusion is unacceptable,
because it drains free exercise of virtually all independent meaning
and renders the clause superfluous.
The free exercise view of privacy, though, avoids anarchy with-
out eviscerating the free exercise guarantee. By limiting free exer-
cise protection to responses addressing the profound questions of
human existence addressed by religion, this view of privacy avoids
both extremes. Thus, not all deeply held "secular" beliefs qualify
for protection. For that matter, not all beliefs premised on the exis-
tence of a god qualify. It is in this way -by limiting both the "reli-
gious" and "secular" beliefs that qualify rather than by excluding
"secular" belief altogether-that the free exercise view of privacy
tries not to place an unmanageable strain on the free exercise
guarantee.
This strategy for keeping free exercise within manageable
bounds must respond to at least two challenges. First, ajustification
must be supplied for narrowing the definition of religion that is cur-
298 The prevailing understanding requires that beliefs be sincerely held to qualify
for presumptive protection. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); TRIBE,
supra note 141, § 14-12, at 1245 ("[C]ourts since Ballard have inquired into the sincerity
of religious objectors."). Cf Marshall, supra note 258, at 359 (arguing that judicial in-
quiry into sincerity itself raises a threat to religious liberty). The free exercise view of
privacy would likewise extend presumptive protection only to beliefs sincerely ad-
dressed to a quintessentially religious question. Thus, a fully competent person could
not claim a right to commit suicide simply by declaring herself dead. Such a definition
of death is so eccentric that it does not qualify as a sincere response to the question of
the proper definition of life and death.
299 Like the prevailing view, see infra note 340, the free exercise view of privacy
would not protect actions interfering with overriding government interests.
300 McConnell, supra note 248, at 1493 ("[I]f the exercise of religion extends to
'everything and anything,' the interference with ordinary operations of government
would be so extreme that the free exercise clause would fall of its own weight. To pro-
tect everything is to protect nothing.").
301 Marshall, supra note 258, at 361; Gey, supra note 258.
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rently attributed to the free exercise guarantee. The free exercise
view of privacy broadens that definition in one respect by including
a nonbeliever's responses to quintessentially religious questions.
Yet it narrows that definition in another respect. Under the ac-
cepted view, the Free Exercise Clause protects action based on all
sincerely held beliefs traceable to a belief in a "God."30 2 Under the
view proposed here, such beliefs would qualify for free exercise pro-
tection only if directed at quintessentially religious questions such
as God's existence or the proper definition of life and death. On
what grounds can this alteration in existing law be defended?
A proponent of the free exercise view of privacy can plausibly
argue that the broadening and narrowing of the entrenched defini-
tion of religion better implements free exercise values. Whether
free exercise ultimately aims at protecting persons from the severe
psychic trauma of violating deeply held beliefs or at recognizing the
proper claims of a transcendent sovereignty superior to that of gov-
ernment, the law cannot effect absolute fidelity to this value. The
law can neither protect everyone who feels any psychic harm from
the governmentally compelled violation of a felt belief nor extend
its protection based on case-by-case determinations of the degree of
psychic harm. While the former approach would lead to anarchy,
the latter would prove unworkable because it would require a judge
to engage in the time-consuming and inevitably inaccurate task of
mapping out each individual's web of beliefs and judging the au-
thenticity of claimed feelings of psychic harm. In addition to being
unworkable, this task would be deeply and unacceptably intru-
sive.303 The law also can neither protect all beliefs ultimately tracea-
ble to a transcendent sovereignty nor protect beliefs based on case-
by-case determinations of the directness or obviousness of a belief's
derivation from a transcendent source.
Any effort to give meaning to free exercise must draw categori-
cal lines that are both over- and under-inclusive in implementing
free exercise values.30 4 Any listing of quintessentially religious
questions, for instance, will exclude questions that, within the belief
systems of some persons, are closely related to free exercise values,
and will include questions that, within the belief systems of others,
are weakly related to such values. Similarly, the prevailing under-
302 Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You
Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 713.
303 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 457-58
(1988).
304 Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990) (finding it inappro-
priate "for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs" for a particular
claimant).
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standing of free exercise is both over- and under-inclusive. It is
over-inclusive because it extends protection to all sincerely held
religious beliefs, even when the believer regards the matter as rela-
tively trivial.305 It is under-inclusive because it excludes a nonbe-
liever's responses to quintessentially religious questions even
though nonbelievers sometimes suffer as much psychic harm and
can claim as much compulsion from a transcendental source as
those who believe in a "God."30 6 The existing understanding thus
excludes all responses of the nonbeliever, no matter how centrally
religious the question addressed, and includes all responses of the
believer, no matter how peripherally religious the question ad-
dressed. In contrast, the view proposed here includes both the be-
liever's and the nonbeliever's responses to quintessentially religious
questions while excluding their responses to other questions. A
strong claim can be made that the line drawn by the free exercise
view of privacy better promotes the values thought to underlie the
free exercise guarantee.
The second challenge concerns whether the list of "basic reli-
gious questions" can be limited so as to make free exercise worka-
ble.30 7 The list of such questions, which elicit responses afforded
presumptive free exercise protection, undoubtedly includes the
question of God's existence. Prayer, congregation, and other forms
of worship that celebrate the existence of a "God" would receive
such protection. The question of defining life and death also clearly
qualifies for inclusion.308 It might be argued, however, that all
moral questions qualify because the provision of a comprehensive
moral system has been a central concern of religions.309 Of course,
if all beliefs about right and wrong qualify, then the two unaccept-
305 See Garvey, supra note 277, at 783 (footnotes omitted):
[Elverything is covered by the free exercise clause, provided it has a reli-
gious motivation. The variety of recent cases demonstrates that this is
literally true. One's religious convictions can make a free exercise ques-
tion out of having a social security number, paying social security or un-
employment tax, carrying a driver's license, having license plates, getting
paid a minimum wage, going to school, running a racially segregated
school, or playing records;
Id. at 785 ("apart from the infinite variety of protected acts... those acts vary... greatly
in their importance to the claimant"); Marshall, supra note 258, at 384.
306 Marshall, supra note 258, at 384 ("A person who has a secular, moral objection to
killing in war and a religious objection to working on the Sabbath might well suffer a
greater psychic harm in being forced to kill than in being forced to work.").
307 See Ingber, supra note 258, at 271-72; Mitchell, supra note 261, at 662 n.270 (ad-
dressing "the difficulty of deciding which questions are 'ultimate' and thus religious").
308 See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
309 Ingber, supra note 258, at 281 (noting that religions "provid[e] comprehensive
moral systems").
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able extremes discussed earlier surface again: we can either sap free
exercise rights of all strength or risk anarchy.3 10
A proponent of the free exercise view of privacy, however,
again has a defense to this challenge. Just as the free exercise view
of privacy identifies certain basic questions that have traditionally
Veen the domain of religion, so too might it identify certain basic
moral questions. Perhaps moral questions concerning the meaning
and value of human life would qualify, but other moral views would
not. Views concerning the morality of war might be presumptively
protected; views about the morality of liquor would not. The ques-
tion of how moral questions are answered-whether by reference to
an authoritarian creed, a balancing of benefits and harms, or other-
wise-might be thought basic. This would explain the result in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3 "t one of the progenitors of the modern pri-
vacy cases, in which the Court recognized a substantive due process
right of parents to send their children to private schools; parents
"exercise" their right of deciding how to resolve moral questions by
sending their children to a school teaching the appropriate
method.31 2
The identification of "quintessentially religious questions" is
certainly no easy task, but it is not arbitrary or unmanageable.
There are clear cases on both sides of the line. The questions of
God's existence and the definition of life and death would seem
clearly to qualify; the question of the appropriate speed limit would
not. The drawing of the line, of course, must be guided by the un-
derlying values of the free exercise guarantee. The difficulty of
identifying such values and tracing their implications is not peculiar
to the free exercise view of privacy. Such difficulty accompanies any
effort to give meaning to free exercise 31 3 and to the many other am-
biguous guarantees found in the Constitution.
Finally, consider the potential problems that the free exercise
view of privacy poses for interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
310 See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
311 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
312 Id at 535. Although the prevailing view of free exercise purports to claim Pierce
as its own, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 992 (1991), it offers only partial support for that deci-
sion. The prevailing view can recognize only the right of believers to send their children
to private schools. Pierce, in contrast, holds that both believers and nonbelievers possess
a constitutional right to send their children to a private school. The Court held that the
law compelling attendance at a public school was unconstitutional as applied to parents
who had been sending their children to a nonreligious military academy. Pierce, 268 U.S.
at 532-36.
313 Note, for instance, the vast, conflicting commentary on the definition of "reli-
gion" for purposes of the First Amendment. See Ingber, supra note 258, at 233 n.3 (cit-
ing a "representative list").
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The conclusion that a nonbeliever's responses to quintessentially
religious questions qualify as religious for free exercise purposes
seems to imply that they are also religious for establishment pur-
poses. This implication is not as troubling for the free exercise view
of privacy as it is for a view that treats all secular moral belief as
within the Free Exercise Clause. Nonetheless, some aspects of this
implication are troubling. It is not worrisome that government may
not establish nonbelief in a "God", just as it may not establish belief
in a "God." But what about belief in, say, the scientific method?
The means of arriving at true belief would seem to be a quintessen-
tially religious question thus placing responses to it within the defi-
nition of religion embraced by the free exercise view of privacy.
One "secular" response to this question is that true or justified be-
lief is achieved through free inquiry and the testing of hypotheses
for their correspondence with observable evidence. One "reli-
gious" response, however, is that the test of true belief lies in its
correspondence with a sacred text such as the Bible. The free exer-
cise view of privacy thus would seem to imply that the teaching of
science in public schools constitutes an establishment of "religion."
One response to this dilemma is to define the term "religion"
more narrowly for establishment than for free exercise purposes.
But this will not do. Although the "dual definition" position has
had its advocates,3 14 it cannot be reconciled with the First Amend-
ment's text, which uses the term "religion" once for both establish-
ment and free exercise purposes.3 1 5 We might overlook the text if
the "dual definition" approach appealed to the values of free exer-
cise and establishment. But the only reason for treating secular
beliefs as religious for free exercise, but not for establishment, pur-
poses is a desire to favor the influence of secular beliefs by permit-
ting their establishment. Some commentators actually espouse such
favoritism, noting that religious belief is generally antithetical to the
Enlightenment values of critical inquiry and individual autonomy
implicit in the Constitution as a whole.3 16 Hostility towards religion
314 United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1985); TRIBE, supra note
141, § 14-6, at 1186 & n.53 (noting that first edition had advocated this position); Marc
Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217,
260 (discussing the dual definition position).
315 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
316 See Gey, supra note 258, at 172-85; Marshall. supra note 258. One way to favor
"secular" beliefs is to include them for free exercise but not for establishment purposes.
This protects the exercise of such beliefs while permitting their establishment. "Reli-
gious" belief, by contrast, may be exercised but not established. Marshall and Gey effect
favoritism for the nonbeliever through a different route. They define "exercise" very
narrowly so that the only circumstances in which a believer has a right to exercise his
beliefs is when the free speech guarantee independently protects such exercise. Because
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nonetheless seems more in keeping with Karl Marx and Sigmund
Freud than it does with our constitutional history and, in particular,
the religion clauses.
A stronger response contends that arguing public schools es-
tablish religion by teaching science misconstrues the nature of the
issue at hand. The issue dividing believers and nonbelievers is not
whether science is a permissible way of obtaining knowledge about
the world, but rather whether the scientific method is the only way.
Creationists have no general quarrel with the scientific method. In-
deed, they seek to show that the scientific method leads to their
contra-evolutionary conclusion,31 7 a conclusion they also happen to
support as a matter of religious faith. Seen in this light, the dispute
over creationism does not involve religion as defined by the free
exercise view of privacy. Rather than implicating the basic religious
question of how one obtains knowledge about the world, the dis-
pute is actually an intramural scientific controversy. The teaching of
evolution thus would not establish religion. Nor, for that matter,
would a requirement that creationism be taught establish religion
unless it amounted to a mere subterfuge for conveying an answer to
a quintessentially religious question such as whether God exists. 3 18
only a believer's beliefs qualify as "religion," only such beliefs may not be established.
In other words, Gey and Marshall permit the exercise of neither religious nor secular
belief and prohibit the establishment of only religious beliefs. See Michael W. McCon-
nell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 330 (1991).
For an example of "reverse" favoritism, that is, favoritism for religious over secular
belief, see infra notes 323-27 (discussing Ingber's view that atheism is not religious for
free exercise but is religious for establishment purposes).
Kent Greenawalt's recent book, see supra note 73, suggests the possibility of a differ-
ent brand of reverse favoritism. Ingber's brand effects favoritism for "religious" belief
by holding that while "secular" beliefs never qualify for free exercise protection they
sometimes, may furnish the basis for an establishment of religion. Rather than ex-
panding the reach of establishment to encompass some "secular" belief, Greenawalt
wants to exempt some religiously-inspired belief from the ambit of the establishment
clause. In particular, he argues that respecting value judgments that require some input
beyond "shared premises and common forms of reasoning," believers may enact their
religiously inspired beliefs into law without establishing religion. GREENAWALT, supra
note 73, at 246-51. Greenawalt does not address the free exercise implications of his
argument. His position would result in "reverse favoritism" if believers may freely exer-
cise their value judgments requiring input beyond shared forms of reasoning, but
nonbelievers may not.
Consistently developed, Greenawalt's argument implies that, for purposes of both
free exercise and establishment, it is arbitrary to distinguish between the responses of
believers and nonbelievers to certain fundamental value questions. Greenawalt's argu-
ment thus supports this Article's proposed definition of "religion."
317 For an account of the evidence on which Creationists rely, see PHILLIP KITCHER,
ABUSING SCIENCE, THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 30-44, 55-123 (1982).
318 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding a Louisiana statute re-
quiring that creationism be taught alongside evolution an unconstitutional establish-
ment). The weakness of creationism's scientific case suggests that cieationism is really
not directed at the scientific question, which is nonreligious under the free exercise view
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Of course, the more fundamental questions of whether science is
the only way of obtaining knowledge and how to resolve conflicts
between beliefs derived from science and faith in God are quintes-
sentially religious. But public schools do not establish answers to
these questions by teaching evolution or science.
Admittedly, this recharacterization of the issue might not suc-
ceed in solving this particular establishment dilemma. The question
of whether science is a permissible way of obtaining knowledge may
continue to divide believers and nonbelievers because some believ-
ers deny science's utility.3 1 9 Alternatively, the inquiry into the ori-
gins of humankind might be deemed a quintessentially religious
question, so that any answer to it is religious, regardless of the
method producing the answer.
Proponents of the free exercise view of privacy might avoid Es-
tablishment Clause problems by defining "establishment" fairly nar-
rowly.320 One might accept David Richards's view that the core
concern of the Establishment Clause lies with "the corruption of the
state's educational role, at stages of belief formation and revi-
sion." 32 1 Further, an "establishment" might be equated with the
imposition of beliefs on a quintessentially religious question. 322
Such imposition would not occur when public schools teach the sci-
entific method or evolution, as long as they address other ways of
of privacy, but rather at the quintessentially religious questions of God's existence, the
proper resolution of conflicts between scientific evidence and biblical text, and where
humankind came from. See Ingber, supra note 258, at 320-32 (making this argument);
Jesse Choper, Church, State, and the Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29 ARIZ. L. REV.
551,-557 (1987); Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977.
319 See Fish, supra note 278, at 999 ("[The clash between liberals and fundamental-
ists is a clash between two faiths, or if you prefer between two ways of thinking under-
girded by incompatible first principles, empirical verification and biblical inerrancy.").
320 See Mitchell, supra note 261, at 746 (arguing that "secularism" is a "religion" for
purposes of establishment but taking a narrow view of "establishment").
321 RICHARDs, supra note 176, at 146. Richards avoids the irksome conclusion that
teaching the scientific method violates the Establishment Clause only by describing that
method as "a neutral method of critical inquiry ...... Id. at 154 (emphasis added). Yet
Richards, who defines conscientious secular beliefs as religious for purposes of free ex-
ercise, offers no explanation of why the scientific method is neutral and why the compet-
ing view that truth is derived from sacred scripture represents an "intramural sectarian"
position. IdL at 154. Both satisfy Richards's definition of "religion," and the unques-
tioning inculcation of the scientific method seems to satisfy Richards's notion of "estab-
lishment," which he defines as the imposition of "any one conception (whether religious
or secular) from among the range of conceptions of a life well and humanely lived ..
Id. at 149.
322 Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE Lj.
692 (1968). Cf Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PrI-r. L. REV. 673, 686-87 (1980) (establishment entails evidence that reli-
gious beliefs "were either coerced, compromised, or influenced"); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986)
(compulsion of religious belief or action the essence of establishment).
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testing belief regarding humankind's origins. In this and other con-
texts, the free exercise view of privacy will be able to meet the chal-
lenge of giving meaningful content to the term "establishment"
without crippling the ability of public schools to perform their basic
educational tasks.
In fact, the view of free exercise proposed here furnishes a bet-
ter response to an important establishment dilemma than that pro-
vided by the prevailing understanding. Consider whether public
schools would establish religion by advocating atheism. Under the
prevailing view, beliefs that are, like atheism, based only on reason
rather than some (other) transcendental source such as a "god" do
not qualify as religious. Unless one accepts the implausible "dual
definition" of religion,3 23 the prevailing understanding indisputably
implies that the advocacy of atheism would not establish "reli-
gion."'324 Yet this conclusion is strongly counterintuitive. Indeed,
Stanley Ingber, a'leading proponent of the prevailing view, declares
that the promotion of "irreligious perspectives" such as atheism
"undoubtedly would violate the establishment clause." 325 Although
323 See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons
requiring rejection of this position.
324 Michael McConnell defends the prevailing view against the charge that it favors
"religious" over "secular" beliefs:
Both [religion clauses] "single out" religion for special treatment, but
sometimes this is an advantage and sometimes a disadvantage. When a
Jehovah's Witness refuses to work in an armaments factory, he is consti-
tutionally entitled to unemployment benefits, while a secular antiwar ac-
tivist in the same position is not. In this context, it may appear that
religion is "favored." But if a public schoolfootball coach ... offers a prayer or
other religious inspiration before the game, he will be stopped; a girls' tennis coach
who offers feminist words of inspiration before the game engages in protected
speech. ... In these contexts, religion seems "disfavored."
McConnell, supra note 316, at 329 (emphasis added). In other words, beliefs presuppos-
ing the existence of a "God" are favored for free exercise purposes because the believer
has a presumptive right to exercise them, but they are disfavored for establishment pur-
poses because government may not establish them. Conversely, conscientious beliefs
not presupposing the existence of a God, such as feminism, are disfavored for free exer-
cise purposes because the holder of such beliefs does not have a presumptive right to
"exercise" them. But such beliefs are favored for establishment purposes because gov-
ernment does not establish religion by advocating them.
This line of argument necessarily implies that government may advocate atheism
without establishing religion. Like the feminism in McConnell's hypothetical, atheism is
not "religious" because it is not premised on the existence of a sacred, transcendental
reality. Advocacy of atheism, of course, might conflict with the free exercise rights of
students who believe in God. But free exercise would not preclude the advocacy of
atheism; it would merely require schools to exempt students asserting free exercise
ights from the pertinent classes. By advocating atheism, the public schools might also
violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. But, as Professor Ingber's
views suggest, see infra notes 325-27 and accompanying text, the conclusion that seems
most natural and correct is that the advocacy of atheism would constitute an establish-
ment of religion.
325 Ingber, supra note 258, at 318. See id. at 306 & nA49, 310-19.
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Professor Ingber's conclusion seems clearly correct, it flatly contra-
dicts his views that "religion" both should only include beliefs pre-
supposing the existence of a sacred, transcendental reality326 and
should receive a unitary definition for free exercise and establish-
ment purposes.3 27
In contrast, the view of "religion" advanced here cleanly and
persuasively explains why the public schools would establish reli-
gion by advocating atheism. Atheism qualifies as a "religion" be-
cause, although it does not appeal to a transcendent reality other
than reason, it addresses the quintessentially religious question of
God's existence. From this perspective, the Establishment Clause is
the source of one of the principal attractions of the free exercise
view of privacy. This view of free exercise and privacy answers an
Establishment Clause dilemma which the prevailing view cannot
solve without either becoming implausible or falling into logical
contradiction.
c. Summary
The view of privacy and free exercise outlined above gives ef-
fect to the intuition that some controversial moral questions run so
deep that, absent compelling reasons, government may not dictate
how individuals answer those questions in their beliefs or their lives.
In addition, it furnishes a textual basis for privacy, avoiding appeals
to evanescent "penumbras" and "transcendental" conditions of
democracy.
The potential problems associated with this view accompany
any effort to give meaning to the free exercise guarantee. Any work-
able theory of free exercise must draw lines that are both over- and
under-inclusive in implementing free exercise values. Given the ar-
bitrariness of the rigid line the prevailing understanding draws be-
tween responses of believers and nonbelievers, the lines drawn by
the free exercise view of privacy plausibly reflect a more defensible
understanding of free exercise.
Because its attractions are so substantial and its problems po-
tentially remediable, the free exercise view of privacy demands seri-
ous consideration as at least a partial solution to the interrelated
puzzles of constitutional privacy and free exercise of religion. It fur-
nishes an intriguing alternative or supplement to the more problem-
atic view organized around whether a decision has life-shaping
consequences.
326 Id. at 277-88.
327 Id. at 288-91.
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Acceptance of the free exercise view of privacy requires consti-
tutional enforcement of a permanently unconscious patient's living
will. The definition of death is intimately tied to the very meaning
of life, to what distinguishes humans from other creatures, to
whatever transition is thought to exist between life and after-life,
and to an individual's personal fate. The list of quintessentially reli-
gious questions certainly must include this profound definitional in-
quiry.3 28  Responses to it therefore qualify for presumptive
constitutional protection under the free exercise view of privacy.
The principal alternative to this view of privacy, which empha-
sizes a decision's consequences rather than its character, does not
require enforcement of a permanently unconscious patient's living
will. Enforcement of such wills no doubt affects the welfare of con-
scious persons who actively care about how they will be treated
should they become permanently unconscious. Yet these persons'
lives are hardly "occupied" and "directed" by the consequences of
government's refusal to. enforce living wills.
Neither the free exercise view of privacy nor its principal alter-
native accords any constitutional right to a patient who lacks a living
will or its functional equivalent. Such a patient has no interest in
whether she is regarded as dead or alive. The manner of her treat-
ment obviously will not affect the .patient in her insentient state.
Nor will it significantly affect conscious persons who never consider
how they wish to be treated in such a state, remain unaware of the
pertinent medical and legal practices, or contemplate the matter
only in passing. One's welfare cannot be much influenced by medi-
cal -or legal practices of which one is unaware or with which one is
not actively concerned.
2. Constitutional Privacy, Free Exercise, and the Interests of Close
Family Members
A permanently unconscious patient very frequently will not
have a living will resolving how she should be treated. Like the pa-
tients in Cruzan and the numerous other similar cases, 329 most per-
sons simply do not give the matter serious thought, much less
actively care about it.33° According to the argument presented
above, a permanently unconscious patient fitting this description
328 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
329 See cases cited supra notes 157-59.
330 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2875 & n.21 (1990)
(dissenting opinion); id at 2857 & n.1 (O'Connor,J., concurring); Rhoden, supra note 5,
at 382; Richard P. Vance, Autonomy's Paradox Death, Fear, and Advance Directives, 42 MER-
CER L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1991) ("[Wlith living will statutes in at least forty states, and
durable power of attorney statutes in all fifty states (twenty-five of which cover health
care decisions in some way), no more than ten percent of us sign living wills.").
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has no interest in the manner of her treatment, much less a constitu-
tional right to decide how her death is defined. The interests of the
family members thus become pre-eminent. This section considers
whether close and caring family members may claim a constitutional
right to decide whether a permanently unconscious loved one
should be regarded and treated as dead.331
In one sense, the family's interests fit into the privacy right
more easily than do the interests of a permanently unconscious pa-
tient. Consider the view of privacy focusing on the pervasiveness of
a decision or law's consequences.33 2 A permanently insentient pa-
tient experiences no consequences from a decision to either con-
tinue or terminate treatment. Whether government honors a
patient's living will can affect the future welfare of other, conscious
persons who actively care about whether government will respect
their wishes should they become permanently unconscious. But the
consequences of -government's refusal to enforce living wills hardly
occupy the daily lives of these persons.
In contrast, a decision to continue or withhold treatment pro-
duces consequences that substantially absorb the daily lives of fam-
ily members who remain close and caring. The daily reality of one
seeking to give support to a hospitalized child, spouse, or parent is
organized around the hospital. Time is structured around daily or
near daily hospital visits. Even when not physically present at the
hospital, thoughts are consumed by the hospitalization and the con-
dition of the loved one. These thoughts form the substratum of
daily life to which one's attention, if temporarily diverted, inevitably
returns. The only empirical study available confirms the absorbing
effect of a permanently unconscious loved one on family members'
lives. 333 A decision to treat the patient as alive means the continua-
331 This section does not address the issue of how the "family" should be defined
for purposes of the constitutional inquiry. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Martha Minow, The Free
Exercise of Families, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming).
332 See supra Part II.B.l.(b)(ii).
333 Donald D. Tresch et al., Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State: Attitudes and Reactions
of Family Members, 39J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 17 (1991). The authors studied the reac-
tions of 33 family members of patients in a persistent vegetative state. The average
duration of the patient's unconsciousness was over four years. The authors' findings
strongly confirm the conclusion that a permanently unconscious patient occupies and
directs the lives of close family members:
Family members reported that they had visited the patient at the
mean rate of 260 days yearly during the first 3 months following the onset
of the patient's PVS and that they were visiting at the mean rate of 209
visits yearly at the time of the interview. Though this reduction in visit
frequency was [statistically] significant . . ., it should be noted that the mean
reported visits after 4.7 years were more frequent than every other day.
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tion of this life-pervading reality; a contrary decision means its end.
The view of constitutional privacy focusing on a decision's conse-
quences thus strongly supports giving close family members a right
to define the terms upon which the death of a permanently uncon-
scious loved one will be decided.z3 4 Because this matter is quintes-
sentially religious, so too does ihe free exercise view of privacy.
In another sense, though, it is more difficult to accord constitu-
tional status to the interests of the family than to those of patient.
This is because the family members are deciding someone else's
fate, not their own. How can the right of privacy, which focuses on
intensely personal matters, encompass a decision pertaining so di-
rectly to someone else?33 5
One way to answer this question is to point to Roe. To decide
the issue of abortion is, in large part, to confront whether the fetus
constitutes actual life early in the pregnancy.33 6 Roe holds that the
right to resolve this question belongs to the mother, even though
she is deciding the status and fate of a separate being. In one im-
portant respect, there is a close analogy between fetuses and the
permanently unconscious. Both lack consciousness when the deci-
sion regarding their status is made; the fetus has not yet acquired a
capacity for consciousness and the permanently unconscious have
forever lost theirs.337 Roe would seem to imply that a person pro-
foundly affected by the existence or nonexistence of such a being
has a right to resolve its contested status.
Family members reported that they thought about the patient daily
l at 19 (emphasis added). For a father's personal description of his reaction to his
daughter's permanent unconsciousness and to the Cruzan decision, see Pete Busalacchi,
How Can They?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 6.
334 Interestingly, the empirical study discussed supra note 333 found that most fam-
ily members "desired the patient to undergo therapeutic interventions" such as feeding
through a tube. Tresch et al., supra note 333, at 19.
335 Kamisar, Right to Die, supra note 74, at 1229 ("As a matter of constitutional law, fam-
ily autonomy has never embraced the right to terminate a close family member's life
support and its sphere should not be expanded to include it."); Ira M. Ellman, Cruzan v.
Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can Exercise an Incapacitated Patients Right to Die,
29 JURIMETRICS J. L. Sci. & TECH..389, 395 (1989).
336 But see Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47 (1971)
(arguing that abortion is often justifiable even assuming that the fetus has a right to life);
TRIBE, supra note 141, at 1354 ("Even if we view pre-viable fetuses as full human beings,
the intimate and personal sacrifice that a ban on abortion would impose by requiring
pregnant women to nurture unborn life is one that our legal system almost never de-
mands"); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
337 In another respect, of course, there is an important difference between the abor-
tion and right-to-die-situations. The existence of the fetus obviously infringes more di-
rectly and intimately on the mother's liberty than does a permanently unconscious
patient on the liberty of the family. See supra note 336.
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Reliance on Roe might appear insufficient. Wholly apart from
its other controversial aspects, reasons exist for questioning Roe's
holding that the mother has a right to decide the fetus's status.
Although the fetus lacks a capacity for consciousness when the deci-
sion concerning its status must be made, it will soon acquire such a
capacity if permitted to develop. Given this, one might contend that
it is inappropriate for the mother to decide the fetus's status. Her
judgment will inevitably be colored by her own peculiar interests,
which are seemingly quite adverse to the fetus's interests. It is true
that a decision made early in the pregnancy does not then affect any
interest the fetus then possesses-the fetus, lacking a capacity for
consciousness, has no experiences and therefore no iterests. But
the decision affects interests the fetus will acquire in the future
should its development continue. In view of the fetus's imminent
potential for acquiring whatever characteristics one might identify
as conferring actual human life and personhood, and the decision's
effect on the fetus's future interests, the best decisionmaker is ar-
guably a person concerned exclusively with the fetus's future
interests.
The force of this argument in the abortion context cannot, how-
ever, be transferred to the situation of the permanently unconscious
patient. Such a patient, by definition, currently lacks the capacity for
consciousness and, unlike a fetus, will never acquire such a capacity
in the future. Such patients will never again experience the world
and, in that sense, cannot be affected by the decision, either now or
in the future. As discussed earlier, surrogate decisionmaking pro-
posals, which seek to construct a decision for the patient, make little
sense.33 s Unlike the abortion situation, such a decision cannot ad-
vance any interest the patient will possess in the future. The case
for having close family members decide the status of the perma-
nently unconscious is accordingly stronger than that for having the
mother decide the status of the fetus.
Indeed, the case for having close family members make the de-
cision is quite compelling. Among the permanently unconscious pa-
tient (or her surrogate), close family members, and government, the
family is clearly the appropriate decisionmaker. Because the deci-
sion is quintessentially religious in character and because its conse-
quences absorb the day-to-day shape and purposes of the family
members' lives, it falls within the right of privacy. This requires that
the decision be resolved by the individual rather than by govern-
338 See Smith, supra note 91, at 872-73 (describing a substitute judgment test as "an
unnecessary mind trip").
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ment-by the patient's surrogate or family members, and not by
government.33 9
Between a surrogate acting in accordance with the patient's
supposed wishes and family members acting on their own, the deci-
sion is better made by the family. As explained above, the family
has powerful interests-the patient has really none.
3. The Insufficiency of Countervailing State Interests
The interests of the permanently unconscious patient and the
patient's close family members sometimes qualify for constitutional
protection. A living will effectively prescribing the terms upon
which a patient's death shall be determined is within the free exer-
cise view of constitutional privacy. In the absence of a living will or
its functional equivalent, the decision of close family members re-
garding the status of a permanently unconscious loved one deserves
protection under both the free exercise view and the view of privacy
centered on life-shaping consequences. Of course, to locate these
interests within a fundamental constitutional right is not to conclude
that they shall always prevail. The rights or interests that constitu-
tional privacy and free exercise protect may be overridden by suffi-
ciently important countervailing interests.3 40
a. Interests Pertaining to a Refusal to Enforce a Permanently
Unconscious Patient's Living Will
What countervailing interests might justify a refusal to enforce
a living will prescribing the terms upon which the patient's death is
339 The proposal that family members should decide the status of a permanently
unconscious loved one based on their own interests is not unprecedented. It has been
endorsed, although not really justified, by the President's Commission. See DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 193 ("When there are several
treatment options that are acceptable to all interested parties and there is no advance
directive from the patient, the option actually followed should generally be the one se-
lected by the family.").
340 In cases such as Roe, the Court required that restrictions on the unenumerated
right of privacy survive "strict scrutiny." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) ("Where
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'.., and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake.").
More recent cases, including Cruzan, suggest that an emerging majority will apply a less
rigorous standard of review to governmental burdens on unenumerated rights. See supra
note 206 and accompanying text. For the standard of review governing restrictions on
the free exercise right, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("The
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accom-
plish an overriding governmental interest."); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."). Cf McConnell,
supra note 250, at 1127-28 (arguing that before Smith the Court did not really apply strict
scrutiny but rather applied an intermediate level of scrutiny).
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decided? The interests differ depending on whether the living will
mandates that the patient should be regarded as dead and treatment
withdrawn, or regarded as alive and treatment continued.
When the will mandates that the patient is to be regarded as
alive and the state must pay for continued medical treatment, cost is
an obvious concern.34 1 Whether the state is obligated to subsidize
the patient's exercise of her constitutional right is governed by the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions. ' 342 It would seem unnec-
essary to decide this issue. As the law currently stands, states will
not often resist enforcing a living will prescribing continued treat-
ment. The willingness to continue treatment does not reflect defer-
ence to the patient's claimed privacy right as much as to existing
legal definitions of death, which require that the patient be regarded
as alive.
A state may, however, resist a living will that provides for the
opposite-that the patient be regarded as dead. In doing so, states,
as they have in all of the contested right-to-die cases involving per-
manent unconsciousness, would likely rely on the interests in pre-
serving life and in preventing suicide.3 43 This, however, is obvious
341 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 5, at 195-96 ("[U]se of social resources to sustain
the permanently unconscious is irrational and, it could be argued, poor medical practice
as well, if there are other, less costly ways of dealing humanely with the family's denial."
Id at 196); Goldberg, supra note 252, at 1246-47. Estimates of the money costs of main-
taining a permanently unconscious patient vary from $50 to $1000 a day. Cranford,
supra note 4, at 31-32; DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14,
at 185 n.35. The average monthly cost of Nancy Cruzan's care was $8844. Cruzan, Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of The American Academy of Medical Ethics in Support of Respon-
dents (appendix A) (letter from Donald Lamkins, Administrator of the Missouri
Rehabilitation Center, Aug. 10, 1989).
342 See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword-"
Unconstitutional Conditions: State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988);
McConnell, supra note 312; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989). Even assuming that the state would otherwise have an obligation to
subsidize the patient's exercise of her right to freely exercise her definition of death, the
enormity of the cost surely has some relevance. Of course, there is law to the effect that
fundamental constitutional liberties do not yield to mere cost considerations. E.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-89 (1973) (plurality opinion); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 655 (1972); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Perhaps,
though, the cost argument could be made more compelling by focusing not on cost itself
but on opportunity cost-not on the dollars spent but on what else those dollars can
buy. It might be argued that in a time of scarcity, the devotion of medical resources to
the permanently unconscious means the effective withdrawal of those resources from
others standing to benefit more clearly. A respirator given to a permanently uncon-
scious patient might mean that a prematurely born infant with respiratory distress syn-
drome must do without. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 40, at 188-89 ("An
irresponsible stewardship of society's resources can occur when a permanently uncon-
scious patient is given care that precludes the treatment of others who would be helped
far more than the unconscious patient.").
343 Though they amount to the same thing, these are two of the interests most fre-
quently cited in the right-to-die cases as competing with a patient's right to refuse treat-
ment. See, e.g., Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986)
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question-begging. If a person has a constitutional right to decide
whether she should be regarded as dead in the event of permanent
unconsciousness, the state may not defeat this right by asserting that
a permanently unconscious patient is alive.
Wholly apart from its own judgment about whether such bio-
logical life constitutes life or personhood, states might claim an in-
terest in preserving the biological life of the patient. Four such
interests suggest themselves as possibilities. First, states can claim
an interest in preserving the patient's biological life to preserve or-
gans for transplantation. 344 Here states would not really be re-
sisting the conclusion that the patient is dead but instead would be
asserting an interest in disposing of parts of a concededly dead pa-
tient's body.345 Second, states might claim an interest in preserving
the patient's biological life when close family members regard the
patient as alive and want treatment continued. This kind of case,
which may involve a competition between the patient's and the fam-
ily's constitutional rights, is discussed in the margin.3 46
The third potential interest, which is likewise unrelated to the
state's own judgment about whether the patient is alive or dead, is
that of protecting the patient from a past decision which might well
not correspond with what she would decide in her current state. In
(citing cases). The other two are the interests in protecting third parties and in main-
taining the integrity of the medical professsion. Id.
344 For an argument that the Constitution prohibits the state from taking a cadaver's
organ without the prior person's consent, see Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis
Eyes" Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1990). But see Robertson, supra note 5, at 1171-72 n.121
(citing cases unholding the constitutionality of laws allowing postmortem use of a de-
ceased's eyes, even in the absence of familial consent).
345 Cases in which a permanently unconscious person is pregnant furnish an analo-
gous situation. See DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 14, at
184 n.33.
346 If one rejects the free exercise view of privacy and instead views constitutional
privacy as organized around life-altering decisions, no conflict between constitutional
claims of the patient and the family can arise. The patient would have no constitutional
claim even when there is a living will. See supra Part II.B.l.b(ii). Because the resolution
of the patient's status has life-altering consequences for family members who remain
close, the family has a constitutional right at stake. See supra Part II.B.2. The family
should thus prevail.
The result would seem to be just as easy if one accepts the free exercise view of
privacy and rejects the alternative life-altering decision view. When the patient has a
living will, the patient, through that will, would have a constitutional right to resolve the
essentially religious question of the status of her permanent unconsciousness. The
terms of the living will should prevail over any conflicting desires on the part of the
family. Yet a strong argument exists for deferring to the family when it disagrees with
the terms of the patient's living will. At least when the living will effectively specifies that
the patient should be regarded as dead, the will almost always will have been motivated
by a desire not to burden family members. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
Because the will's overriding concern lies with the welfare of the family, it makes sense
to defer to the family's view that the patient is not a burden and that life-support ought
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contrast with the two interests mentioned above, this interest would
exist in all cases. A similar interest is often advanced in support of
prohibitions against suicide. The fact that many persons who un-
successfully attempt suicide never try again arguably shows that a
current desire to commit suicide does not mean that this desire will
persist into the future. 47 Prohibitions against suicide are accord-
ingly justified as necessary to protect the future person from the
transient desires of the current person. 48 Using a similar line of
reasoning, Rebecca Dresser argues that courts should refrain from
enforcing living wills to protect an incompetent patient, the current
person, from the decisions made by the patient in his formerly com-
petent state, the past person.3 49 But even if this argument works for
suicide or for incompetent conscious patients, it fails respecting the
permanently unconscious. Given that a permanently unconscious
patient has no experience and never will, there are no consequences
to protect the current person from. The past person cannot possi-
bly inflict injury on the current person.
to continue. This disposition does not really resolve a conflict between the living will
and the family's views; it simply enforces the will's most basic intent.
Of course, when the patient lacks a living will, the outcome is clear: The patient has
no constitutional right at stake, close family members do, and the family must thus pre-
vail.
In all of these situations, the Constitution dictates the outcome and the state has no
real discretion. The state has discretion, however, when no constitutional claims may be
validly asserted. Under the life-altering decisions view of privacy, such a situation arises
when the family members do not remain in dose contact with the patient and thus the
contentof their daily lives is not occupied with the consequences of the patient's condi-
tion. Because no constitutional rights are involved in this situation, statutory and com-
mon-law definitions of death may dictate the outcome.
347 See Richard B. Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, in ETmicAL ISSUES IN
DEATH AND DYING, supra note 28, at 122, 129-32 (discussing reasons why a desire to
commit suicide may be transient).
348 This is referred to as the paternalistic position. See ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND
DYING, supra note 28, at 91-92. For a discussion of paternalism generally and in the
context of past and future selves, see Feinberg, supra note 180, at 457-61, 475-83. See
also REIMAN, supra note 48, at 161-63 (discussing generally how paternalism might be
reconciled with a respect for a person's autonomy).
349 Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHio ST. L.J. 425, 431-34 (1990)
("By honoring [the] patient's living will, the law elevates the interests of the competent
person in controlling her future care .. "). Although Dresser would not have courts
enforce a permanently unconscious patient's living will, she would have them permit the
cessation of treatment for other reasons. Id at 427-29.
Dresser's contention that a formerly conscious person may in effect be a different
person than the current incompetent person is drawn from the philosopher Derek
Parfit's view of the self. According to Parfit, what we call the "self" is a constellation of
interests, beliefs, memories, and values in a particular segment of time. Personal iden-
tity presumes some reasonable psychological continuity of self over time. Parfit con-
tends that a fully competent person may readily be seen as a different person from the
one she was ten years ago. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 204-08, 223-26, 327-
29 (1984).
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Fourth, states may assert an interest in ensuring that the patient
is, in fact, permanently unconscious. In contrast with the preceding
three interests, this interest is both generally applicable and sub-
stantial. It is substantial because when the patient is not permanently
unconscious, a significantly different constellation of countervailing
interests exists. Because the patient would have some chance of at
least partial recovery, the interest in protecting the patient's future
self from his past self gains plausibility. Troubling quality of life
issues also begin to surface. The interest in making sure that the
patient is permanently unconscious would justify the imposition of
certain procedural requirements. It would support, for example, a
requirement that more than one physician concur in a diagnosis of
permanent unconsciousness35 0 or that this issue be litigated in an
adversarial setting.3 5' It would also support imposition of a de-
manding burden of persuasion. But this interest would not support
a total ban against enforcement of a living will. As shown in Part I,
permanent unconsciousness can sometimes be established with any
degree of certainty a state might reasonably demand.
In sum, when a permanently unconscious patient has a living
will effectively providing that she be treated as dead and treatment
stopped, countervailing government interests may justify condition-
ing the enforcement of the will on compliance with certain proce-
dural requirements. These would be aimed at ensuring that the
patient's unconsciousness is truly permanent. In rare cases, states
may have other interests justifying a refusal to enforce the will. No
substantial government interest, however, supports an across-the-
board refusal to enforce such wills.
b. Interests Pertaining to a Refusal to Honor the Decision of Close
Family Members
What about the more frequent cases in which the patient has no
living will and close family members assert their own privacy right to
declare the patient dead and have treatment stopped? For the most
350 See, e.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984) (attending physician and
two other disinterested physicians must concur in diagnosis of permanent unconscious-
ness); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (Wash. 1983) (requiring "unanimous concur-
rence of a prognosis board" that patient is incurable before withdrawing life support);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984)
("primary treating physician must certify that the patient is in a permanent vegetative
state [and] ... [t]his certification should be concurred in by at least two other physicians
with specialities relevant to the patient's condition"); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447-48
(N.J. 1987) (diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness must be confirmed by "hospital
prognosis committee").
35' Cf Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
433-35 (Mass. 1977) (question of withholding treatment from incompetent patients
must always be presented to probate court for adversarial hearing).
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part, the constellation of interests here is no different. States may
assert interests in ensuring the permanence of the patient's uncon-
sciousness, in preserving biological activity to facilitate organ trans-
plantation, and possibly in resolving conflicts between the patient's
living will and the family's desires. These interests justify the impo-
sition of procedural requirements promoting a reliable assessment
of the patient's prognosis. But in most situations they do not justify
a refusal to defer to the family's wishes when the permanence of the
patient's unconsciousness is reliably established.
In addition to these interests, states may also have an interest in
ensuring that the family's decision represents what the patient
would decide if she could. The Justices in Cruzan and the state
courts in the other right-to-die cases describe this interest as that of
guarding against the danger of "abuse," that is, the danger that the
family will be guided by its own interests rather than the
patient's.35 2
Despite its prominence in the conventional way of thinking, this
government objective can be accorded no weight. Under the analy-
sis proposed here, the family is not acting as a surrogate deci-
sionmaker for the patient; it is asserting its own privacy right. It is
therefore appropriate that family members take into account their
own interests. The patient has ceased to have any.
4. Implications: Beyond Permanent Unconsciousness
It is time to reckon with the full implications of Parts I and II.
These may appear to be in tension. Part I yields a narrow conclu-
sion: Patients permanently lacking consciousness ought to be
regarded as dead, while patients retaining a capacity for con-
sciousness, but lacking higher-order capacities such as for memory
or ratiocination, should be regarded as alive. In contrast, the consti-
tutional analysis proposed in Part II appears to support conclusions
that are far broader. Part II maintains that the definition of death is
a quintessentially religious question that nonbelievers and believers
alike have a presumptive First Amendment right to resolve in their
thoughts and in their lives.
Does this not mean that, in addition to allowing Part I's con-
sciousness-based definition of death to override the existing whole-
brain formulation, still other definitions may also override this for-
mulation? Could not, for example, a mentally competent
quadriplegic who believes that physical mobility is an essential in-
gredient to any truly human life declare herself dead and claim a
right to "exercise" this view by having life-support terminated?
352 See supra notes 12-13, 169-70.
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Surely it cannot be maintained that responses to the quintessentially
religious question of how one defines death must be denied pre-
sumptive constitutional protection simply because of their failure to
conform with the analysis set forth in Part I.
In reality, Part II's implications are considerably less sweeping
than they might first appear. Just as under the conventional view
religious beliefs qualify for presumptive free exercise protection
only if they are sincere, the view urged here would protect only re-
sponses sincerely addressed to a quintessentially religous question.
The view that a fully competent person is "dead" is, quite plainly,
not a sincere response to the proper definition of death. One can
sincerely take the position that in certain circumstances a competent
person may waive or override her right to life. Yet the question of
whether and when such a right may be waived or overridden is quite
different from the one the definition of death raises-whether such a
right exists in the first instance.
If the constitutional analysis proposed here offers no support to
a competent person's wish to terminate life-support or commit sui-
cide, what about conscious, but incompetent patients? Under some
sincerely held definitions of death, such patients may be regarded as
dead. Although Part I argued that it is a mistake to incorporate
higher-order capacities such as those for moral choice' and self-con-
sciousness into one's definition of life and death, definitions incor-
porating such capacities constitute sincere responses to the question
at hand. Persons holding such definitions thus have a presumptive
First Amendment right to freely exercise them.
But this right is only presumptive and the countervailing state
interests are different and stronger than those pertaining to the ex-
ercise of the consciousness-based definition proposed in Part I. Be-
cause conscious patients are capable of having present interests, the
state has an interest in insuring that any decision conforms to the
patient's own authentic choices and best interests. This interest
would justify a requirement that the patient have clearly expressed a
definition of death conflicting with the state's own definition. In
some circumstances, it might justify the state overriding such a
clearly expressed choice. It is not at all clear that conscious, incom-
petent patients would very often be able to overcome these state
interests.
In addition, unlike cases involving permanent unconsciousness,
the family could not claim its own constitutional right to resolve the
status of a conscious, incompetent patient. Roe implies that a per-
son intensely affected by an insentient being who lacks the capacity
for having present interests may resolve that being's contested sta-
tus. It does not imply that a person may resolve the contested status
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of a sentient human being who presently has interests. Because
conscious, incompetent patients have interests, only they, not their
family members, have a presumptive right to resolve their status.
Finally, consider cases involving artificially maintained, brain-
dead patients. Although such patients satisfy the existing whole-
brain definition of death, the analysis proposed here would give
such patients (through a living will or their families) a presumptive
right to exercise a competing definition treating such patients as
alive. As long as the state's resources are not spent to maintain the
patient, the state generally will not be able to demonstrate any over-
riding interest. Whether the state must spend its own resources to
allow the patient or her family to freely exercise competing defini-
tions of death raises delicate and controversial questions addressed
by the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions. '" 3 5 3
Despite the apparent tension between them, the implications of
Parts I and II are in fact mutually reinforcing. Part I shows that
although we ought to expand our definition of death to include the
permanently unconscious, any attempt to expand the definition
further to include conscious, incompetent patients encounters
profound difficulty. Part II shows that persons have a presumptive
right to exercise a definition of death that conflicts with the existing
whole-brain standard found in existing law. Though this right
seemingly comprehends many disparate alternative definitions, only
the consciousness-based definition proposed in Part I trumps ex-
isting definitions unproblematically.
Parts I and II are thus in harmony in showing permanent un-
consciousness to be a clear case, both as a matter of the philosophi-
cal definition of death and as a matter of constitutional law. They
highlight the differences between permanently unconscious pa-
tients, conscious but incompetent patients, and fully conscious
patients. In so doing, they provide a useful antidote to the conven-
tional thinking, which, through its monolithic focus on patient au-
tonomy, blurs these important distinctions.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes that we alter our perspective on the legal
plight of the permanently unconscious in two basic respects. To be-
gin, it urges that the legal issue be framed quite differently than it
has been in the past. The conventional view, found in the Justices'
opinions in Cruzan and in the numerous state court cases involving
permanently unconscious patients, defines the overriding issues as
whether a still alive, incompetent patient has a constitutional right
353 See supra note 342.
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to the withdrawal of life-saving medical treatment and, if so, how
that right may be exercised. According to this Article, the issue is
better conceived as involving who has the right to decide whether a
permanently unconscious patient ought to be regarded as dead.
Casting the issue in these terms facilitates a more realistic anal-
ysis by forcing one to directly confront the reality of the patient's
permanent unconsciousness. First, it avoids the uncritical attribu-
tion of a right of autonomy to a patient who can no longer experi-
ence the world, much less make choices. The conventional view's
exclusive focus on patient's wishes has the tragic consequence of
obscuring and treating as impermissible the interests genuinely at
stake, those of the family. The analysis proposed here, in contrast,
focuses attention on the issues that really matter: the permanence
of patient's unconsciousness and, in the absence of a living will, the
desires of close family members.354
Second, framing the issue as whether a permanently uncon-
scious patient is alive reveals important differences among right-to-
die cases that the conventional view obscures. With its emphasis on
autonomy, that view implies that the easiest cases are those involv-
ing fully competent patients. It lumps cases involving permanent
unconsciousness together with those involving conscious, incompe-
tent patients, treating them as equally problematic due to the diffi-
culty of reliably ascertaining an incompetent patient's desires. Once
the issues are formulated in the manner this Article proposes, a con-
siderably different picture emerges. This formulation shows that
cases involving permanent unconsciousness are the easiest cases,
not among the hardest. It reveals that, compared with those involv-
ing permanent unconsciousness, cases involving fully competent
persons are less, not more, justifiable candidates for recognition of a
right-to-die. Finally, this Article's formulation of the issue exposes
the truly immense difficulties of making decisions respecting con-
scious, incompetent patients.
This Article proposes another fundamental revision in our
thinking about the permanently unconscious. It suggests a funda-
mental reformulation of the relevant substantive law, the constitu-
tional doctrines of privacy and free exercise of religion. This
354 It is true that a permanently unconscious patient may be deemed to have an
interest in the enforcement of a living will. But this interest exists only because the en-
forcement or nonenforcement of such wills affects the welfare of other, conscious per-
sons intensely concerned with how they will be treated in the event of permanent
unconsciousness. Absent a living will, there is no reason to care about the patient's
supposed wishes. See supra Part II.B.l.a. Olick, supra note 100 (discussing recent New
Jersey statute recognizing a personal religious exemption from the legal whole-brain
criterion of death for those who reject that criterion of death in favor of the traditional
heart-lung criteria).
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reformulation recognizes that responses to the fundamental ques-
tions of human existence can be "religious" whether or not they
presume the existence of a "God." It also furnishes textual mooring
for the right of privacy. Constitutional privacy, reconceived as an
aspect of a transformed understanding of the Free Exercise Clause,
requires the enforcement of a permanently unconscious patient's
living will. In the absence of such a will, it also gives close family
members a right to decide how the patient's death should be
defined.
The analysis proposed here might well influence the evolving
views of state lawmakers and courts.355 Of course, in the immediate
future the Supreme Court will neither reformulate the legal issues
raised by permanent unconsciousness nor reshape the doctrines of
constitutional privacy and free exercise of religion. Yet legal schol-
arship should not bind itself slavishly to what the Court has now
done or is soon likely to do, praising, criticizing, and urging as befits
the author's perspective. In a time when the Court is shrinking the
Constitution's meaning and expanding the spheres of life governed
by political majorities,3 56 the articulation of alternative constitu-
355 Cf State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8-11 (Minn. 1990) (responding to
Supreme Court's directive to reconsider free exercise claim in light of Employment Div.
Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), by analyzing case under state
constitution and effectively rejecting Smith); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039 & n.5
(Miss. 1985) (basing decision upholding free exercise claim independently on the state
constitution, declaring, "[I]n this state we take seriously the right to the free exercise of
religion."); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985) (state constitutional right of privacy is "much broader in scope than that of the
Federal Constitution").
The Justices in Cruzan encouraged states to fashion their own responses to the
plight of permanently unconscious patients. The majority opinion noted that "[s]tate
courts have available to them for decision a number of sources-state constitutions, stat-
utes, and common law-which are not available to us." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990). Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, spoke
approvingly of the trend toward adoption of surrogate decisionmaking procedures as a
matter of state law. Id. at 2857-58. Justice Scalia's concurrence asserted that "the Con-
stitution says nothing about the matter." Id at 2859. In fact, since the Cruzan decision,
state courts and lawmakers have sought to facilitate efforts to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment from the permanently unconscious.
Despite the Justices' overriding intention to give state courts and lawmakers great
freedom, Cruzan might be viewed as precluding states from concluding as a matter of
their own law that family members may decide based on their own interests whether treat-
ment should be withdrawn from a permanently unconscious loved one. A majority of
the Justices appeared to recognize a federal constitutional right on the part of an incom-
petent patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. See supra note 201. This con-
clusion might be viewed as implying that family members cannot possess their own,
potentially competing right to decide how the patient should be treated and regarded.
This possible implication of the Cruzan decision, however, has limited practical signifi-
cance. If the reported decisions are any guide, the family's wishes virtually always corre-
spond with those expressed by the patient before becoming unconscious.
356 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 43
(1989).
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tional visions assumes special importance. Without such vision, the
quality of our constitutional discourse threatens to become as su-
perficial as our political discourse. Nowhere is this more true than
in the areas of privacy and free exercise.3 57 There is a real danger
that these once vibrant constitutional ideals will become historical
curiousities should the Court's increasingly impoverished under-
standing of them go unchallenged.
357 Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division
of Employment v. Smith, a Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 388 (1991) (free exercise); McConnell, supra note 324, at 331 n.14 ("The emerging
position among the conservatives on the Court seems to be to take the narrowest plausi-
ble view of both religion clauses.").
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